On Monday, January 6, 2020 at 5:03:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 31 Dec 2019, at 21:06, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>>
> wrote:
>
>
> from ‘The Self’ – Galen Strawson, Journal of Consciousness Studies (1997)
> <https://www.academia.edu/18112359/_The_Self_>
>
>
> ...
>
> Materialism and Mechanism are logically incompatible. You don’t need the
> Movie-Graph Argument to understand this. If matter plays a role in
> consciousness, it has to have a non computable and non first person
> recoverable role, and mechanism has to be false, but there are no evidence
> for that. On the contrary the quantum weirdness, and consciousness/matter
> relations are well explained by mechanism, at least until now. That would
> not be the case if physics was still Newtonian.
> The universal machine has to self (or even 8) well described by the
> Theaetetus’ variant (the difference between provable(p) and (provable(p)
> and p). The first one is nameable, the second one is not.
>
> Without any evidence, it is premature to commit oneself into an ontology.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
If you take what Strawson says seriously - as he says, "physics grows
stranger by the hour" - then the language (ontology) of physics (as of
January 6, 2020) is incomplete: There are more beasts in the particle zoo [
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Particle_zoo ].
So like there's the WIMP and GIMP, there's the
CHIMP
consciousness hyper-intrinsic massless particle
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/12/21/the-neuroscientist-and-the-pea/
@philipthrift
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