> On 5 Apr 2020, at 01:11, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > I agree completely with Strawson that the type of qualia-free computational > approach suggested by some is nothing but zombieism.
The whole point of incompleteness is that it assures that the logic of []p & p, which is undefinable by the machine about itself, obeys a different logic than the logic of []p, which is qualia-free indeed. But machines knows that, and eventually learn to distinguish []p (the virtual body) from []p & p, the logic of the soul. That difference is what the machine needs to understand the difference between I (full of directly accessible qualia) and you (where I need my intellect to attribute, or not, some qualia to a (third) person. > > All the viable computational frameworks (like Donald Hoffmann's) - when > closely examined - depend on this: > > Conscious agent networks: > Formal analysis and application to cognition > http://cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/CA-circuits-CSR-rev.pdf > > The CA framework says nothing about the nature of experience. It says nothing > about qualia; it simply assumes that qualia exist, that agents experience > them, and that they can be tokened. > > > There would have to be "revolution" (or at least "updating") in the current > scientific vocabulary of physics - the vocabulary conventionally written in > 2020 - to match the Strawson view. (CHIMP: consciousnessive hypo-intrinsic > massless particle). But that is perfectly OK, since physics or any science - > as written - is not a fixed catechism, like the Ten Commandments written in > stone for Moses. > > (I am not quite happy with Bruno's response, but it is better.) I agree that the CA miss the point. But Strawson evade the interesting questions, and he seems to miss the fact that computer science does provide the tools to address such questions, at least if we bet on Mechanism (like Darwin). To use Chalmers’ expression, Strawson and CA only agrees the simple “consciousness” problem, and avoid the hard problem, that is the metaphysical mind-body problem. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > On Saturday, April 4, 2020 at 3:33:49 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > I quite agree with Strawson that physics, and science in general, doesn't > tell us about the ding und sich of consciousness or anything else. But I > notice that he completely avoids any similar level description or definition > of qualia. Over and over he says "You know what I mean." So his denial adds > nothing. In contrast the idea that consciousness is a particular kind of > computation does lead somewhere...it leads to AI and analysis and possibly > even repair of brains. It leads to consciousness engineering. > > The student questions are quite good...better than Strawson's answers. > > Brent > > On 4/4/2020 1:07 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7FHLjHC-soU >> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7FHLjHC-soU> >> >> "there is no conflict between a ‘hard-nosed’ >> physicalist/materialist/naturalistic scientific approach to the world and >> all-out belief in the reality of consciousness, conscious experience, good >> old fashioned qualia - whatever you want to call it or them" >> -- Galen Strawson >> >> @philpthrift >> >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5f0ff3bc-12b5-47ab-a9be-094d12622499%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5f0ff3bc-12b5-47ab-a9be-094d12622499%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/EFDD5DDD-2AC3-442F-BD24-64B1D61F282E%40ulb.ac.be.
