No. You're not blocked. I'll try to look at it and give a response. AG On Friday, January 15, 2021 at 12:48:14 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Obviously I'm blocked by AG for whatever reason, because that's what I've > been telling him since and got no answer... I even bother to take the time > to make a schematics (well a ugly one but still) :D > > Le ven. 15 janv. 2021 à 07:36, Pierz Newton-John <[email protected]> a > écrit : > >> >> >> On Fri, 15 Jan 2021 at 4:01 pm, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 3:15:47 PM UTC-7, Pierz wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:07:59 PM UTC+11 [email protected] >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 >>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 >>>>>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 >>>>>>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson < >>>>>>>>>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurements, for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the SAME >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OTHER worlds as trials progress, to get ensembles in those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OTHER worlds. * >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>> as what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> electron go >>>>>>>>>>>>>> left, in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> electron go >>>>>>>>>>>>>> right, other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> so which >>>>>>>>>>>>>> one was the "SAME OTHER world"? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> guarantee [...] >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with probability. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complicated. * >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple >>>>>>>>>>>>>> can have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other not so much. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into >>>>>>>>>>>>> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds >>>>>>>>>>>>> in third >>>>>>>>>>>>> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the >>>>>>>>>>>>> SAME other >>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of >>>>>>>>>>>>> these >>>>>>>>>>>>> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no >>>>>>>>>>>>> ensemble of >>>>>>>>>>>>> measurements exist in these other world. AG >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" >>>>>>>>>>>> worlds. The worlds that arise at each trial are different in >>>>>>>>>>>> precisely one >>>>>>>>>>>> way and one way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. >>>>>>>>>>>> The >>>>>>>>>>>> different eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of >>>>>>>>>>>> differentiations" >>>>>>>>>>>> as the consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> different worlds generated by the original experimental difference >>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> multiply. "World" really means a unique configuration of the >>>>>>>>>>>> universal wave >>>>>>>>>>>> function, so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the >>>>>>>>>>>> "same >>>>>>>>>>>> world", and yes, there is only one measurement in each. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This is what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one >>>>>>>>>> measurement outcome in each world. However this business about "same >>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>> worlds" betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI >>>>>>>>>> "doesn't >>>>>>>>>> guarantee" that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. >>>>>>>>>> It's that >>>>>>>>>> the whole notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this >>>>>>>>>> context and >>>>>>>>>> has no bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and 1 >>>>>>>>>> twice >>>>>>>>>> whether we are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the >>>>>>>>>> "SAME >>>>>>>>>> ones" at each addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that then how >>>>>>>>>> can we >>>>>>>>>> be sure the answer is the same? Basically the only answer to that is >>>>>>>>>> "WTF?" >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum >>>>>>>>>>>> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally >>>>>>>>>>>> likely per the >>>>>>>>>>>> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two >>>>>>>>>>>> worlds >>>>>>>>>>>> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version >>>>>>>>>>>> knowing >>>>>>>>>>>> nothing about the other. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Again, what I have been saying all along! AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> If you get that, then the next bit follows. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole >>>>>>>>>>>> wave function as it were), no probability is involved. But if you >>>>>>>>>>>> repeat >>>>>>>>>>>> this experiment many times, each version of you will record an >>>>>>>>>>>> apparently >>>>>>>>>>>> random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens >>>>>>>>>>>> in the >>>>>>>>>>>> next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. >>>>>>>>>>>> Objectively >>>>>>>>>>>> there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Here's where you go astray. AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You *seem* to >>>>>>>>>> be saying that probability can't describe QM experiments because in >>>>>>>>>> each >>>>>>>>>> world there is only one outcome and therefore no "ensemble" of >>>>>>>>>> outcomes >>>>>>>>>> from which a probability can be derived. That is totally >>>>>>>>>> wrong-headed. >>>>>>>>>> There are two "ensembles": the ensemble of different multiverse >>>>>>>>>> branches at >>>>>>>>>> each experiment, and the ensemble of each experimenter's prior >>>>>>>>>> measurements, and those are enough to derive the appearance of >>>>>>>>>> randomness >>>>>>>>>> and to justify a probabilistic description despite the objective >>>>>>>>>> lack of >>>>>>>>>> randomness. If you agree with "what you have been saying all along", >>>>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>> you must agree that every experimenter in every world in an MWI >>>>>>>>>> multiverse >>>>>>>>>> will see a record of an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s in >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> described experiment. Right? And if not why not? