> On 4 Feb 2020, at 18:08, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 6:06:05 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 3 Feb 2020, at 17:43, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, February 3, 2020 at 8:45:30 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 2 Feb 2020, at 04:48, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> Can anyone offer a justification for this postulate, presumably at the >>> heart of the MWI? Clark? AG >> >> It is a direct consequence of the assumption of mechanism, where physics >> emerge from all computations (in arithmetic). So, you don’t need to >> postulate a physical world to understand that all consistent computations >> “happens”, and Everett formulation of QM can be seen as a conformation of >> the mechanist theory of mind. >> >> A key point in both Mechanism and Everett is that although all computations >> “happens”, they do not happen relatively to each other with the same >> relative probabilities. That can be used to refute some “ethical critics” >> that some people use against Everett. >> >> Bruno >> >> So if I put on my left shoe first today, there's must be a universe in which >> I put on my right shoe first. And then there are the many ways I can tie my >> shoe laces, each resulting in more universes. This is about the most >> ridiculous model conceivable, don't ya think? Put another way, this is just >> plain dumb. AG > > The fact is that all those computations are executed in all models of > elementary arithmetic. To deny them, you need to either deny that 2+2=4 or > deny the Church-Turing thesis. > > And quantum mechanics without collapse, or just quantum field theory, > confirms this, by providing evidence that if we want the exact decimal for > the probability o find an electron at B when he starts at A, we have to sum > on all path that the electron can take for going from A to B. > > You have to assume a non-mechanist theory of mind to sustain your ontological > commitment in a primitively physical universe. > > Bruno > > It doesn't pass the smell test. AG
You need to make more specific comment. The smell test is not a criterion in science, especially in counter-intuive fundamental science. We can rely only to the facts, and the facts are that the arithmetical reality execute all computations, that a universal machine cannot distinguish a computation from a computation + an ontological commitment, and that this imposed to recover the physical laws from a statistic on all computations executed in arithmetic. To avoid this, you need to abandon the Mechanist hypothesis, which asks to abandon Descartes, Darwin, but also any current theories in physics, which all implies or use mechanism. Mechanism pass well the experimental test, and provided the only known non-magical theory of consciousness and qualia, and quanta. It is not something which should replace physics, like an idea that some people want to attribute to me. But it is something which replace physicalism in metaphysics. You need to study my older posts, or to read at the least Davis’ Dover book “computability and unsolvability” up to the chapter 4 included, which shows how to “arithmetize” (represent faithfully in arithmetic) computer science and metamathematics. My work is build on this. Bruno > > > > > >> >> >> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] <>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a1683342-69c3-4564-b18e-b3064f02e4c0%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a1683342-69c3-4564-b18e-b3064f02e4c0%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5fefeccf-64dd-49a1-ad6f-842fb0fad192%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5fefeccf-64dd-49a1-ad6f-842fb0fad192%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1a371d21-25dc-442d-a778-16e6d219206d%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1a371d21-25dc-442d-a778-16e6d219206d%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/C904C7BA-FF97-4672-9AE5-FB4409B43BE2%40ulb.ac.be.
