Your dismissal of the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) as "otiose"
seems to rest on the assumption that collapse problems vanish within
an epistemic interpretation. However, this presumes that the
wavefunction need not be universal, a presumption computationalism
challenges by treating the wavefunction as a measure over all
computations. These computations are integral to the
self-referential experiences of observers supported by them. MWI
coherently explains quantum phenomena without relying on ad hoc
collapse mechanisms, aligning seamlessly with observation and the
mathematical structure of quantum theory.
While you assert that "science trumps speculative philosophy,"
computationalism reframes this dichotomy. The scientific method
remains central but is contextualized as a study of observable
phenomena emerging from the constraints of self-referentially
correct systems. Computationalism is firmly grounded in formal
structures such as arithmetic, computer science, mathematical
self-reference, and modal logics, all of which have demonstrable
explanatory power in areas like quantum mechanics with lots of open
problems. Everett’s MWI aligns naturally with these foundations,
dispensing with external collapse mechanisms and treating the
universal wavefunction as the generator of first-person
phenomenological experiences.
Solomonoff-Levi induction, while dismissed by some as speculative,
provides a rigorous framework for algorithmic modeling of phenomena.
Extending this into computational metaphysics reveals reality as
fundamentally mathematical, with physicality arising as a projection
supported by universal computation. Ignoring this recursive and
hierarchical view of knowledge—where phenomenological "worlds"
emerge from simpler computational interactions—has potential to
limit our grasp of the conjunction between physics and
consciousness. At least, that’s how it seems to me.
Critiques suggesting that computationalism or MWI are disconnected
from quantum mechanics misrepresent their relevance.
Computationalism doesn’t dismiss quantum mechanics; it
reinterprets it as a statistical and phenomenological consequence of
universal computation. The many-worlds framework naturally
incorporates first-person indeterminacy and avoids introducing
unexplained collapse phenomena. By adhering to mathematical
completeness and Occam’s razor, MWI addresses the same quantum
phenomena while offering a broader explanatory scope.
While physicalism and phenomenology contribute valuable insights,
they often fail to account for the structures underpinning
experience. Now, regarding your can of beans: it’s undeniably
nutritious, and its taste surely arises from... well, something.
Skipping over such questions feels like an oddly flavorless game.
The divide between science and metaphysics, much like the divide
between bland food and flavorful cuisine, could be artificial.
Computationalism bridges this gap by situating observable
physicality upon a logically consistent, mathematical foundation
that respects both third-person objectivity and first-person
experiential realities. If you prefer your meals devoid of taste, no
one will stop you—but to others, it’s hardly an inspiring feast.
For example, how would we ever explain why the cheap can imparts the
same metallic tang in all those Everett branches and why fresha
could be betta in the meta?
Maybe the real mystery here is why we keep coming back to the same
beans—and not a single collapse has spilled them yet.
Just a matter of taste.
On Monday, November 18, 2024 at 2:39:40 AM UTC+1 Bruce Kellett
wrote:
On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 12:16 PM Russell Standish
<[email protected]> wrote:
On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:48:28AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:35 AM Russell Standish
<[email protected]>
wrote:
On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:14:16AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
But there are no branches to be "equally real". You are fond
of calling
sound
arguments "non sequitur".
If the arguments were sound, I would not call them
non-sequitur. There
is the possibility I missed something you consider obvious,
but in
that case, I just ask you to dig deeper to join the dots.
The epistemic interpretation says that the wave function is merely
a summary of
our knowledge of the physical situation. And it gives the
probabilities for
various future outcomes. There are no "branches", so there is
nothing to be
"equally real".
There is observational evidence for at least one branch. To say an
epistemic interpretion implies there are no branches is a
misinterpretation of epistemic interpretation, if not a complete
strawman.
Possibly the trouble here is that your argument really has nothing
to do with quantum mechanics. So arguments about interpretations of
quantum mechanics, and the difference between Everett and the
epistemic interpretation, are beside the point as far as you are
concerned.
> Your claim that all branches are equally real is
indeed a non sequitur, in that it does not follow from
anything at all.
Indeed. As is that there is only a single reality. But one is
simpler than
the other. A lot of people get Occam's razor wrong here.
There is only one reality, and a set of probabilities for future
outcomes. The
simplest solution is that the so-called "other worlds" do not
exist. They are
just a figment of your imagination. I know that your starting
point is that
"everything exists" is simpler than any other proposition. But if
you do not
start from there, you can see that this position is indeed otiose.
But I do start from there. Because it is a consequence of
Solomonoff-Levi
induction, sometimes known as Occam's razor theorem.
Any so-called theorem depends on its assumptions. And Solomonoff
induction may not amount to a hill of beans.
I know that your position stems from many years of discussions on
the "everything" list, but I have never bought into the idea that
everything is simpler than the scientific approach based on the
phenomenology of the world around us. Science trumps speculative
philosophy every time, and this thread started as a discussion of
interpretations of quantum mechanics. So arguments from quantum
mechanics are relevant, and not "non sequiturs" as you so frequently
claim.
Bruce
In order to get to your "There is only one reality", you _have_ to
add
a mysterious something, call it what you will. My assertion is that
that "something" is probably a figment of imagination. Nobody in 20
odd years of arguing about this has been able to point their finger
at
anything that will do the job. The closest I've seen is an appeal to
Goedel incompleteness, that (if believed) would privilege the
integers
as something more real than anything else, but that seems to lead to
an even deeper multiverse than the MWI.
