On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 [email protected] > wrote: > >> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >> >>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 [email protected] >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 >>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 [email protected] >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 [email protected] >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson <[email protected]> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, >>>>>>>>>> for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER >>>>>>>>>> worlds as >>>>>>>>>> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. * >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as >>>>>>>>> what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go >>>>>>>>> left, >>>>>>>>> in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go >>>>>>>>> right, >>>>>>>>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one >>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>> the "SAME OTHER world"? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee >>>>>>>>>> [...] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with >>>>>>>>> probability. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't >>>>>>>>>> complicated. * >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can >>>>>>>>> have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not >>>>>>>>> so much. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into >>>>>>>> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in >>>>>>>> third >>>>>>>> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME >>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these >>>>>>>> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> measurements exist in these other world. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The >>>>>>> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and >>>>>>> one >>>>>>> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different >>>>>>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the >>>>>>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the >>>>>>> different >>>>>>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply. >>>>>>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave >>>>>>> function, >>>>>>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> yes, there is only one measurement in each. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> This is what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>> >>>>> No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one >>>>> measurement outcome in each world. However this business about "same >>>>> other >>>>> worlds" betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI "doesn't >>>>> guarantee" that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. It's >>>>> that >>>>> the whole notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this context and >>>>> has no bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and 1 twice >>>>> whether we are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the "SAME >>>>> ones" at each addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that then how can >>>>> we >>>>> be sure the answer is the same? Basically the only answer to that is >>>>> "WTF?" >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum >>>>>>> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two >>>>>>> worlds >>>>>>> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version >>>>>>> knowing >>>>>>> nothing about the other. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Again, what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>> >>>>> If you get that, then the next bit follows. >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole wave >>>>>>> function as it were), no probability is involved. But if you repeat >>>>>>> this >>>>>>> experiment many times, each version of you will record an apparently >>>>>>> random >>>>>>> sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens in the next >>>>>>> experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. Objectively >>>>>>> there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Here's where you go astray. AG >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You *seem* to be >>>>> saying that probability can't describe QM experiments because in each >>>>> world >>>>> there is only one outcome and therefore no "ensemble" of outcomes from >>>>> which a probability can be derived. That is totally wrong-headed. There >>>>> are >>>>> two "ensembles": the ensemble of different multiverse branches at each >>>>> experiment, and the ensemble of each experimenter's prior measurements, >>>>> and >>>>> those are enough to derive the appearance of randomness and to justify a >>>>> probabilistic description despite the objective lack of randomness. If >>>>> you >>>>> agree with "what you have been saying all along", then you must agree >>>>> that >>>>> every experimenter in every world in an MWI multiverse will see a record >>>>> of >>>>> an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s in the described experiment. >>>>> Right? And if not why not? >>>>> >>>> >>>> IMO, since the trials are independent, the other observers are disjoint >>>> from each other and each records only one measurement. So the only >>>> observer >>>> who sees an ensemble is the observer in THIS world. To get an ensemble of >>>> outcomes in those other worlds, and hence a probability, you need to >>>> appeal >>>> to a non-existent observer, also called the Bird's Eye observer. AG >>>> >>> >>> Respectfully, you did not answer my question. Do you agree or not that >>> every experimenter in every branch of the multiverse who records a series >>> of experiments as described in my scenario will record a *seemingly* >>> random string of 1s and 0s? If you do, that's really all that's required. >>> Abstract debates about "ensembles required to get a probability" are moot. >>> If the world is as described by MWI, the appearance of probability is an >>> outcome, and probability is the best possible description of how quantum >>> experiments turn out from any real observer's POV (as opposed to the Bird's >>> Eye observer). If you disagree that experimenters will get a seemingly >>> random string of 1s and 0s, then you'll need to explain why you think that. >>> >> >> I did answer your question. Since the trials are independent, a NEW OTHER >> WORLD observer is created on each THIS WORLD trial. So the other observers >> see ONE outcome each. No reason to assume otherwise. You need another >> postulate for this to work. AG >> > > You're talking like a politician. Does each observer in each world who > repeats said experiment record a seemingly random series of 1s and 0s or > not? Yes/no. It's not hard. Come on, you can do it now... > The answer is NO. In the spin experiment we're discussing, AG in this world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and 1's. On each trial an imaginary other AG measures the complement of what AG in this world measured. Now since the trials are independent, different imaginary AGs always measure complements, but none measure more than ONE RESULT. As I previously indicated, these other AGs are disjoint from each other. The only way to remedy this situation is to add another postulate to your MWI. 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