If the USA delivers weapons and military knowledge to autonomous parties in instable countries like Israel, Afghanistan and the former Iraq and even trains people there to fight, it is of course not surprising at all (perhaps even unavoidable) that eventually these weapons will be used for an unintended purpose against the will of the US, especially if all these people can do and have learned is to fight.
Although it is therefore obvious that a blowback can happen in this case, it would perhaps interesting to find out the circumstances when it happens exactly, for example by simulating the phenomenon with agent-based modelling in the way Marcus mentioned http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowback_(intelligence) I guess one sequence how terrorists are made goes in a chain of events like this: 1. A superpower first delivers weapons and military knowledge to autonomous parties or groups in instable countries (according to the proverb "The enemy of my enemy is my friend") 2. The autonomous parties succeed in their conflict, fight or resistance against something, e.g. an occupier or aggressor (Bin Laden was successful against the Russian occupier) 3. The autonomous parties do something that is not intended by the superpower (for example bombing embassies in their home countries) 4. The superpower turns against the autonomous parties, threatens them or tries to eliminate them (the Clinton administration for example tried to eliminate Bin Laden with a Cruise missile attack) 5. The autonomous parties react: they are going mad (become terrorists) and plan a terrorist attack on the superpower Terms are relative: the terrorist for one is a freedom fighter for the other and vice versa. -J. -----Original Message----- From: Marcus G. Daniels Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 7:32 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 38, Issue 3 [...] Zbigniew Brzezinski might have pondered "if we fund the Mujahideen to fight the Soviets, what's the likelihood these people will endure and extend their narcissistic rage toward the United States [as Al-Qaeda]". Or the Mossad might have thought more carefully about how much rope they extended to the Hamas. A computer simulation that tracked these organizations as existing and intermixing with the general population (trying to spread their message) could provide some risk profile for the kind of damage they could do. It would at least remind elected officials in later years of the fact they exist at all. [...] I see such a model as sort of thermometer to answer questions like: Who is mad What are they doing now (as a group, relevant to the conflict) What could they do in the next week, month & year, if they achieve it What can't they do in the next week, month & year if they are stopped Where are they Who are they connected to as allies and as enemies What do they want What do they need What do they believe and how mutable is it ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
