On Thursday, March 3, 2022 at 1:38:20 AM UTC+1 meeke...@gmail.com wrote: > > > On 3/2/2022 2:34 PM, Tomas Pales wrote: > > > On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 10:54:50 PM UTC+1 meeke...@gmail.com wrote: > >> >> >> On 3/2/2022 1:42 PM, Tomas Pales wrote: >> >> >> On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 10:07:22 PM UTC+1 meeke...@gmail.com >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 3/2/2022 12:58 PM, Tomas Pales wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 9:11:34 PM UTC+1 meeke...@gmail.com >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 3/2/2022 2:41 AM, Tomas Pales wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 4:28:48 AM UTC+1 meeke...@gmail.com >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 3/1/2022 4:00 PM, Tomas Pales wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 12:17:43 AM UTC+1 meeke...@gmail.com >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 3/1/2022 1:59 PM, Tomas Pales wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tuesday, March 1, 2022 at 8:14:31 PM UTC+1 meeke...@gmail.com >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> But before we can assess whether something has a consistent >>>>>> description we need to specify the description precisely. With a vague >>>>>> description we may be missing an inconsistency lurking somewhere in it >>>>>> or >>>>>> there may appear to be an inconsistency that is not really there. For >>>>>> example, if we try to describe a quantum object in terms of classical >>>>>> physics the description will not be precise enough and the assumptions >>>>>> inherent in those terms will be contradictory. The ideal description >>>>>> would >>>>>> reveal the complete structure of the object down to empty sets but we >>>>>> can't >>>>>> physically probe objects around us to that level. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I think that's a cheat. It's not that classical physics was >>>>>>> imprecise. It was just wrong. QM and Newtonian mechanics even have >>>>>>> different ontologies. If you're wrong about the subject matter no >>>>>>> amount >>>>>>> of logic will correct that. Logic only explicates what is implicit in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> premises. It's a cheat to appeal to an ideal description when you have >>>>>>> no >>>>>>> way of producing such a description or knowing if you have achieved it >>>>>>> or >>>>>>> even knowing whether one exists . >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It's not a cheat, it's a complete mathematical description. Every >>>>>> mathematical structure can be ultimately described as a pure set. >>>>>> Classical >>>>>> physics and quantum physics have not been described as pure sets and so >>>>>> they are not complete mathematical descriptions. The fact that it is not >>>>>> feasible for us to achieve such a description of physical structures >>>>>> doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> And the fact that you can form a sentence using the word doesn't mean >>>>>> it exists either. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Which word? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "Complete" mathematical description. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I said it because according to set theory every mathematical structure >>>> can be reduced to a pure set. So a pure set would be a complete >>>> mathematical description of any object. It basically means that an object >>>> is analyzed down to its smallest parts (empty sets). This internal >>>> structure of the object also establishes all the object's relations to all >>>> other objects, including for example the relation of "insurability" >>>> between >>>> a car and insurance providers. >>>> >>>> >>>> Which means you are assuming the world is a mathematical structure. In >>>> other words begging the question. >>>> >>> >>> Yeah, I am assuming that things constitute collections - that's what a >>> mathematical structure is. What other kind of structure can there be? >>> >>> >>> Don't you see that "things" and "collections" are concepts we impose on >>> the world. Didn't you notice when the whole ontology of the world shifted >>> from particles to fields? No? Did you see metphysicians rushing to revise >>> their world views? >>> >> >> And the concept of "collections" obviously corresponds to the world. >> After all, how could it be otherwise? If there are two somethings they >> automatically constitute a collection of two somethings. Particles or >> fields, whatever - they have mathematical descriptions and mathematical >> descriptions are in principle reducible to pure sets. >> >> >> One of their mathematical descriptions used to be that two different >> something could not be in the same place at the same time. That two >> identical things must be the same thing. It's just logic. >> > > But mathematics doesn't demand that you can't associate different sets > with the same location in a topological space. They chose to describe > objects that cannot be associated with the same location in spacetime > because it worked in classical physics... until more precise measurements > showed that some objects in our world (bosons) are not like that. Two > things with all the same properties are one thing. Two exact copies are not > the same thing because they differ in one property - their position in > reality (and thus in their relations to other things). > > >> >> Yes, all mathematical descriptions can be reduced to sets and relations. >> I'm told they can also be reduced to categories, but haven't studied >> category theory. Russell and Whitehead thought they can be reduced to >> logic. And things admit of mathematical description. But you've leaped >> over all that to things* are *their mathematical description. >> > > Things correspond to a mathematical description. > > > Then we agree that things and their mathematical descriptions are not > identities. I contend that the difference is that some mathematical > descriptions have no referent. >
Descriptions are just words, symbols, notations which refer to things. Why would some mathematical descriptions have a referent and others not? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4740f36c-26c3-4305-bb1f-567bf32d79ffn%40googlegroups.com.
