On Tue, Jun 25, 2024 at 2:01 PM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> @Jason. You say: > > ""Every rule has an exception" > This is a self referential sentence" > > But from my paper: > > "In “This sentence is false”, a 3rd person “sentence” is imagined to > exist, and to that imagined > “sentence”, the property of “is false” is added, and a weird combination > of 3rd person entity “This > sentence is false” masquerading as 1st person entity is created, and from > this the apparent > paradox, which ultimately is nothing but an incoherent worlds-play, > appears. Self-reference on > the other hand, is a 1st person entity all-throughout. It is not a 3rd > person entity like “sentence” > that we can point outside of ourselves and to which we can add properties. > Self-reference is itself > and is for itself. Its “looking-back-at-itself” happens from the inside. > Because of this, the paradox > doesn’t take place as it happens for “This sentence is false” and any > other words-play that can be > made at the 3rd person, including Russell’s paradox." > > So how can you claim you read it, when I say clearly in the paper that > such "self-referential sentences" are just incoherent words-play ? > "The sentence is a lie" may be incoherent word play. But if there are any self-existing absolute truths, they must consist in truths whose denial leads to inconsistency. I think the sentence you gave as an example of incoherent word play is just an example of inconsistency. It is different from the example I provided, which I intended to show leads to an absolute truth: the existence of rules that have no exceptions. If such absolute truths exists then the idea of an absolute nothing (devoid of even truths and relations) cannot be. Jason > > On Tuesday 25 June 2024 at 20:48:56 UTC+3 Jason Resch wrote: > >> On Tue, Jun 25, 2024 at 12:54 PM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> When will that day come when people actually first read the papers and >>> then comment ? Oh, God! >>> >> >> I read your paper. I am sorry if you did not find my comments or >> references helpful. >> >> Jason >> >> >>> >>> On Tuesday 25 June 2024 at 19:18:25 UTC+3 Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jun 25, 2024, 9:09 AM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I invite you to discover my paper "How Self-Reference Builds the >>>>> World" which is the theory of everything that people searched for >>>>> millennia. It can be found on my philpeople profile: >>>>> https://philpeople.org/profiles/cosmin-visan >>>>> >>>> >>>> Hi Cosmin, >>>> >>>> Very nice, and very original work. >>>> >>>> A few comments and questions, written as they occurred to me: >>>> >>>> >>>> The idea of self reference being larger and smaller than itself made me >>>> think of how the universe can be thought of as much larger than us, but all >>>> our thoughts and ideas about the universe are contained within our skulls. >>>> I am not sure if this is an example of the kind of paradox of self >>>> reference that you describe but I thought I would ask. >>>> >>>> >>>> Your bootstrapping of nothing into something via self reference made me >>>> think of the following example. Start with the sentence: >>>> >>>> "Every rule has an exception" >>>> This is a self referential sentence, which can be either true or false. >>>> If it is false, then there are rules without exceptions (i.e. laws). If it >>>> is true, then "every rule has an exception" would also be a rule, and if it >>>> has an exception, then again we reach the conclusion that there are some >>>> rules without exceptions (i.e. laws), so this self refuting sentence >>>> implies a universal truth, the existence of laws. >>>> >>>> >>>> Another comment: >>>> Fractals are objects defined through their self reference, is any >>>> special attention owed to them? What about numbers such as e? Or steps in a >>>> recursive computational relation (steps of the evolving game of life >>>> universe might be conceived of as a recursive function, for example). >>>> >>>> >>>> What would you consider the simplest possible program that had >>>> consciousness to be? That is, what is the shortest bit of code that would >>>> manifest consciousness of something (even a single bit)? >>>> >>>> >>>> I agree to that the difficulty of explaining or communicating qualia >>>> stems from what me might call self-reference islands. Each of us is trapped >>>> within an isolated context, from which we have qualia of various kinds but >>>> no common framework established between other minds that enable >>>> communication beyond this island. Think of the analogous situation of >>>> people in two different universes or AIs in two different computer >>>> simulations, trying to define what they mean by a metered or a kilogram. >>>> These terms are meaningless and incommunicable outside the particular >>>> universe, since they are terms wholly defined by relationships that exist >>>> only within a particular universe or simulation. There not only can be no >>>> agreement on what is meant by those terms, but they aren't even definable >>>> (outside the contextual island that exists only within that universe). For >>>> we consciousness beings, we each have such a universe of qualia in our own >>>> heads, and these are similarly undefinable beyond the context of our inner >>>> view. