PREDICTION (Co., Inc.) already has a number of stock market simulations which I believe they have found to be quite useful.
;-}
--Doug
On 8/8/06,
Frank Wimberly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
What about the following issue: I suspect that a simulation
(agent-based or otherwise) of the "stock market" (e.g. the DJIA) could
be developed which is statistically indistinguishable from the real
thing. That is, the moments, fat tails, etc. would not serve to allow a
statistician to distinguish between the simulated signal and some, as
yet unobserved, actual data. Yet, such a simulation would have no
predictive value except on some set of measure zero. However similar to
the real world the simulation is, it won't tell you the level of the
DJIA next Tuesday. How is it possible to make simulations useful for
PREDICTION?
Frank
---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz(505) 995-8715 or (505) 670-9918 (cell)
Santa Fe, NM [EMAIL PROTECTED]
-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]] On
Behalf Of Robert Cordingley
Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 12:53 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Agent-Based Modelling of a Blowback - How
Terrorists are made
The recent discussions on developing models for political analysis have
been very interesting. I fully expect that to persuade folks
(policymakers and business leaders) to part with their organization's
time and money will require demonstrable results. Demonstrating one can
build a model and show life-like performance is great, but proving it
has value, matches reality and isn't just another SimCity seems to me to
be what's missing. I know this is a bootstrap problem, if one could get
the funding one would be sure it would prove itself.
The question has to be answered: does the process work in this domain?
Do the ethnographic studies, the incorporation of the best political
advisors, etc., perhaps with the use of all the computing power you can
dream of, along with the latest and sharpest computing tools produce a
system that has measurable performance against the real world. What is
the probability that when X is tested, Y will occur? When does chaos
takeover? Is it meaningful in the time it takes to implement policy?
Having performance based results are key to success and probably not
readily shared. (For example, if someone has a functioning model of the
stock market that works, I'd expect them to keep it a pretty closely
guarded secret.)
I'd recommend studies be done on a small scale perhaps to model the
performance of island or tribal cultures. With solid performance data
that proves the technology, one can build a case for larger
implementations. Do such results exist?
Robert
(my 2c)
Justin Lyon wrote:
Jochen,
20/20 hindsight can only be turned into 20/20 foresight with simulation.
Yet, for some reason, I have repeatedly failed to convince policymakers
of this in numerous meetings.
I did an analysis for one of my MIT classes using strategy dynamics
(basically, a dumbed down version of system dynamics for non-math
people) to look at the growth of islamists in Afghanistan during the
80s.
I hypothesized that the use of strategy dynamics by intelligence
agencies would make sense as a way of developing a framework for
analyzing complex situations and providing clear insights into possible
future issues, including possible blowback situations.
I then worked with Dr. Warren (an LBS professor who was teaching system
dynamics at MIT via distance learning) and some other colleagues to use
strategy dynamics to look at the conflict in Sierra Leonne and we had
the opportunity to present the findings to the director of the
secretary-generals office of the UN in New York.
In both cases, I tried to get more funding to explore using strategy
dynamics and system dynamics to analyze terrorists issues, but failed to
know the right people or how to navigate the paperwork to secure
funding. Since it's easier selling work to corporations, that is where I
focus.
But, I still remain convinced that system dynamics, enhanced with agent
based models, in a hybrid model using software like NetLogo or AnyLogic
would be a powerful tool for intelligence purposes.
The strategy dynamics process is well-suited to gathering data in a
structured manner that can be easily fed to analysts back home. I call
it developing a strategic simulation architecture (SSA). It can be
taught to people in a few weeks.
We even discussed training people at the UN and with the head of police
in Sierra Leonne who got it but, once again, we were stymied by lack of
funding.
The key benefit of strategy dynamics, system dynamics and agent based
models are their ability to deal with intangibles, such as the
accumulation of anger in a given population and then provide insights
into plausible scenarios on how that anger impacts the inflow of new
recruits into terrorist organizations.
See my short paper here for more:
http://s158641480.onlinehome.us/public/DS-004_SSA_Terrorism_V0-5_en.doc
Would love to hear your thoughts as the paper has languished in
obscurity since I wrote it in 2001.
:-P
Best,
Justin
Jochen Fromm wrote:
If the USA delivers weapons and military knowledge to autonomous
parties in instable countries like Israel, Afghanistan and the
former Iraq and even trains people there to fight, it is of course
not surprising at all (perhaps even unavoidable) that eventually
these weapons will be used for an unintended purpose against the
will of the US, especially if all these people can do and have
learned is to fight.
Although it is therefore obvious that a blowback can happen
in this case, it would perhaps interesting to find out the
circumstances when it happens exactly, for example by simulating
the phenomenon with agent-based modelling in the way Marcus mentioned
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowback_(intelligence)
I guess one sequence how terrorists are made goes in
a chain of events like this:
1. A superpower first delivers weapons and military knowledge
to autonomous parties or groups in instable countries
(according to the proverb "The enemy of my enemy is my friend")
2. The autonomous parties succeed in their conflict, fight or
resistance against something, e.g. an occupier or aggressor
(Bin Laden was successful against the Russian occupier)
3. The autonomous parties do something that is not intended
by the superpower (for example bombing embassies in their
home countries)
4. The superpower turns against the autonomous parties, threatens
them or tries to eliminate them (the Clinton administration for
example tried to eliminate Bin Laden with a Cruise missile attack)
5. The autonomous parties react: they are going mad (become terrorists)
and plan a terrorist attack on the superpower
Terms are relative: the terrorist for one is a freedom fighter
for the other and vice versa.
-J.
-----Original Message-----
From: Marcus G. Daniels
Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 7:32 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 38, Issue 3
[...]
Zbigniew Brzezinski might have pondered "if we fund the Mujahideen to
fight the Soviets, what's the likelihood these people will endure and
extend their narcissistic rage toward the United States [as
Al-Qaeda]". Or the Mossad might have thought more carefully about how
much rope they extended to the Hamas. A computer simulation that
tracked these organizations as existing and intermixing with the general
population (trying to spread their message) could provide some risk
profile for the kind of damage they could do. It would at least remind
elected officials in later years of the fact they exist at all.
[...]
I see such a model as sort of thermometer to answer questions like:
Who is mad
What are they doing now (as a group, relevant to the conflict)
What could they do in the next week, month & year, if they achieve it
What can't they do in the next week, month & year if they are stopped
Where are they
Who are they connected to as allies and as enemies
What do they want
What do they need
What do they believe and how mutable is it
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FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
--
Doug Roberts, RTI International
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
505-455-7333 - Office
505-670-8195 - Cell
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