As far as I can tell, Russ meant AFAICT to mean "as far as I can tell." But yeah, I also thought of the duck first. Same thing happened when someone once tried to tell me what a millard is.
-Ted On Sat, Jun 13, 2009 at 12:42 AM, Nicholas Thompson < [email protected]> wrote: > Russell > > AFAICT.? My first thought was that it was an insurance company whose > mascott is a duck. I think you dont mean that. > > I think of the anthropic principle about the same way I think of the > "planetary" principle. It is true that the planets we see today are those > that have been selected for orbits that have not yet either spun out or > fallen in. Yet, I am hard pressed to think of the present arrangement of > the planets as a cultmination of anything. The culmination, if there is > one, comes when the sun explodes and we all return to the fire from which > we came. > > But I probably mispeak. To be honest, the anthropic principle is the sort > of idea that makes me uneasy, so I have probably have always shielded > myself from it and never looked at it straight. > > As SS would say: I am not a wise man. > > N > > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([email protected]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > [Original Message] > > From: russell standish <[email protected]> > > To: <[email protected]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity > Coffee Group <[email protected]> > > Date: 6/13/2009 5:50:45 PM > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > > > > On Fri, Jun 12, 2009 at 02:23:03PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > > > > > RS-->""Bedau defines it as emergence with downward causation. For > example, we would say > > > that consciousness is strongly emergent if we felt that we could > > > consciously influence the activities of our neurons, rather than > > > simply our consciousness simply being the result of neuronal activity. > > > > > > I'm not sure this notion has any use in discussions other than > > > consciousness, and even there the notion of epiphenomenalism would say > > > that it is void concept."<--RS > > > > > > OK. We all seem to agree that strong emergence is a reach. > > > > Actually, I'm not as dismissive of it as Bedau is. In particular, I > > see that application of the anthropic principle in a multiverse causes > > the sort of "strange loop" that Hofstadter talks about, and this is > > characteristic of downward causation. Nevertheless, I do concede this > > is rather airy-fairy speculation, so I don't insist. > > > > > But once we have given up on strong emergence, do we need supervenience > for anything? I cannot shake the intuition that the whole reason for > "supervenience" is to defend consciousness against determinism, and this > has always seemed to me a religious, as opposed to a scientific, project. > > > > Supervenience is just a denial of the soul, AFAICT. And yes, it is > > important, in the sense that without it, the anthropic principle > > cannot work in a multiverse, and we would suffer the Occam collapse > > (which we clearly don't). If you've read my book, I talk about this > > stuff there. > > > > > > > > Thanks for your help and patience, > > > > > > Have you both read the Kim and the Wimsatt articles in the same volume? > > > > > > > > No - I don't have the volume. Sorry. > > > > > Nick > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > > Clark University ([email protected]) > > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > > From: Russ Abbott > > > To: [email protected];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity > Coffee Group > > > Cc: Russell Standish > > > Sent: 6/12/2009 12:33:26 AM > > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > > > > > > > > > Hi Nick, > > > > > > See below. > > > > > > -- Russ > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 9:48 PM, Nicholas Thompson > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > Russell, > > > > > > So, is it Bedau and Philllips you have at hand? I am hoping to get > some of > > > my colleagues in Santa Fe to read that with me next fall. > > > > > > It's Bedau and Humphreys. > > > > > > > > > > > > If that is the source you are using, I also had Bedau's contribution to > > > this volume in mind when I made the comment below. > > > > > > I am going to key in some short passages below so we can go over them > > > together. > > > > > > He writes that [strong] emergent properties are supervenient properties > > > with irreducible causal powers"...some of which are "macro-to-micro" > > > effects[,] termed "downward causation". > > > > > > Supervenience means, as i understand it, that while each member of some > > > enumerable list of microstates is sufficient for the occurence of the > > > emergent macrostate, no one of those states is necessary for its > occurence. > > > So in practice one can have many different micro states that can bring > > > about the macrostate, but no change in the macrostate without some > change > > > in a microstate. > > > > > > The necessary and sufficient part isn't part of the definition of > "supervenient." The definition is simply your last clause: no change in the > macrostate