On 9/4/2020 4:00 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Sat, Sep 5, 2020 at 5:37 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<everything-list@googlegroups.com
<mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
On 9/4/2020 4:43 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Sep 4, 2020 at 9:32 PM smitra <smi...@zonnet.nl
<mailto:smi...@zonnet.nl>> wrote:
Even if the MWI is false and the wavefunction collapses to
produce only
one of the possible outcomes with a probability given by the
Born rule,
you'll still get all possibilities realized in a generic
infinite
universe, whether it's spatially infinite or a universe that
exists for
an infinite long time.
The only way to find out what exists beyond the realm we've
explored s
to do experiments. No philosophical reasoning about the
interpretation
of probabilities can ever settle whether or not the universe
is so large
or will exists for such a long time that another copy of me
exists.
That's why these discussions are not so useful as an argument
of whether
the MWI is correct or not.
I think something along those lines was Sean Carroll's answer to
the points David Albert raised. Unfortunately, it doesn't wash!
Applying the Born rule to the repeated measurement scenario tells
you that the probability of the extreme branches is low; whereas,
the idea that all possible outcomes occur on every trial
trivially implies that the probability of the extreme cases is
exactly one. The contradiction couldn't be more stark, and
waffling about infinite universes isn't going to change that --
the theory gives two, mutually contradictory, results.
But the probability of /observing/ extreme cases isn't 1 for a
given observer.
And the probability isn't 1/2^N for a given observer either. The
observer observes what he observes. Probability is relevant for
predictions, not post hoc observations.
We are talking about the predictions of the theory, not the
experiences of individual observers. I think Sean tried this evasive
tactic as well, and Albert rightly pointed out that that just makes
everything idexical, and ultimately makes science impossible.
And it is not just the extreme branches that have low probability.
Given the repeated measurement scenario we have been talking about,
there are N repetitions of the experiment, giving 2^N distinct binary
sequences of results. Applying the Born rule to each possible
sequence shows that it has probability 1/2^N.
But the theory isn't about the probability of a specific sequence, it's
about the probability of |up> vs |down> in the sequence without regard
for order. So there will, if the theory is correct, be many more
sequences with a frequency of |up> near some theoretically computed
proportion |a|^2 than sequences not near this proportion.
Brent
But if every result obtains on every trial, the probability of each
sequence is exactly one. In other words, Everett is incompatible with
the qBorn rule. You can abandon the Born rule if you like, or abandon
the Everettian idea of every outcome occurring on every trial, but you
can't have both.
The twisting and turning we are seeing by participants on this list is
not going to alter this basic observation.
Bruce
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