> On 16 Oct 2019, at 15:45, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, October 16, 2019 at 7:23:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 14 Oct 2019, at 20:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> Part of the dislike of the MWI is that its proponents assume a purity that >> is not an evident virtue of the intepretation. For example, interpreting >> the squared amplitudes as probabilities seems to be assumed, along with the >> existence of the preferred basis in which the amplitudes are defined. >> Together these are almost the same as CI. If you ask "probabilities of >> what?" in MWI the answer can't be probability of existing because MWI has >> committed to all solutions, however improbable, existing. So it becomes >> probability of finding yourself in a particular world...which depends on a >> theory of consciousness and seems to regress to von Neumann and Wigner. > > Ot to Mechanism, as Everett already suggested. > > >> >> Zurek's envariance attempts to answer these questions and provide a >> justification for preferred bases and what probability refers to. But >> notice that to the extent he succeeds he is justifying taking a simple >> probabilistic view and saying one of those preferred states happens and the >> others don’t. > > The others happen too, but are not suited for mechanism to develop. There is > no preferred base in the MWI, but only those on which consciousness can > stabilise and allow first person plural reality to make sense can be seen by > machine. > > With Everett, quantum mechanics becomes exactly the physics expected from > mechanism: a statistics on relative indexical first person (plural) > experience. > > Bruno > > PS I agree that hidden variable reintroduces 3p indeterminacy, non locality, > or threaten physical realism (which is impose by mechanism, btw). Also, > making the SWE non linear demolish the QM prediction, without making the > “parallel histories” disappearing. According to Steve Weinberg, it allows > interaction in between the “parallel” branches of the superposition, and > eventually contradict both thermodynamic and special relativity. > > > > In this theory, each world branch would have its own population of > consciousnesses, branched off from a parent world, a multiplicity of selves: > Bruno-.0, then Bruno-0.0, Bruno-0.1, Bruno-0.00, Bruno-0.10, Bruno-0.01, > Bruno-0.11, ... no one self anymore.
No one unique, or no one one with a unique life. Yes. It is a consequence of mechanism, but it it is not clear to me if a non mechanist theory can evacuate easily this self-multiplication, except by adding some absolute unicity axiom. But how to test it? Such theory would make both Mechanism wrong, and Quantum Mechanics wrong. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d54f9a54-42d1-4127-a594-4b4f54100505%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d54f9a54-42d1-4127-a594-4b4f54100505%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/68EF7612-9948-4267-8417-45C0471EE4E0%40ulb.ac.be.
