> On 31 Jan 2020, at 11:34, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Friday, January 31, 2020 at 4:23:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 30 Jan 2020, at 18:59, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, January 30, 2020 at 11:26:09 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 1/30/2020 1:28 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2020 at 6:17:11 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 1/29/2020 11:55 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> >>>> Now the human brain IP-power is like 10^whatever times that of a rock. >>> >>> Is it? A rock has a lot of atoms that can be a lot of states, like 1e30. >>> Maybe it has to do with connections and signals and sensors and >>> environment. Not IIT. >>> >>>> Also, a human brain has more IP-power than that of a chimp - its language >>>> ability shows that. >>> >>> And your computer has more arithmetical ability than you do. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> >>> If a rock has more information processing power than a brain, and if >>> consciousness is information processing (a lot of it) then why isn't a rock >>> conscious? >>> >>> But a rock isn't conscious! >> >> According to panpsychists (and maybe IIT) it is. >> >> Brent >> >> >> from Ph.D. Thesis - Hedda Hassel Mørch >> >> https://www.newdualism.org/papers/H.Morch/Morch-dissertation-Oslo2014.pdf >> <https://www.newdualism.org/papers/H.Morch/Morch-dissertation-Oslo2014.pdf> >> >> >> What do defenders of panpsychism normally mean when they say that everything >> is mental? It seems generally agreed upon that the “pan” of “panpsychism” >> requires that mentality is to be attributed to at least every fundamental >> and concrete thing, in addition to humans and other animals. Being concrete >> means being non-abstract, perhaps in virtue of being spatiotemporal, so >> numbers and other abstract objects are excluded from the thesis. > > This automatically makes that “panpsychism” incompatible with Mechanism. With > Mechanism, we are abstract, immaterial being. We can understand this by the > fact that in principle we can change our body for a new one every morning, > and we can download ourself on the net, etc. With Mechanism, we possess a > (local) body (emerging from infinitely many computations), and so we are not > that body: we possess it like we can possess a bike or a car. Advantage: we > can save our soul on an hard-disk. Problem (psychological problem for some): > we are duplicable, and duplicated by huge number (perhaps transfinite > cardinal) “all the time”, personal identity is an indexical illusion, physics > is reduced to arithmetic/meta-arithmetic, etc. > > > >> The fundamental concrete entities are often taken to include at least the >> ultimate particles of physics, but to exclude most ordinary objects like >> tables, chairs and rocks. >> >> Therefore, panpsychism does not require that such ordinary objects [like >> tables, chairs and rocks] have mentality > > > But then why put some consciousness in their elementary parts, and what make > a brain transporting consciousness and not a table or a chair? > > An answer would that it is the organisation of matter which counts, but then > we are back to some form of mechanism. > > > >> >> >> (as emphasized by Strawson [Realistic Monism*]. The same goes for more >> esoteric objects sometimes considered by philosophers, such as undetached >> rabbit parts or the set of my nose and the planet Venus (however, see Goff >> (forthcoming) for an argument to the contrary). Such presumably >> non-fundamental things can be regarded as mental only in virtue of having >> mental parts or constituents, i.e., in the same indirect way that we >> ordinary think of a society of people as having mentality. >> >> * >> http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s0/Realistic-Monism---Why-Physicalism-Entails-Panpsychism-Galen-Strawson.pdf >> >> <http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s0/Realistic-Monism---Why-Physicalism-Entails-Panpsychism-Galen-Strawson.pdf> > > Physicalism entails a non Mechanist theory of Mind, but Physics never address > the problem of consciousness/matter, and is based on no evidence available. > Again, I think it is better to test simpler theory before jumping to magical > conclusion… > > I try hard to find some sense to “panpsychism” which would be coherent with > Mechanism (Darwin & Co.). The close I could imagine is that the arithmetical > truth would have some consciousness, but then it has to be something rather > weird. > > Only person are conscious. Consciousness is just knowledge, and knowledge is > just true belief. Physical consciousness is more: it is belief + truth + > consistency (that makes it “immediate” indubitable” and keep intact its > undefinability (that we feel when we introspect ourselves). > > This also has many consequences like explaining “free-will”, providing a > functional role to consciousness, and a general role in the selection of the > computational histories (but those are not related: free-will is NOT that > selection!). > > It provides also an objective theory of morality (or more general Protagorean > virtue), but the theory is “negative”. It says that it is immoral to do > moral. It explains that a religious or moral sermon leads to the contrary > effects, and explain why the institutionalisation of religion/moral leads to > Atheism and Suffering (a point rather well explained by the Marquis de Sade, > up to make him doubt at some point of atheism, as Sade realise that if the > goal is to make people suffering: the institutionalisation of religion gives > the better tool for doing this. You can recognise the laws of “Wellcome to > insecurity” by Lan Watts, but also single out by the Taoists (Lie-tseu > notably) and which all have the shape []x -> ~x. Of course in theology (G) we > have already a pretty simple solution: > > []<>t -> ~<>t > > If I prove my consistency then I am inconsistent. Consistency is a sort of > abstract ancestor of all moral virtue, and somehow, morality is related to > surviving. > > People are attached to matter, and they are right, if they want to keep up > its existence, you need to reject mechanism. But Mechanism explain both > consciousness (and qualia, …) and the “matter appearance”, > > May be if you decide that number are God’s object of thought, that is “ideal > object”, then mechanism is a panpsychism, but that does not teach us anything > new, and it is better to avoid metaphysics at the level of the numbers, given > that we are using the numbers to define all the rest and formulate the > metaphysical question. > > What *is* coherent here (not with Mechanism, but with the “fundamental > result” (that Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible), is the search for > pretty weird theory of mind, when you want keep an ontological matter). > > Bruno > > > > > > > I don't think that panpsychism is coherent with Mechanism (as I understand > your definition of Mechanism). > > And scientists seem to assign "lower-levels" of consciousness > (experientiality) to at least some non-human animals.
I tend to assume consciousness in all living being from bacteria to most higher mammals. Reading the news I get some doubt for the human though. It remains a vexing problem with mechanism to decide at which moment adding neurons/connexion (in the brain or outside, like with internet) diminishes consciousness instead of expansing it. All universal numbers “are" conscious, and indeed the unprogrammed universal numbers are the starting point of the universal consciousness flux, whose differentiation leads to the physical reality. This works, and lead to an arithmetical transparent interpretation of the Moderatus-Plotinus theory of Reality. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fe44f777-fcd9-426c-9721-e53fa501996d%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fe44f777-fcd9-426c-9721-e53fa501996d%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/34EF85A0-B9E3-4773-908E-AAC6B02909A6%40ulb.ac.be.
