On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:07 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 22 Feb 2020, at 23:10, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > The arguments that I have developed here, based on Kent's insight, take > Many-worlds at face value. Then the theory is clearly incoherent, or at > least incompatible with observation. However, if you take a classical > deterministic theory, such as Bruno's WM-duplication thought experiment, > then there is no way you can sensibly interpret such a theory > probabilistically. > > > It is the experiences obtained which cannot avoid the probabilities. That > is the cute part: we get 1p unavoidable probabilities from a 3p purely > deterministic picture. > The problem is that different observers infer different probabilities from their individual 1p perspectives -- there is no 3p probability in these purely deterministic pictures. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS-FzGfXJkZ%3DrZyDfDQvnbYnDEDcNsiOn4%3DkA4qni62QA%40mail.gmail.com.