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> IMO, since the trials are independent, the other observers are >>>>>>>>> disjoint from each other and each records only one measurement. So >>>>>>>>> the only >>>>>>>>> observer who sees an ensemble is the observer in THIS world. To get >>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> ensemble of outcomes in those other worlds, and hence a probability, >>>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>> need to appeal to a non-existent observer, also called the Bird's Eye >>>>>>>>> observer. AG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Respectfully, you did not answer my question. Do you agree or not >>>>>>>> that every experimenter in every branch of the multiverse who records >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> series of experiments as described in my scenario will record a >>>>>>>> *seemingly* random string of 1s and 0s? If you do, that's really >>>>>>>> all that's required. Abstract debates about "ensembles required to get >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> probability" are moot. If the world is as described by MWI, the >>>>>>>> appearance >>>>>>>> of probability is an outcome, and probability is the best possible >>>>>>>> description of how quantum experiments turn out from any real >>>>>>>> observer's >>>>>>>> POV (as opposed to the Bird's Eye observer). If you disagree that >>>>>>>> experimenters will get a seemingly random string of 1s and 0s, then >>>>>>>> you'll >>>>>>>> need to explain why you think that. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I did answer your question. Since the trials are independent, a NEW >>>>>>> OTHER WORLD observer is created on each THIS WORLD trial. So the other >>>>>>> observers see ONE outcome each. No reason to assume otherwise. You need >>>>>>> another postulate for this to work. AG >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> You're talking like a politician. Does each observer in each world >>>>>> who repeats said experiment record a seemingly random series of 1s and >>>>>> 0s >>>>>> or not? Yes/no. It's not hard. Come on, you can do it now... >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The answer is NO. In the spin experiment we're discussing, AG in this >>>>> world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and 1's. >>>>> >>>> >>>> That's all we need. Remember, we are talking about *if MWI were true* >>>> here. >>>> This is a thought experiment in which we are imagining how things would go >>>> if the MWI picture were correct. So if you're admitting that, in such a >>>> world, "AG in this world measures an apparently random sequence of 0's and >>>> 1's", then you have all the preconditions for making probabilistic >>>> predictions from it. >>>> >>>>> On each trial an imaginary other AG measures the complement of what AG >>>>> in this world measured. >>>>> >>>> >>>> They are not imaginary in MWI. I agree with this statement once you >>>> remove the word "imaginary", which we can do ex-hypothesi. I'm not asking >>>> you to believe in them here, only to advance an argument based of "if" MWI >>>> were true. >>>> >>>>> Now since the trials are independent, different imaginary AGs always >>>>> measure complements, but none measure more than ONE RESULT. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Again, discarding the word "imaginary", I agree. Of course they don't >>>> measure more than one outcome at the same trial. >>>> >>> >>> *I meant, of course, that each other AG measures ONE value when created >>> for some trial, but that's all this observer EVER observes because, unless >>> you can offer an argument, he's disjoint, that is NOT related or connected >>> any other "other AG". AG * >>> >> >> Of course? I’m starting to think your picture of MWI is even more >> misconceived than I imagined. Look, the MWI multiverse has the structure of >> a tree, where each branch event is a different possible eigenvalue of some >> observable. But - again ex hypothesi - all branches of the tree are >> ontologically equal. They are all as real as one another. Each AG’s past at >> a particular trial is the same as all the other AGs at that trial, though >> each AG’s future diverges into further trees of different observed >> realities. The equal status of all branches means that your idea that AG >> observers on other branches are in some way different from the AG branch >> you happen to be on in that they only ever have one observation is just >> totally misconceived. To be blunt, you don’t get it. >> >>> >>> As I previously indicated, these other AGs are disjoint from each other. >>>>> >>>> >>>> What do you mean by "disjoint" exactly? Mathematically "disjoint" means >>>> "having no elements in common". In the case of AG's who have measured >>>> different results, initially their worlds have only this difference >>>> between >>>> them, so in that sense they are not disjoint. If you mean they cannot >>>> interact with one another, and inhabit diverging realities, then that is >>>> only the case discounting interference, which we cannot do, because >>>> without >>>> interference effects we dot have quantum mechanics. This word disjoint >>>> seems to be central to your objection, but you need to define precisely >>>> what is meant by it or we cannot assess the validity of your claims. >>>> >>>> The only way to remedy this situation is to add another postulate to >>>>> your MWI. AG >>>>> >>>> >>>> No idea what we need to remedy. I'll ask my question again, adjusting >>>> it slightly. Does AG record a seemingly a random string of 1s and 0s in >>>> this experiment if MWI describes reality? >>>> >>> >>> *You seem to be assuming the other worlds created according to the MWI >>> interact with other due to interference. Since these other worlds are never >>> observed, I call them "imaginary"; and more important, no observations of >>> interacting other worlds have ever been made, within QM or without QM. So >>> the MWI is a huge stretch, at best. AG* >>> >> >> Im not assuming it. It’s part of QM that wave functions interfere with >> themselves. In MWI that translates to different “worlds” interfering. That >> interference is extremely limited since it only occurs to the extent that >> two branches can become identical again after having diverged. Nonetheless >> it is the basis for proposed experimental proofs of MWI. One argument goes >> that if we can make a quantum computer with a sufficiently large number of >> qubits, we can prove the existence of other worlds because the other worlds >> are the only place we can get all that information from. So, no, this is >> not my assumption, it’s intrinsic to MWI. Again, if you don’t get that, you >> don’t get MWI. You can’t expect your arguments to be taken seriously if you >> don’t understand basics like this. >> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/xsl8cSDT4M8/unsubscribe >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>> [email protected]. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9028f9b4-f111-4366-bb84-f4024d15202do%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9028f9b4-f111-4366-bb84-f4024d15202do%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >> -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAArMS00gPngPUgNvQLBvjOAHN%2B0TVVkBC%2BtYSJSah_5PNSx9qQ%40mail.gmail.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAArMS00gPngPUgNvQLBvjOAHN%2B0TVVkBC%2BtYSJSah_5PNSx9qQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7c6a0c4a-bccb-4034-9bf2-7e900ec808ean%40googlegroups.com.
