On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 10:08 AM John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 9:34 AM Terren Suydam <[email protected]> > wrote: > > *> A theory would give you a way to predict what kinds of beings are >> capable of feeling pain* >> > > Finding a theory is not a problem, theories are a dime a dozen > consciousness theories doubly so. But how could you ever figure out if > your consciousness theory was correct? > The same way we figure out any theory is correct. Does it have explanatory power, does it make falsifiable predictions. We're still arguing over whether there's such a thing as a fact about consciousness, but if we can imagine a world where you grant that there are, that's the world in which you can test theories of consciousness. > > > we'd say "given theory X, >> > > And if the given X which we take as being true is "Hogwarts exist" then we > must logically conclude we could find Harry Potter at that magical school > of witchcraft and wizardry. > > > *we know that if we create an AI with these characteristics,* >> > > If you're talking about observable characteristics then yes, but then > you're just talking about behavior not consciousness. > Sure, but we might be talking about the behavior of neurons, or their equivalent in an AI. > > *> a theory of consciousness that explains how qualia come to be within a >> system,* >> > > Explains? Just what sort of theory would satisfy you and make you say the > problem of consciousness has been solved? If I said the chemical Rednosium > Oxide produced qualia would all your questions be answered or would you be > curious to know how this chemical managed to do that? > All of our disagreements come down to whether there are facts about consciousness. You don't think there are, and that's all the question above is saying. > > >> > *you could make claims about their experience that go beyond observing >> behavior.* >> > > Claims are even easier to come about then theories are, but true claims > not so much. > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis>. > > . > >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1kQhdVYf5O9eLv2%3D16k%3Dm%2BE8mMhGd6CfwL_fGaB-SyHw%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1kQhdVYf5O9eLv2%3D16k%3Dm%2BE8mMhGd6CfwL_fGaB-SyHw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMy3ZA9Mruynsx6pEpUNojfqdCEXG6e4WCJ-0fShxWTbNAoSjA%40mail.gmail.com.