without some change in a microstate. > > > > > > > > > > > > Downward causation means, as I understand it, that some macrostates are > > > sufficient for some microstates. This brings about the loopiness that > some > > > of the authors in the book regard as inspired and others regard as > vicious. > > > [Some will argue that if a microstate is sufficient for A macrostate > and > > > that macrostate is sufficient for a microstate then the macrostate > drops > > > out of the equasion and we need simply point out that the first > microstate > > > is sufficient for the second. } > > > > > > Bedau then writes: "Such [macro] causal powers cannot be explained in > > > terms of the aggregationof the micro-level potentialities; they are > > > primtive or "brute" natural powers that arise inexplilcably withthe > > > existence of certain macro-level entitites." > > > > > > Which led to my comment that they are, by definition, inexplicable. > > > > > > I understand downward causation to refer to a new causal power. An > example might be dark energy. It causes changes in the universe even though > there are no micro explanations for it. If it operates only at cosmological > scales (and not just because it is weak at other scales, but it simply > doesn't exist at other scales) then it exhibits downward causation. Another > example is vitalism, were it true. It would say that there are new causal > powers at the biological level that simply come into existence at that > level and are not explicable in terms of lower level forces. > > > > > > > > > Bedau goes on to write, "All the evidence today suggests that strong > > > emergence is scientifically irrelevant." and goes on to argue that no > > > essentially examples exist. In othere words, strong emergence is > possible, > > > it just has never been observed. This seems a very strange resolution > of > > > the argument, since it seems to define emergence in terms of our > inablity > > > to explain something, rather than in terms of some measurable property > of > > > the thing itself. This seems very close to the "surprise" argument > that > > > Bedau rejects in the early pages of the same article. > > > > > > > > > His argument is really a rejection of vitalism. No one wants to be a > defender of vitalism, which is the rejected poster boy of downward > causation. > > > > > > I've never seen anyone talk about dark energy in this context. It might > be a more respectable candidate for downward causation. But it's not likely > -- in my opinion. It's conceivable that dark energy is a new force of > nature and that it's different from the other known forces -- gravity, > electromagnetic, strong, and weak.But even if that were the case, if it > could be shown to exist at all scales -- or perhaps like time and gravity > -- to be simply a part of the structure of the universe, it wouldn't > qualify as downward causation. Downward causation requires that the new > force pop into existence when and only when some macro condition holds but > not as a consequence of the micro conditions that make it up. > > > > > > > > > > > > More on this tomorrow, I hope. > > > > > > Nick > > > > > > > > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > > Clark University ([email protected]) > > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > [Original Message] > > > > From: russell standish <[email protected]> > > > > To: <[email protected]>; The Friday Morning Applied > Complexity > > > Coffee Group <[email protected]> > > > > Date: 6/12/2009 3:17:44 PM > > > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > > > > > > > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 07:01:38PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > > > > Steve, > > > > > > > > > > My understanding of the meaning of "strong" emergence is > "inexplicable > > > > > emergence". > > > > > > > > > > Is there another meaning? > > > > > > > > > > N > > > > > > > > Bedau defines it as emergence with downward causation. For example, > we > > > would say > > > > that consciousness is strongly emergent if we felt that we could > > > > consciously influence the activities of our neurons, rather than > > > > simply our consciousness simply being the result of neuronal > activity. > > > > > > > > I'm not sure this notion has any use in discussions other than > > > > consciousness, and even there the notion of epiphenomenalism would > say > > > > that it is void concept. > > > > > > > > Cheers > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > > > Mathematics > > > > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [email protected] > > > > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > > > > > > ============================================================ > > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > ============================================================ > > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > > -- > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > Mathematics > > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [email protected] > > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >
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