> On 12 Jan 2021, at 13:41, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 5:26:50 AM UTC-7 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 3 Jan 2021, at 03:43, Alan Grayson <[email protected] 
>> <applewebdata://5171EB0C-FEFA-4ADE-B155-8E9E18B6D0F7>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, January 2, 2021 at 2:17:12 AM UTC-7 [email protected] 
>> <http://gmail.com/> wrote:
>> On Fri, Jan 1, 2021 at 5:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> <[email protected] <>> wrote:
>> 
>> >> Assuming that Many Worlds is true and the multiverse is completely 
>> >> determined by Schrodinger's equation and there are therefore an 
>> >> astronomically large number (perhaps an infinite number) of Bruce 
>> >> Kelletts with microscopic or submicroscopic differences between them, and 
>> >> those Bruce Kelletts were observing a stream of photons polarized at 
>> >> angle X hit a polarizing filter set to angle X+Y; would any one of those 
>> >> Bruce Kelletts be able to predict with certainty that Bruce Kellett would 
>> >> or would not observe the photon pass through that filter? No. Would Bruce 
>> >> Kellett have to resort to probability? Yes. How would Bruce Kellett 
>> >> calculate the probability? If Bruce Kellett wanted to avoid logical self 
>> >> contradictions there is only one method Bruce Kellett could use, the Born 
>> >> Rule.
>> 
>> > I don't think that's quite true.  Suppose for example BK decided to 
>> > predict that the polarization with the highest value of |psi|^2 is the one 
>> > that would pass thru. He wouldn't run into any logical contradiction 
>> > because he's not interpreting it as probability,
>> 
>> If the BKs are Interpreting that as a certainty and not a probability then 
>> the BKs wouldn't run into a logical contradiction but they would run into an 
>> empirical one because that wouldn't match experimental observation. It's 
>> entirely possible that a BK's prediction would fail and that the high 
>> |psi|^2 photon would NOT make it through (unless the value happened to be 
>> exactly 1), and even if the prediction turned out to be correct scientific 
>> experiments must be repeatable and when the BKs conduct it over and over 
>> again all the BKs will soon find out that the predictions tend to be correct 
>> |psi|^2 of the time.
>> 
>>  > he wouldn't run into an empirical contradiction unless he assumed the 
>> actual process was producing a probability distribution and so he needed to 
>> predict a distribution and not just a value. 
>> 
>> But the BKs didn't assume it was a probability distribution, they discovered 
>> it was. If the BKs assumed the |psi|^2 value was just a number and not a 
>> probability and had no physical significance then the BKs would soon 
>> discover that the assumption was wrong
>>   
>> > Once you know that you need a probability distribution from the wave 
>> > function...then Born's rule is the only choice. 
>> 
>> Yes.
>>  
>> > But it's the step from the wave-function and "everything happens" to a 
>> > probability distribution where MWI leaves a gap.
>> 
>> I don't see the gap. If Many Worlds was true then what would the Brent 
>> Meekers interpret |psi|^2 to mean? If it's just a number and means nothing 
>> then solving Schrodinger's equation would be a waste of time because that 
>> equation would also mean nothing, it should be ignored; but then we wouldn't 
>> have transistors or lasers or about 6.02*10^23 other things in modern life. 
>> 
>> The gap Brent refers to has nothing to do with Schrodinger's equation, as I 
>> previously explained. Every trial in an experiment can be interpreted as a 
>> separate horse race, creating its own set of worlds where each possible 
>> occurrence is allegedly measured. But on subsequent trials, the MWI gives no 
>> guarantee that the same set of worlds is created. IOW, without another 
>> postulate appended to the MWI, each world is associated with exactly ONE 
>> measurement. No ensembles in these worlds; hence, the necessary condition 
>> for a probability doesn't exist. AG. 
> 
> The born rule must be applied, and it concerns the relative accessible 
> histories. It is better to avoid the term “world” which is hard to define.
> 
> Accessible to who, or to what? AG 


To the observer which are defined by relative universal number in arithmetic. 
The digital mechanist hypothesis entails directly a “many-histories” 
interpretation of elementary arithmetic, in arithmetic. 
You need to grasp that all computations are emulated in virtue or all true 
(sigma_1, semi-computable) arithmetical propositions. We know this implicitly 
since Gödel 1931 (the translation of provable into arithmetic) and made 
explicit later (provable is sigma_1 complete, so the box “[]” is a Universal 
Turing machine(ry).

Bruno





> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> John K Clark   See my new list at  Extropolis 
>> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis>
>>  
>> 
> 
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