> On 2 Feb 2020, at 12:32, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, February 1, 2020 at 11:42:12 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: > First, it's false. You can make it true by interpreting "can happen" to mean > "can happen according the prediction of quantum mechanics for this > situation", but then it becomes trivial. Second, it's not "at the heart of > MWI"; the trivial version is all that MWI implies. Read the first few > paragraphs of this paper: > > arXiv:quant-ph/0702121v1 13 Feb 2007 > > Brent > > In posing the question, I want to give its advocates such as Clark the > opportunity to justify the postulate. It goes way beyond the MWI and QM. > E.g., it means that if someone puts on his/her right shoe first this morning, > there must be a universe in which a copy of the person puts on his/her left > shoe first. It seems way, way over the top, but oddly many embrace it with > gusto. AG
That is already completely different, as it seems to say that everything happen with the same probability, but that is non sense, both with Mechanism (the many-worlds interpretation of arithmetic) and with Everett (the many-worlds formulation of QM). Thinking is presumably classical so when you take decision, you take the same decision in all worlds, with rare exceptions. Bruno > > > On 2/1/2020 7:48 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: >> Can anyone offer a justification for this postulate, presumably at the heart >> of the MWI? Clark? AG >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a1683342-69c3-4564-b18e-b3064f02e4c0%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a1683342-69c3-4564-b18e-b3064f02e4c0%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/81e65c04-c3c6-4cd4-97c0-c6aa370798b0%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/81e65c04-c3c6-4cd4-97c0-c6aa370798b0%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/BFB7AADA-F233-4EC8-810D-034A6C95EC0E%40ulb.ac.be.