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> As for the ontology that results, your work reminded me of these works >>>> that contain related ideas (of self-reference, observer-centric, >>>> nothing-based means of bootstrapping reality): >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal's "The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body >>>> problem" >>>> >>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236138701_The_computationalist_reformulation_of_the_mind-body_problem >>>> >>>> >>>> Mark F. Sharlow's "Can Machines Have First-Person Properties?" >>>> https://archive.is/rDP33 >>>> >>>> >>>> Markus Muller's >>>> "Law without law: from observer states to physics via algorithmic >>>> information theory" >>>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.01826 >>>> >>>> David Pearce's "The Zero Ontology" >>>> https://www.hedweb.com/witherall/zero.htm >>>> >>>> Stephen Wolfram's "The Concept of the Ruliad" >>>> https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/11/the-concept-of-the-ruliad/ >>>> >>>> And Russell Standish's "Theory of Nothing" >>>> https://www.hpcoders.com.au/nothing.html >>>> >>>> I have written an article which reaches similar conclusions: >>>> >>>> https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/ >>>> >>>> Note that while I focus more on the mathematics than self-reference, I >>>> do see self-reference (in consciousness) as being a key step in the process >>>> of realizing an apparent reality, providing a first person localized >>>> perspective out of objective mathematical truths and number relations. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Here are some quotes and references you may appreciate from others who >>>> have seen a key role of self-reference in the definition of consciousness: >>>> >>>> Douglas Hofstadter's notion of "Strange Loop" >>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strange_loop >>>> >>>> “In the end, we are self-perceiving, self-inventing, locked-in mirages >>>> that are little miracles of self-reference.” >>>> — Douglas Hofstadter, I Am a Strange Loop, p. 363 >>>> >>>> WHO SHOVES WHOM AROUND INSIDE THE CAREENIUM? OF WHAT IS THE MEANING OF >>>> THE WORD "I"? - DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER - 1982 >>>> - >>>> https://jsomers.net/careenium.pdf >>>> - >>>> “The real point is, there's only ONE MECHANISM underlying "I-ness": >>>> namely, the circling-back of a complex representation of the system >>>> together with its representations of all the rest of the world. Which >>>> “I” you are is determined by the WAY you carry out that cycling, >>>> and the way you represent the world.” >>>> >>>> “In a sense, Gödel’s Theorem is a mathematical analogue of the fact >>>> that I cannot understand what it is like not to like chocolate, or to be a >>>> bat, except by an infinite sequence of ever-more-accurate simulation >>>> processes that converge toward, but never reach, emulation. I am trapped >>>> inside myself and therefore can’t see how other systems are. Gödel’s >>>> Theorem follows from a consequence of the general fact: I am trapped inside >>>> myself and therefore can’t see how other systems see me. Thus the >>>> objectivity-subjectivity dilemmas that Nagel has sharply posed are somehow >>>> related to epistemological problems in both mathematical logic, and as we >>>> saw earlier, the foundations of physics.” (Hofstader in Mind’s I) >>>> -- Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett in "The Mind’s I" (1981) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> “There was a man who said though, >>>> it seems that I know that I know, >>>> what I would like to see, >>>> is the eye that knows me, >>>> when I know that I know that I know.” >>>> - >>>> “This is the human problem, we know that we know.” >>>> -- Alan Watts >>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I_Q2xNqKvnE >>>> >>>> >>>> “Even for the universal machine doing nothing more than >>>> self-introspection, her consciousness (related to []p & p) is not >>>> definable, for reason related to the fact that knowledge and truth are not >>>> definable by any machine, when the range of that knowledge and truth is >>>> vast enough to encompass the machine itself.” >>>> -- Bruno Marchal >>>> >>>> >>>> “You need self-reference ability for the notion of belief, together >>>> with a notion of reality or truth, which the machine cannot define. >>>> To get immediate knowledgeability you need to add consistency ([]p & >>>> <>t), to get ([]p & <>t & p) which prevents transitivity, and gives to the >>>> machine a feeling of immediacy.” >>>> -- Bruno Marchal >>>> >>>> “It is not because some “information processing” could support >>>> consciousness that we can conclude that all information processing can >>>> support consciousness. You need at least one reflexive loop. You need two >>>> reflexive loop for having self-consciousness (Löbianity)." >>>> -- Bruno Marchal >>>> >>>> >>>> “The appearance of a universe, or even universes, must be explained by >>>> the geometry of possible computations of possible machines, seen by these >>>> machines".” >>>> -- The Amoeba’s Secret - Bruno Marchal 2014 >>>> https://www.hpcoders.com.au/docs/amoebassecret.pdf page 140 >>>> >>>> >>>> “To exist, it must have cause–effect power; to exist from its own >>>> intrinsic perspective, independent of extrinsic factors, it must have >>>> cause–effect power upon itself: its present mechanisms and state must ‘make >>>> a difference’ to the probability of some past and future state of the >>>> system (its cause–effect space)” >>>> https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rstb.2014.0167 >>>> (Tononi Koch, IIT paper) >>>> >>>> >>>> “More broadly one could say that, through the human being, the universe >>>> has created a mirror to observe itself.” - David