On Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 6:06:05 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 3 Feb 2020, at 17:43, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Monday, February 3, 2020 at 8:45:30 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 2 Feb 2020, at 04:48, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Can anyone offer a justification for this postulate, presumably at the >> heart of the MWI? Clark? AG >> >> >> It is a direct consequence of the assumption of mechanism, where physics >> emerge from all computations (in arithmetic). So, you don’t need to >> postulate a physical world to understand that all consistent computations >> “happens”, and Everett formulation of QM can be seen as a conformation of >> the mechanist theory of mind. >> >> A key point in both Mechanism and Everett is that although all >> computations “happens”, they do not happen relatively to each other with >> the same relative probabilities. That can be used to refute some “ethical >> critics” that some people use against Everett. >> >> Bruno >> >> So if I put on my left shoe first today, there's must be a universe in > which I put on my right shoe first. And then there are the many ways I can > tie my shoe laces, each resulting in more universes. This is about the most > ridiculous model conceivable, don't ya think? Put another way, this is just > plain dumb. AG > > > The fact is that all those computations are executed in all models of > elementary arithmetic. To deny them, you need to either deny that 2+2=4 or > deny the Church-Turing thesis. > > And quantum mechanics without collapse, or just quantum field theory, > confirms this, by providing evidence that if we want the exact decimal for > the probability o find an electron at B when he starts at A, we have to sum > on all path that the electron can take for going from A to B. > > You have to assume a non-mechanist theory of mind to sustain your > ontological commitment in a primitively physical universe. > > Bruno >
*It doesn't pass the smell test. AG * > > > > > > >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a1683342-69c3-4564-b18e-b3064f02e4c0%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a1683342-69c3-4564-b18e-b3064f02e4c0%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5fefeccf-64dd-49a1-ad6f-842fb0fad192%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5fefeccf-64dd-49a1-ad6f-842fb0fad192%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1a371d21-25dc-442d-a778-16e6d219206d%40googlegroups.com.
