> On 20 Sep 2019, at 05:29, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 9/19/2019 4:42 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: >> >> >> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 12:52:03 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 9/19/2019 2:45 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: >> > Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy, velocity, >> > acceleration, space, time, entropy? Without them, we simply couldn't >> > do physics. Here, as in your MW obsession, you seem opaque to reality. AG >> >> Sure. But ultimately they are all grounded in ostensive definitions. >> >> Brent >> >> Obstensively, like imagining anything like an elephant exists? But what and >> how is this imagining helpful in knowing what consciousness us, as compared >> to specific definitions used in physics as previously indicated? AG > > Whether it's helpful or not, it's the basis we have to go on. Bruno wants to > define consciousness as whatever is self-referential,
Not 3p self-referential (that is []p), but very importantly it is 1p-self-referential. Consciousness is first person knowledge, with not definable self, but still existing. My theory of consciousness is basically the standard one found by Theaetetus. Incompleteness literally imposed it once we bet on mechanism. > because he can prove arithmetic is self-referential (given the right coding). > But I've seen billboards that are self-referential, so I don't think that's > a good definition. If the billboard is Turing universal, it will work. And the main point is that this theory of consciousness implies the laws of physics, and implies already the quantum formalism and its many-histories structuration. > And even if it's true that consciousness if self-referential (I have my > doubts), Here there is a difficulty. The consciousness of the universal machine lack full self-reference power, and is not subjectively self-referential. Only the Löbian machine get aware of the self-reference,ntial aspect of consciousness, but it makes sense to say that this is already a delusion. The induction axioms belongs already in the phenomenology, somehow. > so what? It's doesn't see that essential to consciousness, since I very > rarely refer to my consciousness. It is normal. It has to be like that. When the worm is suffering, he is not aware of the self-reference, but we, from outside can bet that the worm’s suffering is the worms’ one, like you say “my consciousness” (a symptom that you are a Löbian machine). Consciousness can be meta-defined in many ways. It is what we know the best, and the only thing we can be sure of, yet it is not definable with any words, and not identifiable with anything describable in the third person way. That is something that consciousness has in common with god (and that’w why the idealist sometimes want to assume consciousness as the primitive thing, but with mechanism, consciousness is just a relative property of numbers with respect to their infinitely many computational histories. Unfortunately, most people (especially since the closure of Plato’s academy) confuse first person notion and third person notion, like Penrose and Lucas who use Gödel against mechanism, but confuse []p and ([]p & p). Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c11dd3d1-97b4-6acb-3bea-3a3ce34cf538%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c11dd3d1-97b4-6acb-3bea-3a3ce34cf538%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F3C38C8B-9636-4C7E-AAC2-6AE4F1FDC7EC%40ulb.ac.be.
