> On 5 Apr 2020, at 16:53, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, April 5, 2020 at 7:35:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 5 Apr 2020, at 01:11, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> I agree completely with Strawson that the type of qualia-free computational >> approach suggested by some is nothing but zombieism. > > > The whole point of incompleteness is that it assures that the logic of []p & > p, which is undefinable by the machine about itself, obeys a different logic > than the logic of []p, which is qualia-free indeed. But machines knows that, > and eventually learn to distinguish []p (the virtual body) from []p & p, the > logic of the soul. That difference is what the machine needs to understand > the difference between I (full of directly accessible qualia) and you (where > I need my intellect to attribute, or not, some qualia to a (third) person. > > > > > >> >> All the viable computational frameworks (like Donald Hoffmann's) - when >> closely examined - depend on this: >> >> Conscious agent networks: >> Formal analysis and application to cognition >> http://cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/CA-circuits-CSR-rev.pdf >> <http://cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/CA-circuits-CSR-rev.pdf> >> >> The CA framework says nothing about the nature of experience. It says >> nothing about qualia; it simply assumes that qualia exist, that agents >> experience them, and that they can be tokened. >> >> >> There would have to be "revolution" (or at least "updating") in the current >> scientific vocabulary of physics - the vocabulary conventionally written in >> 2020 - to match the Strawson view. (CHIMP: consciousnessive hypo-intrinsic >> massless particle). But that is perfectly OK, since physics or any science - >> as written - is not a fixed catechism, like the Ten Commandments written in >> stone for Moses. >> >> (I am not quite happy with Bruno's response, but it is better.) > > > I agree that the CA miss the point. But Strawson evade the interesting > questions, and he seems to miss the fact that computer science does provide > the tools to address such questions, at least if we bet on Mechanism (like > Darwin). To use Chalmers’ expression, Strawson and CA only agrees the simple > “consciousness” problem, and avoid the hard problem, that is the metaphysical > mind-body problem. > > Bruno > > > > > > To adopt a numerical framing, the qualia are either computable numbers
We cannot identify a first person notion with anything third person describable. Consciousness belongs to the type “truth”, and cannot be defined by the machine concerned. Consciousness is not a third person notion. > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computable_number > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computable_number> > > (the traditional AI approach is with computable numbers) or they are > uncomputable numbers - which are numbers that are not computable! (Simple > enough.) > > There Roger Penrose says as much, after this point. > > > > > @58min <https://twitter.com/58min> (approx.) > Penrose: quantum-state "collapse" produces proto-consciousness, the opposite > of consciousness produces the "collapse" > > "Roger Penrose: Physics of Consciousness and the Infinite Universe | AI > Podcast #85 with Lex Fridman" on YouTube https://youtu.be/orMtwOz6Db0 > <https://t.co/sbwq31Dc7v?amp=1> > > @philipthrift Penrose has lost his credibility on consciousness by misapplying Gödel’s theorem. There is a relation between consciousness and the quantum, but it is the “other way round”: the conceptually simple theory of consciousness provided already by the universal machine explains the quantum appearances, and it explains the qualia first person experience, their non definability, their non provability, but also the fact that it is indubitable immediate knowledge, and this by using only elementary mathematics, and the most standard definition in the field, brought by Theaetetus and the neopmlatonicians. Bruno >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f31576fb-c0f9-46f9-94b8-844b73b6ed6e%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f31576fb-c0f9-46f9-94b8-844b73b6ed6e%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/065DCDEA-960F-4FE8-A81D-C33200A421BF%40ulb.ac.be.
