Wittgenstein (*language games*) like Derrida (*writing games*) [ https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Lang/LangOrba.htm <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bu.edu%2Fwcp%2FPapers%2FLang%2FLangOrba.htm&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNG_4l8ij-d6cMyYGgP99I6J07jxew> ] exposes the *ambiguity* and* underdetermination* of all languages.
Hence the end of metaphysics and the search for philosophical certainty. @philipthrift On Thursday, February 20, 2020 at 5:50:24 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote: > > Daniel Dennett said that Alan Turing gave us the computer and Wittgenstein > gave us Wittgenstein. Though to be fair Wittgenstein did point to how > language has this inherent aspect of ambiguity, though his mission was to > try to remove such ambiguities from philosophy by clarification of > language. His main enemy of course turned to metaphysics. Then through the > back door comes quantum physics that illustrates how certain concepts are > not as hard or absolute as we previously thought. There is then a tension > of sorts between Wittgenstein' insistence of complete clarity and the > necessity to appeal to heuristic concepts. > > LC > > On Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 1:43:27 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/was-wittgenstein-right/ >> >> *Was Wittgenstein Right?* >> BY PAUL HORWICH >> MARCH 3, 2013 >> >> A reminder of philosophy’s embarrassing failure, after over 2000 years, >> to settle any of its central issues. >> >> >> The singular achievement of the controversial early 20th century >> philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein was to have discerned the true nature of >> Western philosophy — what is special about its problems, where they come >> from, how they should and should not be addressed, and what can and cannot >> be accomplished by grappling with them. The uniquely insightful answers >> provided to these meta-questions are what give his treatments of specific >> issues within the subject — concerning language, experience, knowledge, >> mathematics, art and religion among them — a power of illumination that >> cannot be found in the work of others. >> >> Admittedly, few would agree with this rosy assessment — certainly not >> many professional philosophers. Apart from a small and ignored clique of >> hard-core supporters the usual view these days is that his writing is >> self-indulgently obscure and that behind the catchy slogans there is little >> of intellectual value. But this dismissal disguises what is pretty clearly >> the real cause of Wittgenstein’s unpopularity within departments of >> philosophy: namely, his thoroughgoing rejection of the subject as >> traditionally and currently practiced; his insistence that it can’t give us >> the kind of knowledge generally regarded as its raison d’être. >> >> Wittgenstein claims that there are no realms of phenomena whose study is >> the special business of a philosopher, and about which he or she should >> devise profound a priori theories and sophisticated supporting arguments. >> There are no startling discoveries to be made of facts, not open to the >> methods of science, yet accessible “from the armchair” through some blend >> of intuition, pure reason and conceptual analysis. Indeed the whole idea of >> a subject that could yield such results is based on confusion and wishful >> thinking. >> >> This attitude is in stark opposition to the traditional view, which >> continues to prevail. Philosophy is respected, even exalted, for its >> promise to provide fundamental insights into the human condition and the >> ultimate character of the universe, leading to vital conclusions about how >> we are to arrange our lives. It’s taken for granted that there is deep >> understanding to be obtained of the nature of consciousness, of how >> knowledge of the external world is possible, of whether our decisions can >> be truly free, of the structure of any just society, and so on — and that >> philosophy’s job is to provide such understanding. Isn’t that why we are so >> fascinated by it? >> >> If so, then we are duped and bound to be disappointed, says Wittgenstein. >> For these are mere pseudo-problems, the misbegotten products of linguistic >> illusion and muddled thinking. So it should be entirely unsurprising that >> the “philosophy” aiming to solve them has been marked by perennial >> controversy and lack of decisive progress — by an embarrassing failure, >> after over 2000 years, to settle any of its central issues. Therefore >> traditional philosophical theorizing must give way to a painstaking >> identification of its tempting but misguided presuppositions and an >> understanding of how we ever came to regard them as legitimate. But in that >> case, he asks, “[w]here does [our] investigation get its importance from, >> since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is >> great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only >> bits of stone and rubble)” — and answers that “(w)hat we are destroying is >> nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language >> on which they stand.” >> >> Given this extreme pessimism about the potential of philosophy — perhaps >> tantamount to a denial that there is such a subject — it is hardly >> surprising that “Wittgenstein” is uttered with a curl of the lip in most >> philosophical circles. For who likes to be told that his or her life’s work >> is confused and pointless? Thus, even Bertrand Russell, his early teacher >> and enthusiastic supporter, was eventually led to complain peevishly that >> Wittgenstein seems to have “grown tired of serious thinking and invented a >> doctrine which would make such an activity unnecessary.” >> >> But what is that notorious doctrine, and can it be defended? We might >> boil it down to four related claims. >> >> — The first is that traditional philosophy is scientistic: its primary >> goals, which are to arrive at simple, general principles, to uncover >> profound explanations, and to correct naïve opinions, are taken from the >> sciences. And this is undoubtedly the case. >> >> —The second is that the non-empirical (“armchair”) character of >> philosophical investigation — its focus on conceptual truth — is in tension >> with those goals. That’s because our concepts exhibit a highly >> theory-resistant complexity and variability. They evolved, not for the sake >> of science and its objectives, but rather in order to cater to the >> interacting contingencies of our nature, our culture, our environment, our >> communicative needs and our other purposes. As a consequence the >> commitments defining individual concepts are rarely simple or determinate, >> and differ dramatically from one concept to another. Moreover, it is not >> possible (as it is within empirical domains) to accommodate superficial >> complexity by means of simple principles at a more basic (e.g. microscopic) >> level. >> >> — The third main claim of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy — an immediate >> consequence of the first two — is that traditional philosophy is >> necessarily pervaded with oversimplification; analogies are unreasonably >> inflated; exceptions to simple regularities are wrongly dismissed. >> >> — Therefore — the fourth claim — a decent approach to the subject must >> avoid theory-construction and instead be merely “therapeutic,” confined to >> exposing the irrational assumptions on which theory-oriented investigations >> are based and the irrational conclusions to which they lead. >> >> Consider, for instance, the paradigmatically philosophical question: >> “What is truth?”