On Monday, January 6, 2020 at 5:03:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 31 Dec 2019, at 21:06, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>>
> wrote:
>
>
> from ‘The Self’ – Galen Strawson, Journal of Consciousness Studies (1997)
> <https://www.academia.edu/18112359/_The_Self_>
>
>
> ...
>
> Materialism and Mechanism are logically incompatible. You don’t need the
> Movie-Graph Argument to understand this. If matter plays a role in
> consciousness, it has to have a non computable and non first person
> recoverable role, and mechanism has to be false, but there are no evidence
> for that. On the contrary the quantum weirdness, and consciousness/matter
> relations are well explained by mechanism, at least until now. That would
> not be the case if physics was still Newtonian.
> The universal machine has to self (or even 8) well described by the
> Theaetetus’ variant (the difference between provable(p) and (provable(p)
> and p). The first one is nameable, the second one is not.
>
> Without any evidence, it is premature to commit oneself into an ontology.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
If you take what Strawson says seriously - as he says, "physics grows
stranger by the hour" - then the language (ontology) of physics (as of
January 6, 2020) is incomplete: There are more beasts in the particle zoo [
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Particle_zoo ].
So like there's the WIMP and GIMP, there's the
CHIMP
consciousness hyper-intrinsic massless particle
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/12/21/the-neuroscientist-and-the-pea/
@philipthrift
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3519fb18-688e-44cb-ad38-ee8b5196b6f3%40googlegroups.com.
