On 3/2/2022 2:34 PM, Tomas Pales wrote:
On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 10:54:50 PM UTC+1 meeke...@gmail.com wrote:
On 3/2/2022 1:42 PM, Tomas Pales wrote:
On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 10:07:22 PM UTC+1
meeke...@gmail.com wrote:
On 3/2/2022 12:58 PM, Tomas Pales wrote:
On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 9:11:34 PM UTC+1
meeke...@gmail.com wrote:
On 3/2/2022 2:41 AM, Tomas Pales wrote:
On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 4:28:48 AM UTC+1
meeke...@gmail.com wrote:
On 3/1/2022 4:00 PM, Tomas Pales wrote:
On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 12:17:43 AM UTC+1
meeke...@gmail.com wrote:
On 3/1/2022 1:59 PM, Tomas Pales wrote:
On Tuesday, March 1, 2022 at 8:14:31 PM UTC+1
meeke...@gmail.com wrote:
But before we can assess whether something
has a consistent description we need to
specify the description precisely. With a
vague description we may be missing an
inconsistency lurking somewhere in it or
there may appear to be an inconsistency that
is not really there. For example, if we try
to describe a quantum object in terms of
classical physics the description will not
be precise enough and the assumptions
inherent in those terms will be
contradictory. The ideal description would
reveal the complete structure of the object
down to empty sets but we can't physically
probe objects around us to that level.
I think that's a cheat. It's not that
classical physics was imprecise. It was
just wrong. QM and Newtonian mechanics
even have different ontologies. If
you're wrong about the subject matter no
amount of logic will correct that. Logic
only explicates what is implicit in the
premises. It's a cheat to appeal to an
ideal description when you have no way of
producing such a description or knowing
if you have achieved it or even knowing
whether one exists .
It's not a cheat, it's a complete
mathematical description. Every mathematical
structure can be ultimately described as a
pure set. Classical physics and quantum
physics have not been described as pure sets
and so they are not complete mathematical
descriptions. The fact that it is not
feasible for us to achieve such a description
of physical structures doesn't mean that it
doesn't exist.
And the fact that you can form a sentence
using the word doesn't mean it exists either.
Which word?
"Complete" mathematical description.
I said it because according to set theory every
mathematical structure can be reduced to a pure set. So
a pure set would be a complete mathematical description
of any object. It basically means that an object is
analyzed down to its smallest parts (empty sets). This
internal structure of the object also establishes all
the object's relations to all other objects, including
for example the relation of "insurability" between a
car and insurance providers.
Which means you are assuming the world is a mathematical
structure. In other words begging the question.
Yeah, I am assuming that things constitute collections -
that's what a mathematical structure is. What other kind of
structure can there be?
Don't you see that "things" and "collections" are concepts we
impose on the world. Didn't you notice when the whole
ontology of the world shifted from particles to fields? No?
Did you see metphysicians rushing to revise their world views?
And the concept of "collections" obviously corresponds to the
world. After all, how could it be otherwise? If there are two
somethings they automatically constitute a collection of two
somethings. Particles or fields, whatever - they have
mathematical descriptions and mathematical descriptions are in
principle reducible to pure sets.
One of their mathematical descriptions used to be that two
different something could not be in the same place at the same
time. That two identical things must be the same thing. It's
just logic.
But mathematics doesn't demand that you can't associate different sets
with the same location in a topological space. They chose to describe
objects that cannot be associated with the same location in spacetime
because it worked in classical physics... until more precise
measurements showed that some objects in our world (bosons) are not
like that. Two things with all the same properties are one thing. Two
exact copies are not the same thing because they differ in one
property - their position in reality (and thus in their relations to
other things).
Yes, all mathematical descriptions can be reduced to sets and
relations. I'm told they can also be reduced to categories, but
haven't studied category theory. Russell and Whitehead thought
they can be reduced to logic. And things admit of mathematical
description. But you've leaped over all that to things*are *their
mathematical description.
Things correspond to a mathematical description.
Then we agree that things and their mathematical descriptions are not
identities. I contend that the difference is that some mathematical
descriptions have no referent.
Brent
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