> On 2 Feb 2020, at 12:32, Alan Grayson <agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 1, 2020 at 11:42:12 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
> First, it's false.  You can make it true by interpreting "can happen" to mean 
> "can happen according the prediction of quantum mechanics for this 
> situation", but then it becomes trivial.  Second, it's not "at the heart of 
> MWI"; the trivial version is all that MWI implies.  Read the first few 
> paragraphs of this paper:
> 
> arXiv:quant-ph/0702121v1 13 Feb 2007
> 
> Brent
> 
> In posing the question, I want to give its advocates such as Clark the 
> opportunity to justify the postulate. It goes way beyond the MWI and QM. 
> E.g., it means that if someone puts on his/her right shoe first this morning, 
> there must be a universe in which a copy of the person puts on his/her left 
> shoe first. It seems way, way over the top, but oddly many embrace it with 
> gusto. AG 


That is already completely different, as it seems to say that everything happen 
with the same probability, but that is non sense, both with Mechanism (the 
many-worlds interpretation of arithmetic) and with Everett (the many-worlds 
formulation of QM). Thinking is presumably classical so when you take decision, 
you take the same decision in all worlds, with rare exceptions.

Bruno





> 
> 
> On 2/1/2020 7:48 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> Can anyone offer a justification for this postulate, presumably at the heart 
>> of the MWI? Clark? AG
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