Bohm, The Undivided >>>> Universe, Routledge, 2002, pp. 389 >>>> >>>> “A many minds theory, like a many worlds theory, supposes that, >>>> associated with a sentient being at any given time, there is a multiplicity >>>> of distinct conscious points of view. But a many minds theory holds that it >>>> is these conscious points of view or ‘minds,’ rather than ‘worlds’, that >>>> are to be conceived as literally dividing or differentiating over time.” >>>> – Michael Lockwood in “‘Many Minds’. Interpretations of Quantum >>>> Mechanics” (1995) >>>> >>>> >>>> “It is sometimes suggested within physics that information is >>>> fundamental to the physics of the universe, and even that physical >>>> properties and laws may be derivative from informational properties and >>>> laws. This “it from bit” view is put forward by “Wheeler (1989, 1990) and >>>> Fredkin (1990), and is also investigated by papers in Zurek (1990) and >>>> MAtzke (1992, 1994). If this is so, we may be able to give information a >>>> more serious role in our ontology. [...] >>>> This approach stems from the observation that in physical theories, >>>> fundamental physical states are effectively individuated as information >>>> states. When we look at a feature such as mass or charge, we find simply a >>>> brute space of differences that make a difference. Physics tells us nothing >>>> about what mass is, or what charge is: it simply tells us the range of >>>> different values that these features can take on, and it tells us their >>>> effects on other features. As far as physical theories are concerned, >>>> specific states of mass or charge might as well be pure information states: >>>> all that matters is their location within an information space.” >>>> -- David Chalmers in "The Conscious Mind" (1996) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> "A cat. >>>> A cat is seen. >>>> Something seen, must be a seer. >>>> I see a cat. >>>> I exist. >>>> What is I?" >>>> -- Jason >>>> >>>> >>>> "Perhaps consciousness arises when the brain’s simulation of the world >>>> becomes so complete that it must include a model of itself. Obviously the >>>> limbs and body of a survival machine must constitute an important part of >>>> its simulated world; presumably for the same kind of reason, the simulation >>>> itself could be regarded as part of the world to be simulated. Another word >>>> for this might indeed be “self-awareness,” >>>> -- Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett in "The Mind’s I" (1981) >>>> >>>> >>>> These quotes get to the heart of the difficulty of self reference, and >>>> the difference between being vs. describing: >>>> >>>> “As we discussed in the first chapters of this book, the study of >>>> consciousness as a scientific subject casts a sharp light on a special >>>> problem faced by the scientific observer. As long as his description leaves >>>> out his phenomenal experience and he can assume that such experience is >>>> present in another observer, they both can give a description of the >>>> physical world from a “God’s-eye” view. When the observer turns his >>>> attention to the description of consciousness, however, he must face some >>>> challenging issues. These issues include the fact that consciousness is >>>> embodied uniquely and privately in each individual; that no description, >>>> scientific or otherwise, is equivalent to the experience of individual >>>> embodiment; that there is no judge deciding categories in nature except for >>>> natural selection; and that the external description of information by the >>>> observers as a code in the brain leads to paradox. These issues pose a >>>> challenging set of problems: how to provide an adequate description of >>>> higher brain functions; how information arises in nature; and, finally, how >>>> we know–the central concern of epistemology.” >>>> -- Gerald Maurice Edelman and Giulio Tononi in "A Universe of >>>> Consciousness" (2000) >>>> >>>> >>>> “Our analysis has predicated on the notion that while we can construct >>>> a sensible scientific theory of consciousness that explains how matter >>>> becomes imagination, that theory cannot replace experience: Being is not >>>> describing. A scientific description can have predictive and explanatory >>>> power, but it cannot directly convey the phenomenal experience that depends >>>> on having an individual brain and body. In our theory of brain complexity, >>>> we have removed the paradoxes that arise by assuming only the God’s-eye >>>> view of the external observer and, by adhering to selectionism, we have >>>> removed the homunculus. Nevertheless, because of the nature of embodiment, >>>> we still remain, to some extent, prisoners of description, only somewhat >>>> better off than the occupants of Plato’s cave.” >>>> -- Gerald Maurice Edelman and Giulio Tononi in "A Universe of >>>> Consciousness" (2000) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> When do you expect part 2 will be out? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Jason >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> >> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/911a06ce-28a5-40ed-9282-a7b14b92220fn%40googlegroups.com >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/911a06ce-28a5-40ed-9282-a7b14b92220fn%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/996327cb-81e3-480d-8fd2-43ba11c6a802n%40googlegroups.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/996327cb-81e3-480d-8fd2-43ba11c6a802n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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