On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 12:24 PM Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote:
>> I proposed a question, "How is it possible that evolution managed to >> produce consciousness?" and I gave the only answer to that question I could >> think of. And 3 times I've asked you if you can think of another answer. >> And three times I received nothing back but evasion. I now asked the same >> question for a fourth time, given that evolution can't select for what it >> can't see and natural selection can see intelligent behavior but it can't >> see consciousness, can you give me an explanation different from my own o >> n how evolution managed to produce a conscious being such as yourself? >> > > *>No, I can't*. > So I can explain something that you cannot. So which of our ideas are superior? > * > If you're saying evolution didn't select for consciousness, it > selected for intelligence, I agree with that. But so what?* > So what?!! If evolution selects for intelligence and you can't have intelligence without data processing and consciousness is the way data feels when it is being processed then it's no great mystery as to how evolution managed to produce consciousness by way of natural selection. >>> OK, fine, let's say intelligence implies consciousness, >>> >> >> >> If you grant me that then what are we arguing about? >> > > *> Over whether there are facts about consciousness, without having to > link it to intelligence.* > If there is no link between consciousness and intelligence then there is absolutely positively no way Darwinian Evolution could have produced consciousness. But I don't think Darwin was wrong, I think you are. > >> Do we really agree on all those terms? How can we know words that >> refer to qualia mean the same thing to both of us? There is no objective >> test for it, if there was then qualia wouldn't be subjective, it would be >> objective. >> > > *> We don't need infinite precision to uncover useful facts. * > I'm not talking about infinite precision, when it comes to qualia there is no assurance that we even approximately agree on meanings. > If someone says "that hurts", or "that looks red", we know what they mean. > Do you? When they say "that looks red" the red qualia they refer to may be your green qualia, and your green qualia could be their red qualia, but both of you still use the English word "red" to describe the qualia color of blood and the English word "green" to describe the qualia color of a leaf. > * > We take it as an assumption, and we make it explicit, that when > someone says "I see red" they are having the same kind of, or similar > enough,* > That is one hell of an assumption! If you're willing to do that why not be done with it and just take it as an assumption that your consciousness theory, whatever it may be, is correct? John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis> . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0fFgjWVsPTKG0SmeKb0PVuAyah9hyTDGpG2M8O-_AKYA%40mail.gmail.com.
