Am Fr, 12. Aug 2022, um 19:56, schrieb Jason Resch:
> 
> 
> On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 2:04 AM Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote:
>> __
>> Hi Jason,
>> 
>> This is really interesting, thanks for sharing. Since Wolfram started going 
>> in this direction, something that occurs to me is this: hypergraphs are 
>> perhaps one of the most general mathematical constructs that can be 
>> conceived of. Almost everything else can be seen as a special case of 
>> hypergraphs. Like you say, with the update rules, we shouldn't be surprised 
>> if they are equivalent to the UD. My scepticism is this: is anything being 
>> gained in terms of explanatory power? Should we be surprised that such a 
>> powerful representation can contain the rules of our reality? I do admit 
>> that I have to study these ideas in more detail, and there is something 
>> really compelling about hypergraphs + update rules.
> 
> That is a good question. I am not familiar with them myself, but my 
> understanding is they do not provide for any form of computation beyond what 
> is turing computable, so in that sense, I don't know that they provide any 
> additional explanatory power beyond the simple statement that all 
> computations exist.
> 
> A commenter on my site recently asked, what can we say about the "computer" 
> that computes all these computations. My reply was:
>> 
>> "There is no single one. There are infinite varieties of different TMs, and 
>> all can exist Platonically/Arithmetically. Gregory Chaitin discovered an 
>> equation whose structure models LISP computers. There are likewise other 
>> equations corresponding to the Java Virtual Machine, and the Commodore 64.

This is really interesting, I didn't know about that! Can you provide some 
references?

>> All these Turing machines, and their execution traces of every computer 
>> program they can run, exist in math in the same sense that the Mandelbrot 
>> set or the decimal expansion of Pi exist in math. Despite the infinite 
>> variety of architectures for different Turing machines, their equivalence 
>> (in the Turing computability sense) makes the question of “Which Turing 
>> machine is running this universe?” impossible to answer, beyond saying, “all 
>> of them are.”"

I agree.

> I think hypergraphs, then, would be just one more mathematical object we 
> could add to the heap of Turing universal mathematical objects which could 
> (and would, if Platonism is correct) underlie the computations of our 
> universe/experiences.
>  
>> 
>> 
>> "As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will 
>> immediately ask “On what computer?” But a key intellectual point is that 
>> computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, 
>> without reference to anything like a physical computer. "
> 
> My same reply also provided an explanation/argument, which is applicable to 
> anyone who accepts simple truths concerning abstract objects have definite 
> and objective true/false values, paired with a rejection of philosophical 
> zombies. I think John rejects zombies, so he would have to reject objective 
> truth to believe a physical computer is necessary to produce observers. Below 
> is what I wrote:
> 
>> The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that 
>> truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be 
>> true independently of the universe or someone writing it down, or a 
>> mathematician thinking about it, that is all you need.
> 
>> For if the truth values of certain simple relations have an independent 
>> existence, then so to do the truth values of far more complex equations. 
>> Let’s call the Diophantine equation that computes the Wave Function of the 
>> Hubble Volume of our universe “Equation X”. Now then, it becomes a question 
>> of pure arithmetic, whether it is true or false that:
> 
>> “In Equation X, does the universal state variable U, at time step T contain 
>> a pattern of electrons that encode to the string:
>> ‘why does the existence of Universal Equations imply the existence of 
>> iterative search processes for solutions?'”
> 
>> If that question has a definitive objective truth, then it is the case that 
>> in the universe U, at time step T, in equation X, there is some person in 
>> that universe who had a conscious thought, and wrote it down and it got 
>> organized into a pattern of electrons which anyone who inspects this vast 
>> equation with its huge variables could see.
> 
>> Once you get to this point, the last and final step is to reject the 
>> possibility that the patterns found in these equations, which behave and act 
>> like they are conscious, and claim to be conscious, are philosophical 
>> zombies. In other words, to accept that they are conscious beings, just like 
>> those who exist in “physical” universes (assuming there is any possible 
>> distinction between a physical universe, and a physical universe computed by 
>> a Platonic or Arithmetic Turing Machine).

I tend to agree with you, because this is the most parsimonious explanation of 
reality than assuming some mysterious process/mechanism/entity that makes it so 
that this particular Universe and this particular state of affairs and this 
particular moment in time is real and others are not.

Telmo

> 
> Jason
> 
>  
>> 
>> 
>> Oh boy, John Clark is not going to like this :)
>> 
>> Telmo.
>> 
>> Am Do, 11. Aug 2022, um 20:35, schrieb Jason Resch:
>>> https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/04/why-does-the-universe-exist-some-perspectives-from-our-physics-project/
>>>  
>>> 
>>> I found this fascinating. It appears to have many similarities with the 
>>> type of physical reality that emerges from then universal dovetailer, with 
>>> new ways of explaining it and some new insights.
>>> 
>>> Jason
>>> 
>>> 
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