Here's an interesting question, or perhaps it simply draws us back to
the same general problem. Can we say that social or psychological
phenomenon are any more or less "real" than say that of physical
systems?
By corollary, can we say that theories from observations of such
system's phenomenon are in general less valid?
I can think of at least one way of answering yes, but I'm not sure
that it is correct or even wether I like it or not. I think it is a
consequence of Glen's thoughts on model validity -- I'm still muling
that as it deserves reflection: I don't know what I "know", and from
there how I feel about it yet. (These scare quotes are getting
tiresome, but I can't think of anyway other way to all out their
poorly defined or indefinable qualities.) All of the statements below
be challenged, of course.
Given:
a) Social and psychological systems are inherently more complex than
so-called physical systems.
b) Our understanding of a given system increases as we add models that
are novel and valid.
c) Increasingly complex systems require increasing numbers of models
in order to show that they are valid.
d) A theory is or rests on some model or set of models.
.:
1) More models are needed to describe a psychological or social system
than for a physical system.
Assume:
e) The set of models for a given system are of equivalent
sophistication, parsimony, scope (size?) and validity.
.:
2) In a very general sense, we should regard theories of social and
psychological systems as less valid, or...
3) relatively more effort will be required to establish the validity
of a social or psychological theory .
As I say, I'm not sure that I agree with the premises and am not
necessarily at all happy with the conclusion, but on the other hand 3)
does seem to dock with public and scientific intuition about the
relative quality of our insights into social and physical systems:
i.e. quite poor compared to physical systems. In other words, the
conclusion is probably not earth-shattering and perhaps not even
controversial.
On the other hand, if we take that against our apparent or assumed
level of understanding or predictive capacity with respect to the
(speaking dualistically now :)) interaction between our mind and the
world, we might actually evaluate a mental model as more valid than
that of a model of the physical world. For example, if a caveman hits
himself on the finger with a hammer (or a rock, say), he will take the
theory that hammers hurt fingers as more valid than the theory of
relativity. Modus tollens, this might challenge Glen's hypothesis.
Sorry for the ramble..
On Sep 19, 2009, at 11:03 AM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
It is true, many terms in Psychology and Sociology
are abstract and "unreal". You mentioned personality,
extroversion, emotional intelligence, in-group preference,..
For social systems, many abstract concepts like
power and freedom become concrete, observable and
measurable phenomena if we consider them as Multi-Agent
Systems (MAS) or CAS, and model them in a suitable way
http://wiki.cas-group.net/index.php?title=Agent_interaction_pattern
The situation is maybe similar for a "psychological
system". If we decompose the brain into different
parts and neural subsystems, then we can possibly map
computational processes in the "cognitive architecture"
on the corresponding psychological phenomena. Maybe
ABM can be helpful here, too. I would really like
see an ABM of self-consciousness..
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_architecture
-J.
----- Original Message ----- From: ERIC P. CHARLES
To: friam
Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2009 3:55 PM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Faith and Science (was comm.)
[..] I argued that it serves scientists well to believe that what
they are studying is real (hence the reference to faith). For
example: People who study personality believe that the word
"personality" refers to a real phenomenon, a real happening in the
world. At the least, they routinely convince me that they think it
is real. This is the standard, lay use of the word "real", which
conforms reasonably well to many (but not all) philosophical
specifications of the term.
Now I do not believe in "personality", at least not in the way those
researchers do, but most of them don't believe in "perception" the
way I think perception works. What goes on at the higher levels is a
war over what is "real". In Science (with a capital S), we like to
think that will be decided on the merits of empirical evidence
(which again necessitates belief in the real). I get the impression
that if any researchers, in psychology, chemistry, physics, art,
history of Europe, etc., stopped believing they were studying
something real, the whole enterprise would fall apart. Given that
many of these endeavors do, in the long run, produce useful things,
it would be sad to see them go. Thus, there is good reason for
scientists to have faith in the reality of what they are studying.
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============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
