Philosophical zombies are not possible, for the trivial reason that body doesn't even exist. "Body" is just an idea in consciousness. See my papers, like "How Self-Reference Builds the World": https://philpeople.org/profiles/cosmin-visan
On Monday 8 July 2024 at 21:23:44 UTC+3 Jason Resch wrote: > On Sun, Jul 7, 2024 at 3:14 PM John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Sun, Jul 7, 2024 at 1:58 PM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> *>>> ** I think such foresight is a necessary component of intelligence, >>>>> not a "byproduct".* >>>> >>>> >>>> >>I agree, I can detect the existence of foresight in others and so >>>> can natural selection, and that's why we have it. It aids in getting our >>>> genes transferred into the next generation. But I was talking about >>>> consciousness not foresight, and regardless of how important we personally >>>> think consciousness is, from evolution's point of view it's utterly >>>> useless, and yet we have it, or at least I have it. >>>> >>> >>> *> you don't seem to think zombies are logically possible,* >>> >> >> Zombies are possible, it's philosophical zombies, a.k.a. smart zombies, >> that are impossible because it's a brute fact that consciousness is the way >> data behaves when it is being processed intelligently, or at least >> that's what I think. Unless you believe that all iterated sequences of >> "why" or "how" questions go on forever then you must believe that brute >> facts exist; and I can't think of a better candidate for one than >> consciousness. >> >> *> so then epiphenomenalism is false* >>> >> >> According to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy "*Epiphenomenalism >> is a position in the philosophy of mind according to which mental states or >> events are caused by physical states or events in the brain but do not >> themselves cause anything*". If that is the definition then I believe in >> Epiphenomenalism. >> > > If you believe mental states do not cause anything, then you believe > philosophical zombies are logically possible (since we could remove > consciousness without altering behavior). > > I view mental states as high-level states operating in their own regime of > causality (much like a Java computer program). The java computer program > can run on any platform, regardless of the particular physical nature of > it. It has in a sense isolated itself from the causality of the electrons > and semiconductors, and operates in its own realm of the causality of if > statements, and for loops. Consider this program, for example: > > [image: twin-prime-program2.png] > > What causes the program to terminate? Is it the inputs, and the logical > relation of primality, or is it the electrons flowing through the CPU? I > would argue that the higher-level causality, regarding the logical > relations of the inputs to the program logic is just as important. It > determines the physics of things like when the program terminates. At this > level, the microcircuitry is relevant only to its support of the higher > level causal structures, but the program doesn't need to be aware of nor > consider those low-level things. It operates the same regardless. > > I view consciousness as like that high-level control structure. It > operates within a causal realm where ideas and thoughts have causal > influence and power, and can reach down to the lower level to do things > like trigger nerve impulses. > > > Here is a quote from Roger Sperry, who eloquently describes what I am > speaking of: > > > "I am going to align myself in a counterstand, along with that > approximately 0.1 per cent mentalist minority, in support of a hypothetical > brain model in which consciousness and mental forces generally are given > their due representation as important features in the chain of control. > These appear as active operational forces and dynamic properties that > interact with and upon the physiological machinery. Any model or > description that leaves out conscious forces, according to this view, is > bound to be pretty sadly incomplete and unsatisfactory. The conscious mind > in this scheme, far from being put aside and dispensed with as an > "inconsequential byproduct," "epiphenomenon," or "inner aspect," as is the > customary treatment these days, gets located, instead, front and center, > directly in the midst of the causal interplay of cerebral mechanisms. > > Mental forces in this particular scheme are put in the driver's seat, as > it were. They give the orders and they push and haul around the physiology > and physicochemical processes as much as or more than the latter control > them. This is a scheme that puts mind back in its old post, over matter, in > a sense-not under, outside, or beside it. It's a scheme that idealizes > ideas and ideals over physico-chemical interactions, nerve impulse > traffic-or DNA. It's a brain model in which conscious, mental, psychic > forces are recognized to be the crowning achievement of some five hundred > million years or more of evolution. > > [...] The basic reasoning is simple: First, we contend that conscious or > mental phenomena are dynamic, emergent, pattern (or configurational) > properties of the living brain in action -- a point accepted by many, > including some of the more tough-minded brain researchers. Second, the > argument goes a critical step further, and insists that these emergent > pattern properties in the brain have causal control potency -- just as they > do elsewhere in the universe. And there we have the answer to the age-old > enigma of consciousness. > > To put it very simply, it becomes a question largely of who pushes whom > around in the population of causal forces that occupy the cranium. There > exists within the human cranium a whole world of diverse causal forces; > what is more, there are forces within forces within forces, as in no other > cubic half-foot of universe that we know. > > [...] Along with their internal atomic and subnuclear parts, the brain > molecules are obliged to submit to a course of activity in time and space > that is determined very largely by the overall dynamic and spatial > properties of the whole brain cell as an entity. Even the brain cells, > however, with their long fibers and impulse conducting elements, do not > have very much to say either about when or in what time pattern, for > example, they are going to fire their messages. The firing orders come from > a higher command. [...] > > In short, if one climbs upward through the chain of command within the > brain, one finds at the very top those overall organizational forces and > dynamic properties of the large patterns of cerebral excitation that > constitute the mental or psychic phenomena. [...] > > Near the apex of this compound command system in the brain we find ideas. > In the brain model proposed here, the causal potency of an idea, or an > ideal, becomes just as real as that of a molecule, a cell, or a nerve > impulse. Ideas cause ideas and help evolve new ideas. They interact with > each other and with other mental forces in the same brain, in neighboring > brains, and in distant, foreign brains. And they also interact with real > consequence upon the external surroundings to produce in toto an explosive > advance in evolution on this globe far beyond anything known before, > including the emergence of the living cell." > > -- Roger Sperry <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Wolcott_Sperry> in > "Mind, > Brain, and Humanist Values > <https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/sperry/Mind_Brain_and_Humanist_Values.html>" > > (1966) > > > > Jason > > > > >> >> >>> *> As you said previously, if consciousness had no effects, there would >>> be no reason for it to evolve in the first place.* >>> >> >> What I said in my last post was "It must be because consciousness is the >> byproduct of something else that is not useless, there are no other >> possibilities". >> >> *> There is another possibility: consciousness is not useless.* >>> >> >> If consciousness is not useless from Evolution's point of view then it >> must produce "something" that natural selection can see, and if natural >> selection can see that certain "something" then so can you or me. So the >> Turing Test is not just a good test for intelligence it's also a good test >> for consciousness. The only trouble is, what is that "something"? >> Presumably whatever it is that "something" must be related to mind in some >> way, but If it is not intelligent activity then what the hell is it"? >> >> John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis >> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis> >> >> >> >> -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> > To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3kar8%3De8dFmYXiBLzY-29kYGKyk%2BnNF9xuhK3m_qipEQ%40mail.gmail.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3kar8%3De8dFmYXiBLzY-29kYGKyk%2BnNF9xuhK3m_qipEQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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