On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 9:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: >> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system >> > with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or >> > perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake >> > from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening >> > from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge >> > stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. >> >> Define in terms of what? We define it ostensively. How would it help >> to define it in words? >> >> Brent >> > > I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define > "consciousness”. > > > Not we don”t have a definition of consciousness, but for those who claim > to not know, I suggest to ask their dentist to not use anesthetiser, and > they will have a pretty good idea of what is it to be like having > consciousness. Consciousness is what gives sense to pain, pleasure, > knowledge, etc. >
I know I have consciousness. That's not the issue. What I don't know is how it can exist or the conditions for its existence. I also know that some chemicals can dramatically alter consciousness, and in some cases destroy it absolutely. So its material basis seems pretty firm. Also, more fundamentally, I find your Platonic theory of numbers on dubious grounds. Numbers can easily be inferred from observations of the physical world, whereas the reverse Platonic claim is hugely difficult if not impossible. I see a single object, from which I conceive "1". I see another indentical object and I conceive "2". And so forth. I also dispute your claim that the successor function or principle is derivable independent of the physical world, which you see as illusional. The successor principle as *codified* in Peano's postulates seems a simply inference from observations, that is, an extension of them. It's not sometime inherently mysterious dependent on what Godel proved. Can you say exactly, in a few words, why Godel is relevant to any of this? AG > In terms of what? > > With mechanism, we can define knowledge by the conjunction-onjction of > belief and truth. For belief, we can use Gödel’s definition in elementary > arithmetic (where you assume x + 0 = x, & Co.), fortieth you can study > Tarski theory of truth, it quite enough, and yes, tarski is the one showing > that the arithmetical truth cannot be defined by machines, or actually, > even by most non-mechanical entities too, with some exception. > > Presumably it's properties, as we define other entities in physics, such > as the electron. > > You cannot use 3p notions to define consciousness which is a pure 1p > notion. > (Eventually the physical will appear as a 1p-plural notion, but that’s for > later). > I am merely stating that an electron is defined by its measured properties which anyone, with sufficient effort, can confirm. I don't see that 1p or 3p has anything to do with this, other than to obfuscate. AG > Who was the SC justice who said you know pornography when you see it, but > you can't define it prior to the observation? So far, the most we can say > about consciousness, that is, its properties, is that it's > self-referential. AG > > > Indeed, but it has two main level: the simple non reflexive consciousness, > which is implicitly self-referential, and the consciousness of the Löbian > machine (which are not just universal, they know that they are universal) > where the self-reference is made explicit by the machine. It has about the > difference between the consciousness of low animals compared to higher > vertebrate, although I suspect the cuttlefish and some others invertebrate > to have it too. > > Bruno > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2fe285a1-8ac7-4d30-9ef4-7f381d1297de%40googlegroups.com.
