When will that day come when people actually first read the papers and then comment ? Oh, God!
On Tuesday 25 June 2024 at 19:18:25 UTC+3 Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Tue, Jun 25, 2024, 9:09 AM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> I invite you to discover my paper "How Self-Reference Builds the World" >> which is the theory of everything that people searched for millennia. It >> can be found on my philpeople profile: >> https://philpeople.org/profiles/cosmin-visan >> > > Hi Cosmin, > > Very nice, and very original work. > > A few comments and questions, written as they occurred to me: > > > The idea of self reference being larger and smaller than itself made me > think of how the universe can be thought of as much larger than us, but all > our thoughts and ideas about the universe are contained within our skulls. > I am not sure if this is an example of the kind of paradox of self > reference that you describe but I thought I would ask. > > > Your bootstrapping of nothing into something via self reference made me > think of the following example. Start with the sentence: > > "Every rule has an exception" > This is a self referential sentence, which can be either true or false. If > it is false, then there are rules without exceptions (i.e. laws). If it is > true, then "every rule has an exception" would also be a rule, and if it > has an exception, then again we reach the conclusion that there are some > rules without exceptions (i.e. laws), so this self refuting sentence > implies a universal truth, the existence of laws. > > > Another comment: > Fractals are objects defined through their self reference, is any special > attention owed to them? What about numbers such as e? Or steps in a > recursive computational relation (steps of the evolving game of life > universe might be conceived of as a recursive function, for example). > > > What would you consider the simplest possible program that had > consciousness to be? That is, what is the shortest bit of code that would > manifest consciousness of something (even a single bit)? > > > I agree to that the difficulty of explaining or communicating qualia stems > from what me might call self-reference islands. Each of us is trapped > within an isolated context, from which we have qualia of various kinds but > no common framework established between other minds that enable > communication beyond this island. Think of the analogous situation of > people in two different universes or AIs in two different computer > simulations, trying to define what they mean by a metered or a kilogram. > These terms are meaningless and incommunicable outside the particular > universe, since they are terms wholly defined by relationships that exist > only within a particular universe or simulation. There not only can be no > agreement on what is meant by those terms, but they aren't even definable > (outside the contextual island that exists only within that universe). For > we consciousness beings, we each have such a universe of qualia in our own > heads, and these are similarly undefinable beyond the context of our inner > view. > > > > > As for the ontology that results, your work reminded me of these works > that contain related ideas (of self-reference, observer-centric, > nothing-based means of bootstrapping reality): > > > Bruno Marchal's "The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body > problem" > > https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236138701_The_computationalist_reformulation_of_the_mind-body_problem > > > Mark F. Sharlow's "Can Machines Have First-Person Properties?" > https://archive.is/rDP33 > > > Markus Muller's > "Law without law: from observer states to physics via algorithmic > information theory" > https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.01826 > > David Pearce's "The Zero Ontology" > https://www.hedweb.com/witherall/zero.htm > > Stephen Wolfram's "The Concept of the Ruliad" > https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/11/the-concept-of-the-ruliad/ > > And Russell Standish's "Theory of Nothing" > https://www.hpcoders.com.au/nothing.html > > I have written an article which reaches similar conclusions: > > https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/ > > Note that while I focus more on the mathematics than self-reference, I do > see self-reference (in consciousness) as being a key step in the process of > realizing an apparent reality, providing a first person localized > perspective out of objective mathematical truths and number relations. > > > > Here are some quotes and references you may appreciate from others who > have seen a key role of self-reference in the definition of consciousness: > > Douglas Hofstadter's notion of "Strange Loop" > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strange_loop > > “In the end, we are self-perceiving, self-inventing, locked-in mirages > that are little miracles of self-reference.” > — Douglas Hofstadter, I Am a Strange Loop, p. 363 > > WHO SHOVES WHOM AROUND INSIDE THE CAREENIUM? OF WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE > WORD "I"? - DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER - 1982 > - > https://jsomers.net/careenium.pdf > - > “The real point is, there's only ONE MECHANISM underlying "I-ness": > namely, the circling-back of a complex representation of the system > together with its representations of all the rest of the world. Which > “I” you are is determined by the WAY you carry out that cycling, > and the way you represent the world.” > > “In a sense, Gödel’s Theorem is a mathematical analogue of the fact that I > cannot understand what it is like not to like chocolate, or to be a bat, > except by an infinite sequence of ever-more-accurate simulation processes > that converge toward, but never reach, emulation. I am trapped inside > myself and therefore can’t see how other systems are. Gödel’s Theorem > follows from a consequence of the general fact: I am trapped inside myself > and therefore can’t see how other systems see me. Thus the > objectivity-subjectivity dilemmas that Nagel has sharply posed are somehow > related to epistemological problems in both mathematical logic, and as we > saw earlier, the foundations of physics.” (Hofstader in Mind’s I) > -- Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett in "The Mind’s I" (1981) > > > > “There was a man who said though, > it seems that I know that I know, > what I would like to see, > is the eye that knows me, > when I know that I know that I know.” > - > “This is the human problem, we know that we know.” > -- Alan Watts > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I_Q2xNqKvnE > > > “Even for the universal machine doing nothing more than > self-introspection, her consciousness (related to []p & p) is not > definable, for reason related to the fact that knowledge and truth are not > definable by any machine, when the range of that knowledge and truth is > vast enough to encompass the machine itself.” > -- Bruno Marchal > > > “You need self-reference ability for the notion of belief, together with a > notion of reality or truth, which the machine cannot define. > To get immediate knowledgeability you need to add consistency ([]p & <>t), > to get ([]p & <>t & p) which prevents transitivity, and gives to the > machine a feeling of immediacy.” > -- Bruno Marchal > > “It is not because some “information processing” could support > consciousness that we can conclude that all information processing can > support consciousness. You need at least one reflexive loop. You need two > reflexive loop for having self-consciousness (Löbianity)." > -- Bruno Marchal > > > “The appearance of a universe, or even universes, must be explained by the > geometry of possible computations of possible machines, seen by these > machines".” > -- The Amoeba’s Secret - Bruno Marchal 2014 > https://www.hpcoders.com.au/docs/amoebassecret.pdf page 140 > > > “To exist, it must have cause–effect power; to exist from its own > intrinsic perspective, independent of extrinsic factors, it must have > cause–effect power upon itself: its present mechanisms and state must ‘make > a difference’ to the probability of some past and future state of the > system (its cause–effect space)” > https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rstb.2014.0167 (Tononi > Koch, IIT paper) > > > “More broadly one could say that, through the human being, the universe > has created a mirror to observe itself.” - David Bohm, The Undivided > Universe, Routledge, 2002, pp. 389 > > “A many minds theory, like a many worlds theory, supposes that, associated > with a sentient being at any given time, there is a multiplicity of > distinct conscious points of view. But a many minds theory holds that it is > these conscious points of view or ‘minds,’ rather than ‘worlds’, that are > to be conceived as literally dividing or differentiating over time.” > – Michael Lockwood in “‘Many Minds’. Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics” > (1995) > > > “It is sometimes suggested within physics that information is fundamental > to the physics of the universe, and even that physical properties and laws > may be derivative from informational properties and laws. This “it from > bit” view is put forward by “Wheeler (1989, 1990) and Fredkin (1990), and > is also investigated by papers in Zurek (1990) and MAtzke (1992, 1994). If > this is so, we may be able to give information a more serious role in our > ontology. [...] > This approach stems from the observation that in physical theories, > fundamental physical states are effectively individuated as information > states. When we look at a feature such as mass or charge, we find simply a > brute space of differences that make a difference. Physics tells us nothing > about what mass is, or what charge is: it simply tells us the range of > different values that these features can take on, and it tells us their > effects on other features. As far as physical theories are concerned, > specific states of mass or charge might as well be pure information states: > all that matters is their location within an information space.” > -- David Chalmers in "The Conscious Mind" (1996) > > > > "A cat. > A cat is seen. > Something seen, must be a seer. > I see a cat. > I exist. > What is I?" > -- Jason > > > "Perhaps consciousness arises when the brain’s simulation of the world > becomes so complete that it must include a model of itself. Obviously the > limbs and body of a survival machine must constitute an important part of > its simulated world; presumably for the same kind of reason, the simulation > itself could be regarded as part of the world to be simulated. Another word > for this might indeed be “self-awareness,” > -- Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett in "The Mind’s I" (1981) > > > These quotes get to the heart of the difficulty of self reference, and the > difference between being vs. describing: > > “As we discussed in the first chapters of this book, the study of > consciousness as a scientific subject casts a sharp light on a special > problem faced by the scientific observer. As long as his description leaves > out his phenomenal experience and he can assume that such experience is > present in another observer, they both can give a description of the > physical world from a “God’s-eye” view. When the observer turns his > attention to the description of consciousness, however, he must face some > challenging issues. These issues include the fact that consciousness is > embodied uniquely and privately in each individual; that no description, > scientific or otherwise, is equivalent to the experience of individual > embodiment; that there is no judge deciding categories in nature except for > natural selection; and that the external description of information by the > observers as a code in the brain leads to paradox. These issues pose a > challenging set of problems: how to provide an adequate description of > higher brain functions; how information arises in nature; and, finally, how > we know–the central concern of epistemology.” > -- Gerald Maurice Edelman and Giulio Tononi in "A Universe of > Consciousness" (2000) > > > “Our analysis has predicated on the notion that while we can construct a > sensible scientific theory of consciousness that explains how matter > becomes imagination, that theory cannot replace experience: Being is not > describing. A scientific description can have predictive and explanatory > power, but it cannot directly convey the phenomenal experience that depends > on having an individual brain and body. In our theory of brain complexity, > we have removed the paradoxes that arise by assuming only the God’s-eye > view of the external observer and, by adhering to selectionism, we have > removed the homunculus. Nevertheless, because of the nature of embodiment, > we still remain, to some extent, prisoners of description, only somewhat > better off than the occupants of Plato’s cave.” > -- Gerald Maurice Edelman and Giulio Tononi in "A Universe of > Consciousness" (2000) > > > > > When do you expect part 2 will be out? > > > > Jason > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/911a06ce-28a5-40ed-9282-a7b14b92220fn%40googlegroups.com.
