On Fri, Dec 29, 2000 at 08:21:41PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 28, 2000 at 11:23:25PM -0800, Ian Clarke wrote:
> > > I did understand this, but the fact that the "shadow" node still eats as
> > > much bandwidth as it provides remains.
> >
> > The price of added security for those who want it I guess. Lets hope
> > that not many people need to do this.
> >
> > > Also, I don't think you can be quite random, since the node doing the
> > > "shadowing" would be best off having a list of nodes that it will shadow
> > > for - otherwise the ability to ask a node to do unlimited data transfers
> > > without caching the data is just asking for DOS attacks.
> >
> > I don't like the idea that people need to seek permission before using
> > another node as a shield - this almost sounds like it requires human
> > intervention.
> >
> > It will always be possible to do a DOS attack on any node, since any
> > server on the Internet, Freenet or not, is vulnerable to DOS or DDOS
> > attacks. The point of Freenet is that each node is individually
> > expendable, and so DOS attacks won't hurt the overall network.
> >
> > Ian.
>
> I suppose that if a node feels it is receiving a DOS attack due to
> servicing too many "tunnel" connections, it can just decide to stop
> doing it. Anyone legitimately trying to contact a shadow node thus
> marooned could use its ARK to get another shield address.
Umm, separate bandwidth quotas?
>
> If this were robust enough, then we could say that any node which
> puts its IP address in a DataSource is volunteering to be a shield
> node.
>
> // Tavin Cole
>
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