On 3/2/2022 1:42 PM, Tomas Pales wrote:

On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 10:07:22 PM UTC+1 meeke...@gmail.com wrote:



    On 3/2/2022 12:58 PM, Tomas Pales wrote:

    On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 9:11:34 PM UTC+1
    meeke...@gmail.com wrote:



        On 3/2/2022 2:41 AM, Tomas Pales wrote:

        On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 4:28:48 AM UTC+1
        meeke...@gmail.com wrote:



            On 3/1/2022 4:00 PM, Tomas Pales wrote:

            On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 12:17:43 AM UTC+1
            meeke...@gmail.com wrote:



                On 3/1/2022 1:59 PM, Tomas Pales wrote:

                On Tuesday, March 1, 2022 at 8:14:31 PM UTC+1
                meeke...@gmail.com wrote:

                But before we can assess whether something has a
                consistent description we need to specify the
                description precisely. With a vague description
                we may be missing an inconsistency lurking
                somewhere in it or there may appear to be an
                inconsistency that is not really there. For
                example, if we try to describe a quantum object
                in terms of classical physics the description
                will not be precise enough and the assumptions
                inherent in those terms will be contradictory.
                The ideal description would reveal the complete
                structure of the object down to empty sets but we
                can't physically probe objects around us to that
                level.

                    I think that's a cheat.   It's not that
                    classical physics was imprecise.  It was just
                    wrong.  QM and Newtonian mechanics even have
                    different ontologies.  If you're wrong about
                    the subject matter no amount of logic will
                    correct that. Logic only explicates what is
                    implicit in the premises.  It's a cheat to
                    appeal to an ideal description when you have
                    no way of producing such a description  or
                    knowing if you have achieved it or even
                    knowing whether one exists .


                It's not a cheat, it's a complete mathematical
                description. Every mathematical structure can be
                ultimately described as a pure set. Classical
                physics and quantum physics have not been
                described as pure sets and so they are not
                complete mathematical descriptions. The fact that
                it is not feasible for us to achieve such a
                description of physical structures doesn't mean
                that it doesn't exist.

                And the fact that you can form a sentence using the
                word doesn't mean it exists either.


            Which word?

            "Complete" mathematical description.


        I said it because according to set theory every mathematical
        structure can be reduced to a pure set. So a pure set would
        be a complete mathematical description of any object. It
        basically means that an object is analyzed down to its
        smallest parts (empty sets). This internal structure of the
        object also establishes all the object's relations to all
        other objects, including for example the relation of
        "insurability" between a car and insurance providers.

        Which means you are assuming the world is a mathematical
        structure.  In other words begging the question.


    Yeah, I am assuming that things constitute collections - that's
    what a mathematical structure is. What other kind of structure
    can there be?

    Don't you see that "things" and "collections" are concepts we
    impose on the world.  Didn't you notice when the whole ontology of
    the world shifted from particles to fields?  No?  Did you see
    metphysicians rushing to revise their world views?


And the concept of "collections" obviously corresponds to the world. After all, how could it be otherwise? If there are two somethings they automatically constitute a collection of two somethings. Particles or fields, whatever - they have mathematical descriptions and mathematical descriptions are in principle reducible to pure sets.

One of their mathematical descriptions used to be that two different something could not be in the same place at the same time.  That two identical things must be the same thing.  It's just logic.

Yes, all mathematical descriptions can be reduced to sets and relations.  I'm told they can also be reduced to categories, but haven't studied category theory.  Russell and Whitehead thought they can be reduced to logic.  And things admit of mathematical description.  But you've leaped over all that to things*are *their mathematical description.

Brent

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