On Friday, July 2, 2021 at 1:16:02 PM UTC-5 Brent wrote:

>
> On 7/2/2021 5:54 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Friday, July 2, 2021 at 4:01:35 AM UTC-5 [email protected] wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Jul 1, 2021 at 5:13 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> [email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>> > *why do you think a probability amplitude wave would not produce a 
>>> discreet spot?  Do you imagine it should produce smear werever it is 
>>> greater than 10% or 1% or what? *
>>>
>>
>> Probability must be about something and that something had to either have 
>> happened or have not happened; so it should produce a smear if and only if 
>> the probability is greater than 0% but less than 100%.  That's why if you 
>> place a detector near one of the slits so you know which one the electron 
>> went through you see no interference pattern, but as soon as you remove 
>> that detector you do.
>>
>>  >> the complex wave function, which contains the square root of -1 in it,  
>>>> is NOT an observable quantity, 
>>>
>>>
>>> * > Right, only the amplified and decohered effect of the probabilistic 
>>> event is observable.  That's why Bohr insisted that a classical world was 
>>> necessary in order that science be possible, since only classical 
>>> observables could be objectively agreed upon.*
>>>
>>
>> Bohr was a great scientist but a lousy philosopher. If Bohr's philosophy 
>> requires classical physics then obviously Bohr's philosophy is wrong  
>> because classical physics is a theory known to be incorrect.  As Richard 
>> Feynman said "Nature is quantum dammit!"
>>
>> > *there's a disconnect between the mechanism of decoherence and the 
>>> assignment of probabilities to different worlds, as Bruce has pointed out.  
>>> There has to be a separate axiom that says there is this splitting into 
>>> worlds that is probabilistic. *
>>
>>
>> There is nothing in Schrodinger's equation that says anything about the wave 
>> collapsing, so Everett simply says it doesn't collapse and that means 
>> you've got many worlds; it's bare-bones quantum mechanics that contains 
>> everything that is required and not one more thing. If you don't like all 
>> those worlds and want to get rid of them you've got to stick on some 
>> additional bells and whistles to the equation that, other than get rid of 
>> those many worlds, do nothing but make the equation more difficult to 
>> solve.  
>>
>
> There are two main schools of thought on the wave function collapse; the 
> wave function collapse is real or it is not. The GRW interpretation states 
> there is with any quantum wave a fundamental phenomenon of collapse. The 
> collapse occurs fundamentally by a stochastic rule. A large number of 
> quantum states with some measure of entanglement then has a far greater 
> probability in any interval of time of a collapse. The classical state is a 
> sort of constant collapsing condition. The other view is that quantum wave 
> function collapse is an illusion and that fundamentally there is no 
> collapse. The MWI is an instance of that, where there is a splitting of the 
> world according to different quantum amplitudes and an observer records 
> data along two or more tracks. The observer enters into an entanglement 
> with the system and what the observer records is in a sense "frame dragged" 
> along each of those branches.
>
>
> You left out a third school of thought, that the wave function is just a 
> mathematical tool and it's "collapse" is just a matter of one updating 
> knowledge of the system.  This includes the QBist, path-integral, and 
> consistent histories approaches.
>
> And I'm not sure where you place the transactional approach of Cramer in 
> which there is a real, probabilistic collapse but not spontaneous.
>
> Brent
>

Well I did not cover all interpretations. There are two types with respect 
to collapse, collapse realism and collapse anti-realism. MWI 
is ψ-ontological and Qubism is ψ-epistemic, but that are both collapse 
anti-real. This is where Qubism departs from Copenhagen Interpretation, 
which is collapse real. If the collapse is regarded as just a math-tool 
then I would tend to call it collapse anti-real.  I am not so sure about 
the transactional interpretation. I communicated with Ruth Kastner who 
seems to think any discussion of QM outside of transactionalism is 
gibberish. 

LC
 

>
> In both of these perspectives there is an unknown mechanism. How the GRW 
> spontaneous collapse occurs is not defined or presented as due to a 
> physical process. Similarly, MWI has this splitting of worlds, where on the 
> global level nothing really changes, but locally to an observer a change 
> does happen. There is no mechanism for this splitting. 
>
> Quantum mechanics by itself has no collapse process, whether real or some 
> sort of subjective observation of phenomenology. The Yggdrasil tree of 
> bifurcating worlds in MWI occurs for no discernible reason and globally it 
> is not real. With GRW objective collapse there is again no fundamental 
> mechanism behind this collapse. This may point to some further underlying 
> physics. If there is such physics it must have some conservation or 
> symmetry principle. If it does not have such then in effect it really is 
> not physics. We might then appeal to conservation of information, 
> information sharing an equivalency with a form of entropy by Shannon-von 
> Neumann formula, or quantum complexity. Which ever of these quantum 
> interpretations fits best into such an understanding is not clear to see at 
> this time.
>
> LC 
>  
>
>>
>>
>>> *> Self-locating uncertainty was invented to explain this, but it seems 
>>> incoherent in that it supposes there is some "self" that could be here or 
>>> there, independent of the physical being which is both places. *
>>>
>>
>> There is absolutely nothing more certain than the existence of the self, 
>> but there is nothing mystical about that; it's just that it's not a noun. 
>> The self is what the brain does, not what the brain is, so "self" must 
>> be an adjective. I would define the particular self called John K Clark 
>> recursively, he is whoever remembers being John K Clark yesterday. If 
>> Everett is right and every change no matter how small causes the 
>> universe to split, then there must be some changes to my brain that are so 
>> small (one neutron in one neuron moving one Planck length to the left ) 
>> that they cause no change in conscious experience and do not degrade the 
>> memory of being John K Clark yesterday. Therefore there must be an 
>> astronomical number to an astronomical power of John K Clarks all living in 
>> different, very very slightly different, worlds. The number would be 
>> HUGE but it would still be finite, so the number of John K Clarks that see 
>> you flip a fair coin and come up heads 5 times in a row must be twice as 
>> large as the number of times he sees you do it 6 times, but there would 
>> still be a few that see him do it 100 times, maybe 1000 or even more.  
>>
>>  John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis 
>> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis>
>> mxc2
>>
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