. This provokes perplexity because, on the one hand, it >> demands an answer of the form, “Truth is such–and-such,” but on the other >> hand, despite hundreds of years of looking, no acceptable answer of that >> kind has ever been found. We’ve tried truth as “correspondence with the >> facts,” as “provability,” as “practical utility,” and as “stable >> consensus”; but all turned out to be defective in one way or another — >> either circular or subject to counterexamples. Reactions to this impasse >> have included a variety of theoretical proposals. Some philosophers have >> been led to deny that there is such a thing as absolute truth. Some have >> maintained (insisting on one of the above definitions) that although truth >> exists, it lacks certain features that are ordinarily attributed to it — >> for example, that the truth may sometimes be impossible to discover. Some >> have inferred that truth is intrinsically paradoxical and essentially >> incomprehensible. And others persist in the attempt to devise a definition >> that will fit all the intuitive data. >> >> But from Wittgenstein’s perspective each of the first three of these >> strategies rides roughshod over our fundamental convictions about truth, >> and the fourth is highly unlikely to succeed. Instead we should begin, he >> thinks, by recognizing (as mentioned above) that our various concepts play >> very different roles in our cognitive economy and (correspondingly) are >> governed by defining principles of very different kinds. Therefore, it was >> always a mistake to extrapolate from the fact that empirical concepts, such >> as red or magnetic or alive stand for properties with specifiable >> underlying natures to the presumption that the notion of truth must stand >> for some such property as well. >> >> Wittgenstein’s conceptual pluralism positions us to recognize that >> notion’s idiosyncratic function, and to infer that truth itself will not be >> reducible to anything more basic. More specifically, we can see that the >> concept’s function in our cognitive economy is merely to serve as a device >> of generalization. It enables us to say such things as “Einstein’s last >> words were true,” and not be stuck with “If Einstein’s last words were that >> E=mc², then E=mc2; and if his last words were that nuclear weapons >> should be banned, then nuclear weapons should be banned; … and so on,” >> which has the disadvantage of being infinitely long! Similarly we can use >> it to say: “We should want our beliefs to be true” (instead of struggling >> with “We should want that if we believe that E=mc², then E=mc²; and that >> if we believe … etc.”). We can see, also, that this sort of utility depends >> upon nothing more than the fact that the attribution of truth to a >> statement is obviously equivalent to the statement itself — for example, >> “It’s true that E=mc²” is equivalent to “E=mc²”. Thus possession of the >> concept of truth appears to consist in an appreciation of that triviality, >> rather than a mastery of any explicit definition. The traditional search >> for such an account (or for some other form of reductive analysis) was a >> wild-goose chase, a pseudo-problem. Truth emerges as exceptionally >> unprofound and as exceptionally unmysterious. >> >> This example illustrates the key components of Wittgenstein’s >> metaphilosophy, and suggests how to flesh them out a little further. >> Philosophical problems typically arise from the clash between the >> inevitably idiosyncratic features of special-purpose concepts —true, good, >> object, person, now, necessary — and the scientistically driven insistence >> upon uniformity. Moreover, the various kinds of theoretical move designed >> to resolve such conflicts (forms of skepticism, revisionism, mysterianism >> and conservative systematization) are not only irrational, but >> unmotivated.The paradoxes to which they respond should instead be resolved >> merely by coming to appreciate the mistakes of perverse overgeneralization >> from which they arose. And the fundamental source of this irrationality is >> scientism. >> >> As Wittgenstein put it in the “The Blue Book”: >> >> Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with >> the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of >> natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural >> laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by >> using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science >> before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the >> way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and >> leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it >> can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain >> anything. Philosophy really is “purely descriptive. >> >> These radical ideas are not obviously correct, and may on close scrutiny >> turn out to be wrong. But they deserve to receive that scrutiny — to be >> taken much more seriously than they are. Yes, most of us have been >> interested in philosophy only because of its promise to deliver precisely >> the sort of theoretical insights that Wittgenstein argues are illusory. But >> such hopes are no defense against his critique. Besides, if he turns out to >> be right, satisfaction enough may surely be found in what we still can get >> — clarity, demystification and truth. >> >> NOTE: A response to this post by Michael P. Lynch will be published in >> The Stone later this week. >> [ >> https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/05/of-flies-and-philosophers-wittgenstein-and-philosophy/ >> >> ] >> >> Paul Horwich is a professor of philosophy at New York University. He is >> the author of several books, including “Reflections on Meaning,” >> “Truth-Meaning-Reality,” and most recently, “Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy.” >> [ https://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/faculty/paul-g-horwich.html ] >> >> >> cf. >> *Language Games, Writing Games - Wittgenstein and Derrida: A Comparative >> Study* >> Jolán Orbán >> https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Lang/LangOrba.htm >> <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bu.edu%2Fwcp%2FPapers%2FLang%2FLangOrba.htm&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNG_4l8ij-d6cMyYGgP99I6J07jxew> >> >> >> @philipthrift >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/54137dae-83b6-47a6-b415-d56f7278ec09%40googlegroups.com.
