On Fri, Jun 12, 2009 at 02:23:03PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > RS-->""Bedau defines it as emergence with downward causation. For example, we > would say > that consciousness is strongly emergent if we felt that we could > consciously influence the activities of our neurons, rather than > simply our consciousness simply being the result of neuronal activity. > > I'm not sure this notion has any use in discussions other than > consciousness, and even there the notion of epiphenomenalism would say > that it is void concept."<--RS > > OK. We all seem to agree that strong emergence is a reach.
Actually, I'm not as dismissive of it as Bedau is. In particular, I see that application of the anthropic principle in a multiverse causes the sort of "strange loop" that Hofstadter talks about, and this is characteristic of downward causation. Nevertheless, I do concede this is rather airy-fairy speculation, so I don't insist. > But once we have given up on strong emergence, do we need supervenience for > anything? I cannot shake the intuition that the whole reason for > "supervenience" is to defend consciousness against determinism, and this has > always seemed to me a religious, as opposed to a scientific, project. Supervenience is just a denial of the soul, AFAICT. And yes, it is important, in the sense that without it, the anthropic principle cannot work in a multiverse, and we would suffer the Occam collapse (which we clearly don't). If you've read my book, I talk about this stuff there. > > Thanks for your help and patience, > > Have you both read the Kim and the Wimsatt articles in the same volume? > No - I don't have the volume. Sorry. > Nick > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([email protected]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Russ Abbott > To: [email protected];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee > Group > Cc: Russell Standish > Sent: 6/12/2009 12:33:26 AM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > > > Hi Nick, > > See below. > > -- Russ > > > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 9:48 PM, Nicholas Thompson > <[email protected]> wrote: > > Russell, > > So, is it Bedau and Philllips you have at hand? I am hoping to get some of > my colleagues in Santa Fe to read that with me next fall. > > It's Bedau and Humphreys. > > > > If that is the source you are using, I also had Bedau's contribution to > this volume in mind when I made the comment below. > > I am going to key in some short passages below so we can go over them > together. > > He writes that [strong] emergent properties are supervenient properties > with irreducible causal powers"...some of which are "macro-to-micro" > effects[,] termed "downward causation". > > Supervenience means, as i understand it, that while each member of some > enumerable list of microstates is sufficient for the occurence of the > emergent macrostate, no one of those states is necessary for its occurence. > So in practice one can have many different micro states that can bring > about the macrostate, but no change in the macrostate without some change > in a microstate. > > The necessary and sufficient part isn't part of the definition of > "supervenient." The definition is simply your last clause: no change in the > macrostate without some change in a microstate. > > > > Downward causation means, as I understand it, that some macrostates are > sufficient for some microstates. This brings about the loopiness that some > of the authors in the book regard as inspired and others regard as vicious. > [Some will argue that if a microstate is sufficient for A macrostate and > that macrostate is sufficient for a microstate then the macrostate drops > out of the equasion and we need simply point out that the first microstate > is sufficient for the second. } > > Bedau then writes: "Such [macro] causal powers cannot be explained in > terms of the aggregationof the micro-level potentialities; they are > primtive or "brute" natural powers that arise inexplilcably withthe > existence of certain macro-level entitites." > > Which led to my comment that they are, by definition, inexplicable. > > I understand downward causation to refer to a new causal power. An example > might be dark energy. It causes changes in the universe even though there are > no micro explanations for it. If it operates only at cosmological scales (and > not just because it is weak at other scales, but it simply doesn't exist at > other scales) then it exhibits downward causation. Another example is > vitalism, were it true. It would say that there are new causal powers at the > biological level that simply come into existence at that level and are not > explicable in terms of lower level forces. > > > Bedau goes on to write, "All the evidence today suggests that strong > emergence is scientifically irrelevant." and goes on to argue that no > essentially examples exist. In othere words, strong emergence is possible, > it just has never been observed. This seems a very strange resolution of > the argument, since it seems to define emergence in terms of our inablity > to explain something, rather than in terms of some measurable property of > the thing itself. This seems very close to the "surprise" argument that > Bedau rejects in the early pages of the same article. > > > His argument is really a rejection of vitalism. No one wants to be a defender > of vitalism, which is the rejected poster boy of downward causation. > > I've never seen anyone talk about dark energy in this context. It might be a > more respectable candidate for downward causation. But it's not likely -- in > my opinion. It's conceivable that dark energy is a new force of nature and > that it's different from the other known forces -- gravity, electromagnetic, > strong, and weak.But even if that were the case, if it could be shown to > exist at all scales -- or perhaps like time and gravity -- to be simply a > part of the structure of the universe, it wouldn't qualify as downward > causation. Downward causation requires that the new force pop into existence > when and only when some macro condition holds but not as a consequence of the > micro conditions that make it up. > > > > More on this tomorrow, I hope. > > Nick > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([email protected]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > [Original Message] > > From: russell standish <[email protected]> > > To: <[email protected]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity > Coffee Group <[email protected]> > > Date: 6/12/2009 3:17:44 PM > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > > > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 07:01:38PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > > Steve, > > > > > > My understanding of the meaning of "strong" emergence is "inexplicable > > > emergence". > > > > > > Is there another meaning? > > > > > > N > > > > Bedau defines it as emergence with downward causation. For example, we > would say > > that consciousness is strongly emergent if we felt that we could > > consciously influence the activities of our neurons, rather than > > simply our consciousness simply being the result of neuronal activity. > > > > I'm not sure this notion has any use in discussions other than > > consciousness, and even there the notion of epiphenomenalism would say > > that it is void concept. > > > > Cheers > > > > -- > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > Mathematics > > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [email protected] > > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [email protected] Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
