> On 30 Jun 2020, at 19:54, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/30/2020 5:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 27 Jun 2020, at 19:36, Jason Resch <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> Brent, >>> >>> It looks like you were right about the importance of including >>> environmental data in a brain simulation. Markus Muller uses algorithmic >>> information theory to argue that whether or not a simulated brain is a >>> zombie or not, depends on a large extent to the degree in which >>> environmental information is incorporated into the simulation: >>> >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1699&v=wsbNT3XEdsA&t=51m40s >>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1699&v=wsbNT3XEdsA&t=51m40s> >>> (See 51 minutes 40 seconds in) >> >> He does not say much there, and taken literally, this is already what the >> antic dream argument put in doubt. >> >> If we take the arithmetical first person indeterminacy into account, it is >> not so much the environment which needs to be taken into account, but the >> collection of all consistent continuation, structured by the material modes >> of self-reference. > > Consistent continuation of what? That's the question.
Consistent continuation of you (the first person knower). It is what is axiomatised completely (at the propositional level) by: []p & <>t & p (p is provable, consistent and true). Intutively, that entails many aberrant experience/dream, but the constraints of self-reference leads to a sort of Everett-Griffith-Omnès-Hartle-Gell’man sort of quantum logic: a statistically interfering bunch of histories “making relative sense”. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> If not, it means that the substitution level has chosen correctly, or that >> the “brain” was not well copied… (or that we use a non mechanist theory of >> mind). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhmdHjJ4%3D9Mkm9dwxKSEwVEMcW_m9Ow2dVeFAz-dPCmHQ%40mail.gmail.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhmdHjJ4%3D9Mkm9dwxKSEwVEMcW_m9Ow2dVeFAz-dPCmHQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/195B5D3A-9503-481A-9562-B7886D82AFDC%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/195B5D3A-9503-481A-9562-B7886D82AFDC%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/998bd878-7681-5a61-042c-91b17363d27d%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/998bd878-7681-5a61-042c-91b17363d27d%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3F7C82D6-AA09-4C7F-8E64-D868CC94C36E%40ulb.ac.be.
