> On 20 Sep 2019, at 09:19, spudboy100 via Everything List 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> At this point, I'd settle for mere intelligence that helps solve human 
> problems as opposed to the "hard" Chalmers Question. 

Chalmers “hard problem” is just a materialist reformulation of the well known, 
by philosopher of mind and theologian, mind-body problem.

For some humans, death or the idea of death is a problem, which plays a big 
role in our history, but of course, you might not be interested in that human 
problem or type of human problem. That’s OK, but I am not sure we ever discuss 
here of human problem, we just try to figure out what is happening here and 
now, and why …

Bruno 



> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
> To: everything-list <[email protected]>
> Sent: Thu, Sep 19, 2019 9:19 am
> Subject: Re: Why Consciousness Cannot Be Algorithmic
> 
> 
>> On 17 Sep 2019, at 22:23, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Premise-wise, Consciousness could indeed be algorithmic, and thus emergent. 
>> In other words baked-in. 
>> View this video link and despair puny humans! 
>> https://openai.com/blog/emergent-tool-use/ 
>> <https://openai.com/blog/emergent-tool-use/>
> 
> 
> Consciousness cannot be algorithmic if Mechanism is true, because it relies 
> on the notion of truth, which is not just not algorithmic, but is not even 
> definable.
> 
> Consciousness is related to the semantic of some program observing itself, 
> and no program can defined its own semantic once he has enough arithmetical 
> belief.
> 
> Sometimes “mechanism” is described as a theory in which consciousness is 
> algorithmic, and that is OK for an oversimplified description of mechanism, 
> but at some point we have to be more precise to avoid contradictions and some 
> nonsense.
> 
> Most attribute of a program are not algorithmic.
> 
> A program can compute the factorial function. That is algorithmic. But the 
> attribute “being a program computing the factorial function” is not 
> algorithmic.
> 
> A total (everywhere defined) program is an algorithm, which stops on all 
> inputs. But being a program computing a total function, or emulating total 
> program is NOT algorithmic at all. It is Pi_2-complete, which is far beyond 
> what is emulable or definable by the partial computable function which does 
> not leave the sigma_1 reality.
> 
> In practice, that is not important, but it is crucial for handling the 
> mind-body problem when we assume mechanism.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: John Clark <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
>> To: everything-list <[email protected] 
>> <mailto:[email protected]>>
>> Sent: Tue, Sep 17, 2019 3:55 pm
>> Subject: Re: Why Consciousness Cannot Be Algorithmic
>> 
>> On Tue, Sep 17, 2019 at 9:10 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] 
>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>> 
>> >>I think the guy is a bit of an idiot. He starts off badly by equating 
>> >>intelligence and consciousness and then it gets worse when he  defines the 
>> >>personal pronoun "I" by what will happen in the future rather than what 
>> >>actually happened in the past. And that was all in the first paragraph, I 
>> >>didn't read any further.  
>>  
>> > But “I” is used in statement concerning the future, or you could not say 
>> > “I didn’t read any further”.
>> 
>> "Did" is the PAST tense form of "do". However personal pronouns are 
>> perfectly fine and everybody uses them a thousand times a day, so it would 
>> be OK to say "I will not read him in the future" UNLESS:
>> 1) The statement was NOT made in our everyday world where personal pronoun 
>> duplicating machines don't exist yet, or...
>> 2) The personal pronoun was used in a thought experiment that was trying to 
>> illustrate a point about existentialism and the fundamental nature of 
>> personal identity.
>> 
>>  John K Clark
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