> On 20 Feb 2020, at 15:58, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]> > wrote: > > It is not so simple. Language as with any symbolic system is incomplete.
Yes, but with first order logic, we get at least that what is provable is satisfied in all models (soundness), and vice versa (completeness). Then incompleteness will be relative to a model (usually the (non definable) standard model intended by the theory. > So any symbolic structure will by Gödel's theorem be incapable of proving > it's consistency. Wittgenstein seemed to recognize this and backed away from > his Tractus. > > Even with basic physics we have F = ma, which has a force, a dynamical > quantity, equal to mass, kinematical, times acceleration that is geometrical. > This is a categorical confusion! Yet we appeal to this as a fundamental > principle. That has a few aspects of metaphysics. I agree. Like a guy (Teneson) argued well on this list sometimes ago, only first order logic makes a theory independent of metaphysics (except for the choice of the theory, of course, but what I mean is that the theory does not hide some metaphysics, like it is the case for second or higher order logic). Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/05687b80-bd1f-45d5-ba5f-252f2729e5df%40googlegroups.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3F6BDD9E-1FD1-4AE9-83AC-A5EBDE25033A%40ulb.ac.be.
