> On 27 Feb 2020, at 12:45, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 10:14 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On 26 Feb 2020, at 23:58, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >> From the first person perspective, there is indeterminacy, > > That is the whole point. That is the 1p-indeterminacy I am talking about (and > that Clark, and only Clark, has a problem with). > >> but no sensible assignment of probabilities is possible. > > And you are right on this, in any “real case scenario”, but that is for the > next steps. > > > And in the theoretical analysis. I am glad that you acknowledge that there is > no useful concept of probability in this WM-duplication scenario.
Yes, the key point is that in Helsinki, the “W v M” is a certainty (modulo the protocole knowledge), and the “W” and “M” prediction is refuted. That’s the first person indeterminacy, and probability is used mainly as a pedagogical tool to understand it. > > > A probability is never observed, but evaluated, using some theory. In the > finite case, the numerical identity suggest the usual binomial, and this is > easy to verify for simple scenario. > > Yes, it is binomial because there are only two possible outcomes. But > binomial without any specification of a probability for 'success’. We can decide that W is success, and M is failure. (Hoping this is not seen as politically biased!). Then the self-duplication is a repeated Bernoulli experiences. > > > All what is used is the fact that you are maximally ignorant on the brand of > coffee, and thus on the city you will see. Maximal ignorance is just modelled > by P = 1/2 traditionally, but that is not important, as the math will show > that we have no probabilities, but a quantum credibility measure. > > > That is probably what all this argument is actually about -- the maths show > that there are no probabilities. I am not sure the math shows that. We will lost “easy probability distribution” in the real case (in “front” of a universal dovetailing), but the P = 1/2 remains consistent in the (irrealist) simple duplication of the thought experience. > Because there are no unique probabilities in the classical duplication case, > the concept of probability has been shown to be inadmissible in the > deterministic (Everettian) quantum case. Not from the first person point of view, where Gleason theorem assure the existence of a unique probability measure, and indeed it is the one given by the square law. > The appeal by people like Deutsch and Wallace to betting quotients, or > quantum credibility measures, are just ways of forcing a probabilistic > interpretation on to quantum mechanics by hand -- they are not derivations of > probability from within the deterministic theory. May be, but the derivation has to be done in arithmetic, and there it works. I am not following Deutsch and Wallace. I got that probability and many-histories interpretation of arithmetic well before discovering that physicists were already there. > There are no probabilities in the deterministic theory, even from the 1p > perspective, because the data are consistent with any prior assignment of a > probability measure. I don’t see this, or I see this for any choice of probability in any statistical analysis. It is irrational to expect “Space-Odyssey with Tibetan subtile” from the big "2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24” multiplication experiences. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQX%2B4zRuSQU_0wQ4Aoo%3DNX7c9TphFDcGpCtGbtFqryN7g%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQX%2B4zRuSQU_0wQ4Aoo%3DNX7c9TphFDcGpCtGbtFqryN7g%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/05CF2DD0-168A-4BBD-8946-6324FF62C631%40ulb.ac.be.
