> On 1 Jul 2020, at 22:30, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 7/1/2020 6:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 30 Jun 2020, at 19:54, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6/30/2020 5:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 27 Jun 2020, at 19:36, Jason Resch <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Brent, >>>>> >>>>> It looks like you were right about the importance of including >>>>> environmental data in a brain simulation. Markus Muller uses algorithmic >>>>> information theory to argue that whether or not a simulated brain is a >>>>> zombie or not, depends on a large extent to the degree in which >>>>> environmental information is incorporated into the simulation: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1699&v=wsbNT3XEdsA&t=51m40s >>>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1699&v=wsbNT3XEdsA&t=51m40s> >>>>> (See 51 minutes 40 seconds in) >>>> >>>> He does not say much there, and taken literally, this is already what the >>>> antic dream argument put in doubt. >>>> >>>> If we take the arithmetical first person indeterminacy into account, it is >>>> not so much the environment which needs to be taken into account, but the >>>> collection of all consistent continuation, structured by the material >>>> modes of self-reference. >>> >>> Consistent continuation of what? That's the question. >> >> Consistent continuation of you (the first person knower). It is what is >> axiomatised completely (at the propositional level) by: >> []p & <>t & p (p is provable, consistent and true). > > How can pick out a person and define the unity of experience of that person?
It is like in the Helsinki—>(Washington/Moscow) experience. It illustrates that nobody can do that, except the first person subject itself, who does it by memorising some past history. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Intutively, that entails many aberrant experience/dream, but the constraints >> of self-reference leads to a sort of Everett-Griffith-Omnès-Hartle-Gell’man >> sort of quantum logic: a statistically interfering bunch of histories >> “making relative sense”. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>>> >>>> If not, it means that the substitution level has chosen correctly, or that >>>> the “brain” was not well copied… (or that we use a non mechanist theory of >>>> mind). >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Jason >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to [email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhmdHjJ4%3D9Mkm9dwxKSEwVEMcW_m9Ow2dVeFAz-dPCmHQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhmdHjJ4%3D9Mkm9dwxKSEwVEMcW_m9Ow2dVeFAz-dPCmHQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/195B5D3A-9503-481A-9562-B7886D82AFDC%40ulb.ac.be >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/195B5D3A-9503-481A-9562-B7886D82AFDC%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/998bd878-7681-5a61-042c-91b17363d27d%40verizon.net >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/998bd878-7681-5a61-042c-91b17363d27d%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3F7C82D6-AA09-4C7F-8E64-D868CC94C36E%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3F7C82D6-AA09-4C7F-8E64-D868CC94C36E%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5a45dd8a-d454-b740-a9cc-df591ac75e68%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5a45dd8a-d454-b740-a9cc-df591ac75e68%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/985583FE-2A36-4545-A461-31D04BF7174A%40ulb.ac.be.
