Le jeu. 14 janv. 2021 à 07:21, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> a écrit :
> > > Le jeu. 14 janv. 2021 à 04:42, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> a > écrit : > >> >> >> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >> >>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 [email protected] >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 >>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 [email protected] >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 [email protected] >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson <[email protected]> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, >>>>>>>>>> for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER >>>>>>>>>> worlds as >>>>>>>>>> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. * >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as >>>>>>>>> what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go >>>>>>>>> left, >>>>>>>>> in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go >>>>>>>>> right, >>>>>>>>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one >>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>> the "SAME OTHER world"? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee >>>>>>>>>> [...] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with >>>>>>>>> probability. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't >>>>>>>>>> complicated. * >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can >>>>>>>>> have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not >>>>>>>>> so much. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into >>>>>>>> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in >>>>>>>> third >>>>>>>> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME >>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these >>>>>>>> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> measurements exist in these other world. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The >>>>>>> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and >>>>>>> one >>>>>>> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different >>>>>>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the >>>>>>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different >>>>>>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply. >>>>>>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave >>>>>>> function, >>>>>>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> yes, there is only one measurement in each. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> This is what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>> >>>>> No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one >>>>> measurement outcome in each world. However this business about "same other >>>>> worlds" betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI "doesn't >>>>> guarantee" that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. It's that >>>>> the whole notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this context and >>>>> has no bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and 1 twice >>>>> whether we are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the "SAME >>>>> ones" at each addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that then how can >>>>> we >>>>> be sure the answer is the same? Basically the only answer to that is >>>>> "WTF?" >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum >>>>>>> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two >>>>>>> worlds >>>>>>> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing >>>>>>> nothing about the other. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Again, what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>> >>>>> If you get that, then the next bit follows. >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole wave >>>>>>> function as it were), no probability is involved. But if you repeat this >>>>>>> experiment many times, each version of you will record an apparently >>>>>>> random >>>>>>> sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens in the next >>>>>>> experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. Objectively >>>>>>> there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Here's where you go astray. AG >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You *seem* to be >>>>> saying that probability can't describe QM experiments because in each >>>>> world >>>>> there is only one outcome and therefore no "ensemble" of outcomes from >>>>> which a probability can be derived. That is totally wrong-headed. There >>>>> are >>>>> two "ensembles": the ensemble of different multiverse branches at each >>>>> experiment, and the ensemble of each experimenter's prior measurements, >>>>> and >>>>> those are enough to derive the appearance of randomness and to justify a >>>>> probabilistic description despite the objective lack of randomness. If you >>>>> agree with "what you have been saying all along", then you must agree that >>>>> every experimenter in every world in an MWI multiverse will see a record >>>>> of >>>>> an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s in the described experiment. >>>>> Right? And if not why not? >>>>> >>>> >>>> IMO, since the trials are independent, the other observers are disjoint >>>> from each other and each records only one measurement. So the only observer >>>> who sees an ensemble is the observer in THIS world. To get an ensemble of >>>> outcomes in those other worlds, and hence a probability, you need to appeal >>>> to a non-existent observer, also called the Bird's Eye observer. AG >>>> >>> >>> Respectfully, you did not answer my question. Do you agree or not that >>> every experimenter in every branch of the multiverse who records a series >>> of experiments as described in my scenario will record a *seemingly* >>> random string of 1s and 0s? If you do, that's really all that's required. >>> Abstract debates about "ensembles required to get a probability" are moot. >>> If the world is as described by MWI, the appearance of probability is an >>> outcome, and probability is the best possible description of how quantum >>> experiments turn out from any real observer's POV (as opposed to the Bird's >>> Eye observer). If you disagree that experimenters will get a seemingly >>> random string of 1s and 0s, then you'll need to explain why you think that. >>> >> >> I did answer your question. Since the trials are independent, a NEW OTHER >> WORLD observer is created on each THIS WORLD trial. So the other observers >> see ONE outcome each. No reason to assume otherwise. You need another >> postulate for this to work. AG >> >> -- >> > > So your postulate is that at each experiment, the other AG has no past > memory and is as conscious as a rock right ? Because if not, those "others" > AG have the same past memory as "this' AG > A little correction here before you go again in the WTF argument. They have the same past memory with this AG up until they spiltted/differentiated from him. and have an ensemble of results consisting of results of the past trials > in their memory and the latest trial. > > Quentin > >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/204901cc-7aa3-4118-8ea9-3e69ffe76778n%40googlegroups.com >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/204901cc-7aa3-4118-8ea9-3e69ffe76778n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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