> On 3 Feb 2020, at 17:43, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Monday, February 3, 2020 at 8:45:30 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 2 Feb 2020, at 04:48, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> Can anyone offer a justification for this postulate, presumably at the heart >> of the MWI? Clark? AG > > It is a direct consequence of the assumption of mechanism, where physics > emerge from all computations (in arithmetic). So, you don’t need to postulate > a physical world to understand that all consistent computations “happens”, > and Everett formulation of QM can be seen as a conformation of the mechanist > theory of mind. > > A key point in both Mechanism and Everett is that although all computations > “happens”, they do not happen relatively to each other with the same relative > probabilities. That can be used to refute some “ethical critics” that some > people use against Everett. > > Bruno > > So if I put on my left shoe first today, there's must be a universe in which > I put on my right shoe first. And then there are the many ways I can tie my > shoe laces, each resulting in more universes. This is about the most > ridiculous model conceivable, don't ya think? Put another way, this is just > plain dumb. AG
The fact is that all those computations are executed in all models of elementary arithmetic. To deny them, you need to either deny that 2+2=4 or deny the Church-Turing thesis. And quantum mechanics without collapse, or just quantum field theory, confirms this, by providing evidence that if we want the exact decimal for the probability o find an electron at B when he starts at A, we have to sum on all path that the electron can take for going from A to B. You have to assume a non-mechanist theory of mind to sustain your ontological commitment in a primitively physical universe. Bruno > > > >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a1683342-69c3-4564-b18e-b3064f02e4c0%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a1683342-69c3-4564-b18e-b3064f02e4c0%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5fefeccf-64dd-49a1-ad6f-842fb0fad192%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5fefeccf-64dd-49a1-ad6f-842fb0fad192%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B4BA993A-A7F2-4D49-88F9-973E630A2ACD%40ulb.ac.be.
