> On 2 Jul 2020, at 18:11, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 7/2/2020 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 1 Jul 2020, at 22:30, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 7/1/2020 6:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 30 Jun 2020, at 19:54, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 6/30/2020 5:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 27 Jun 2020, at 19:36, Jason Resch <[email protected] >>>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Brent, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It looks like you were right about the importance of including >>>>>>> environmental data in a brain simulation. Markus Muller uses >>>>>>> algorithmic information theory to argue that whether or not a simulated >>>>>>> brain is a zombie or not, depends on a large extent to the degree in >>>>>>> which environmental information is incorporated into the simulation: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1699&v=wsbNT3XEdsA&t=51m40s >>>>>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1699&v=wsbNT3XEdsA&t=51m40s> >>>>>>> (See 51 minutes 40 seconds in) >>>>>> >>>>>> He does not say much there, and taken literally, this is already what >>>>>> the antic dream argument put in doubt. >>>>>> >>>>>> If we take the arithmetical first person indeterminacy into account, it >>>>>> is not so much the environment which needs to be taken into account, but >>>>>> the collection of all consistent continuation, structured by the >>>>>> material modes of self-reference. >>>>> >>>>> Consistent continuation of what? That's the question. >>>> >>>> Consistent continuation of you (the first person knower). It is what is >>>> axiomatised completely (at the propositional level) by: >>>> []p & <>t & p (p is provable, consistent and true). >>> >>> How can pick out a person and define the unity of experience of that person? >> >> >> It is like in the Helsinki—>(Washington/Moscow) experience. It illustrates >> that nobody can do that, except the first person subject itself, who does it >> by memorising some past history. > > What does it mean in this computational model to memorize some history. In > the physics model of computation, memory means storing information in a > temporarily static form. I don't see a place for this in the "closest > continuation of observer moments”.
I don’t see how you don’t see it. To be sure I don’t use “observer moment”, but thanks to mechanism I use the notion of first person state, and local description of computation. Consider the Helsinki -> (Washington/Moscow) experience. Locally, you have a computation which correspond more or less to the life of the guy up to just before its experience in Helsinki. Up to that moment, he has store information, but also plausibly erase some of them, during all its life. Then he "pushes on the button" in Helsinki, and we get the two copies, one in Washington, and the other in Moscow. Once they have open the door of their respective reconstitution apparatus (3D printer working at the relevant level), one will see Washington, and he/she will store the information, in his/her brain and/or in the personal notebook. The physical world is obviously Turing universal, and so can emulate all sort of Turing machine, some reversible and some non reversible, but it is easy to show how a reversible Turing machine can emulate a non reversible one.The sigma_1 arithmetic, aka the universal dovetailing, emulates all computations, which means all those which are reversible and all those which are non reversible. The presence of “p -> []<>p” in the material mode of self-reference in arithmetic makes the physical looking completely reversible at its core. For the first person singular modes (with “& p”), we need to take into account that a machine cannot distinguish, from its observation, a machine from a machine with some oracle, and we need the first person limit on the dovetailing, which makes the measure operating on the first person given by the relativisation of the sigma_1 on *all* oracle. I thought wrongly that to get the measure would need both choice and determinacy (in ZF), which has been shown inconsistent, but eventually this works with the axiom of choice and a restricted form of the axiom of determinacy, known as projective determinacy. The works which remains to be done can be done formally in/by ZFC+PD (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory + the axiom of Projective Determinacy (which would be long to explain here). To be franc, I am not sure there is a physics model of computation. What happens is that there are many subpart of the physical laws which are Turing universal. Similarly, many subparts of elementary arithmetic are Turing universal, and that’s typically the case for all universal machinery. The point I make is just that if we assume enough of Mechanism to make sense of Darwin, the mind-body problem consists in deriving the appearance of the physical laws, and their stability, by a measure on the sigma_1 sentences (with oracles) determined by the material modes of self-references (abstractly defined by the presence of []p -> p, plus p -> []<>p). This can be motivated either by thought experience of by using Plato, and the lexicon I gave in the “arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus”. So I have progressed (!). I know now that there is a measure, even a Lebesgue measure or integral. From this, we are closer to derive the group theoretical structure of physics, and some hope to get the “particles”. It is time to revise topology and measure theory (and the so called Descriptive Set theory). Bruno > > Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/58533AB7-D411-4370-BB87-E515E8BFA1B3%40ulb.ac.be.
