> On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:15, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson <[email protected] > <javascript:>> a écrit : > > > On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote: >>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> > Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must >>> > exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed >>> > by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly >>> > argued. What's the argument for such a claim? >>> >>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite >>> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE >>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite >>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in >>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see such >>> a thing. >>> >>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of UNcountable >>> universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming into >>> existence forever and ever, without any repeats. Think of the number of >>> points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a >>> different universe. AG >> >> >> Tegmark missed this? >> >> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather good >> argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable >> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum >> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the measure >> can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the least. >> >> What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which I >> haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any >> repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG > > > I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist, > indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the > difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate, > which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case. > > I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they occur, > just assertions from the usual suspects. AG > > Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in 1920x1080 pixels then > in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more "precision", > once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at which your > consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation thant the ones > at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there are an infinity of > them) does not make any difference, but there are an infinity of them (at the > correct level and below it). > > Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive integers, > and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, such as a > continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. No matter how > many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity for any > repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any universe. AG
There is no repeat of universe, only of computations. The universe (the physical universe) is a statistical illusion/appearance from within arithmetic (assuming mechanism, and doing the reasoning: it is NOT obvious, the math relies on Gödel and many others). Once you understand that elementary arithmetic RUN all computations, already the idea of a physical ontological universe seems quite speculative. Now some still believe that the physical universe is brought by one computation, but that too does not make sense, unless your brain. Is really the entire physical universe. If not, the physical reality is brought by a relative measure on all computations (a concept making sense with the Church-Turing thesis). Bruno > > > >> >> As to your general theory, that with mechanism (replacing brains and >> presumably consciousness, with digital copies), computability, and the >> natural numbers, we can derive the physical universe we observe. This is >> your theory, isn't it? > > It is a theorem. Not a theory. My theory is not mine. It is usually > attributed to Descartes, and revised by Turing in the digital frame. > > >> If so, I just don't see it as explanatory. AG > > It explains many things, some trivially, like why physics seems so much > mathematical. But it is also the only theory that I know which explains why > there is a physical universe, instead of nothing. Then I found the > “many-histories” and its quantum logic by myself well before I realise that > the physicists were already there. In fact even when I studied quantum > mechanics, due to the collapse, I taught that QM was refuting mechanism. Only > by reading Everett will I realise that QM is an incredible confirmation of > the most startling (and shocking I guess) aspect of mechanism: that we are > multiplied "all the times”, and that physics is “only” a statistics on all > relative computations (“seen from inside”). > > Comare the three theory of physics: > > Copenhagen: > SWE + unintelligible dualist theory of mind on which nobody agree > > Everett > SWE + mechanism > > Your servitor > Mechanism. > > Not only Mechanism explains the quanta (qualitatively and quantatitavely) but > it explains the qualia, and protect consciousness and (first) person of the > materialist velleity to dismiss them. > > Bruno > > > > >>> Your closest identical copy is 10^12 light years away. About 10^76 light >>> years away there is a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical to the one >>> centered here, so everything we see here during the next century will be >>> identical to those of our counterparts over there. And 10^102 light years >>> away the is a exact copy of our entire observable universe. And all this is >>> true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics >>> is correct or not, it only depends on the universe being spatially infinite. >>> >>> But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for finite >>> time, starting very small, as can be inferred from the temperature of the >>> CMBR. AG >>> >>> >>> Is there a copy of you >>> <https://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/PDF/multiverse_sciam.pdf> >>> >>> > Morevover, I don't believe a universe of finite age, such as ours which >>> > everyone more or less agrees began some 13.8 BYA, can be spatially >>> > infinite. >>> >>> I see no reason in principle why something can't be finite along one >>> dimension and infinite along another dimension. >>> >>> In general, one can of course have some dimensions finite and others >>> infinite. But if our universe is finite in time since the BB, 13.8 BY, its >>> spatial extent must be finite, since that's how long its been expanding. AG >> >> I agree with Grayson here. (Accepting a lot of premises, like the BB is the >> beginning of the physical reality, which I doubt). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> John K Clark >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] <>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5a270b8e-3bf2-4d34-b0e7-4e0daa3cebce%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5a270b8e-3bf2-4d34-b0e7-4e0daa3cebce%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e558a41c-3784-4298-80be-52a5e6f45f7f%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e558a41c-3784-4298-80be-52a5e6f45f7f%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7a2a5811-8c93-48a9-a64d-932ea16a4d70%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7a2a5811-8c93-48a9-a64d-932ea16a4d70%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger > Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b932b03e-bd1c-404c-908b-18be9ad0cc33%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b932b03e-bd1c-404c-908b-18be9ad0cc33%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/66EA6757-F2CE-4696-9B7E-16A004C1FB19%40ulb.ac.be.
