On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 [email protected] wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: > >> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 [email protected] >> wrote: >> >>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>> >>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 [email protected] >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 [email protected] >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 [email protected] >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson <[email protected]> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, >>>>>>>>> for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER >>>>>>>>> worlds as >>>>>>>>> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. * >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as >>>>>>>> what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go >>>>>>>> left, >>>>>>>> in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go >>>>>>>> right, >>>>>>>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one >>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>> the "SAME OTHER world"? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee >>>>>>>>> [...] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with >>>>>>>> probability. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. * >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can >>>>>>>> have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so >>>>>>>> much. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into >>>>>>> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in >>>>>>> third >>>>>>> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME >>>>>>> other >>>>>>> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these >>>>>>> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> measurements exist in these other world. AG >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The >>>>>> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and >>>>>> one >>>>>> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different >>>>>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the >>>>>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different >>>>>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply. >>>>>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave >>>>>> function, >>>>>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", >>>>>> and >>>>>> yes, there is only one measurement in each. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> This is what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>> >>>> No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one measurement >>>> outcome in each world. However this business about "same other worlds" >>>> betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI "doesn't guarantee" >>>> that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. It's that the whole >>>> notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this context and has no >>>> bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and 1 twice whether >>>> we are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the "SAME ones" at >>>> each addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that then how can we be sure >>>> the answer is the same? Basically the only answer to that is "WTF?" >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum >>>>>> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per >>>>>> the >>>>>> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two >>>>>> worlds >>>>>> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing >>>>>> nothing about the other. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Again, what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>> >>>> If you get that, then the next bit follows. >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole wave >>>>>> function as it were), no probability is involved. But if you repeat this >>>>>> experiment many times, each version of you will record an apparently >>>>>> random >>>>>> sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens in the next >>>>>> experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. Objectively >>>>>> there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Here's where you go astray. AG >>>>> >>>> >>>> So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You *seem* to be >>>> saying that probability can't describe QM experiments because in each >>>> world >>>> there is only one outcome and therefore no "ensemble" of outcomes from >>>> which a probability can be derived. That is totally wrong-headed. There >>>> are >>>> two "ensembles": the ensemble of different multiverse branches at each >>>> experiment, and the ensemble of each experimenter's prior measurements, >>>> and >>>> those are enough to derive the appearance of randomness and to justify a >>>> probabilistic description despite the objective lack of randomness. If you >>>> agree with "what you have been saying all along", then you must agree that >>>> every experimenter in every world in an MWI multiverse will see a record >>>> of >>>> an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s in the described experiment. >>>> Right? And if not why not? >>>> >>> >>> IMO, since the trials are independent, the other observers are disjoint >>> from each other and each records only one measurement. So the only observer >>> who sees an ensemble is the observer in THIS world. To get an ensemble of >>> outcomes in those other worlds, and hence a probability, you need to appeal >>> to a non-existent observer, also called the Bird's Eye observer. AG >>> >> >> Respectfully, you did not answer my question. Do you agree or not that >> every experimenter in every branch of the multiverse who records a series >> of experiments as described in my scenario will record a *seemingly* >> random string of 1s and 0s? If you do, that's really all that's required. >> Abstract debates about "ensembles required to get a probability" are moot. >> If the world is as described by MWI, the appearance of probability is an >> outcome, and probability is the best possible description of how quantum >> experiments turn out from any real observer's POV (as opposed to the Bird's >> Eye observer). If you disagree that experimenters will get a seemingly >> random string of 1s and 0s, then you'll need to explain why you think that. >> > > I did answer your question. Since the trials are independent, a NEW OTHER > WORLD observer is created on each THIS WORLD trial. So the other observers > see ONE outcome each. No reason to assume otherwise. You need another > postulate for this to work. AG > You're talking like a politician. Does each observer in each world who repeats said experiment record a seemingly random series of 1s and 0s or not? Yes/no. It's not hard. Come on, you can do it now... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ff9de68d-3bab-428e-8bed-17e15f576e79n%40googlegroups.com.
