See Larding below: 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Monday, February 22, 2016 3:08 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy

 

Sorry that I'm not responding to Glen, Jochen, or John, but I've got to defend 
Nick's devil's advocate.  Nick, you do keep changing the subject.  In response 
to your two suggested definitions of intimacy I asked the following.

 

--------------

 

Version 1: Intimacy is just being so close that you see the same world from 
where you stand. 

 

I don't know how to understand that. Do you mean close wrt Euclidean distance? 
How does that relate to, for example, pain? No matter how close you are to 
someone, you can't see, for example, their toothache.

[NST==>”close” is a metaphor;  I am suggesting a co-location in space metaphor 
to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be yours.  I am 
suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the more we are of one 
mind.  <==nst] 

 

Version 2: When the self you see projected in another ‘s behavior toward you is 
the same as the self you see projected in your own behavior. [NST==>You will 
find this sentence totally unintelligible until you entertain the notion that 
the self is an inferred entity, inferred using the same sort of equipment that 
we use to infer the motives, aspirations, feelings, and thoughts of others.  
What differs between you and me is the amount of time we spend around me.  To 
the extent that I spend more time than you do around me, I am probably a better 
source of info about what I am up to, thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus.  
Thus, I may greater familiarity with me than you do, I don’t have any special 
access to me.   <==nst] 

 

If I remember what happened when we last did this Russ, you made me clearer and 
a clearer (and Eric, who wrote the Devil’s Advocate questions, in some ways 
modeled himself after you), but in the end, you just concluded that I was nuts, 
and we let it go at that.  

 

I don't know how to understand that either. What do you mean by "self?" What 
does it mean to project it toward someone? What does it mean to say that it's 
the same self as the one you project? Over what period of time must they be the 
same? If we're talking about behavior would it matter if the projecting entity 
were a robot? (Perhaps you answered those questions in the papers I haven't 
read. Sorry if that's the case.)

[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head (or a 
steel cabinet, etc.), than I can only say that if a robot does mind things, 
than a robot “has” a mind.  But I rebel against the metaphor.  <==nst] 

 

--------------

 

You responded with a long (and clear and definitive) extract from your paper. 
But I don't see how it answers my questions. Wrt the first question, if we're 
talking about behavior, distance doesn't see relevant. Wrt the second question, 
the extract doesn't (seem to) talk about what you mean by a self or what it 
means for the projected behaviors of two of them to be "the same" -- or even 
what projected behavior means. Is it the case that you also don't "believe in" 
intentionality? After all how can there be intentionality without a subjective 
intent? And if that's the case, what does "projected" mean? Is it the same as 
oriented in 3D space?

[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see  Intentionality is the Mark of the 
Vital 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital>
  .  Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary 
condition for intentionalty.  All is required is the sign relation (cf Peirce). 
<==nst] 

 

 

 

On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 1:38 PM glen <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:


I may as well chime in, too, since none of what's been said so far is 
meaningful to me.  My concept of intimacy runs along M-W's 2nd entry:

    2 :  to communicate delicately and indirectly

This is almost nothing to do with subjectivity and almost nothing to do with 
non-private knowledge (things others know).  It has to do with "delicate" 
attention to detail and, perhaps, manipulation.  A robot could easily be 
intimate with a human, and demonstrate such intimacy by catering to many of the 
tiny things the human prefers/enjoys, even if each and every tiny preference is 
publicly known.  Similarly, 2 robots could be intimate by way of a _special_ 
inter-robot interface.  But the specialness of the interface isn't its privacy 
or uniqueness.  It's in its handling of whatever specific details are 
appropriate to those robots.

Even if inter-subjectivity is merely the intertwining of experiences, it's 
still largely unrelated to intimacy.  Two complete strangers can become 
intimate almost instantaneously, because/if their interfaces are pre-adapted 
for a specific coupling.  There it wouldn't be inter-subjectivity, but a kind 
of similarity of type.  And that might be mostly or entirely genetic rather 
than ontogenic.

And I have to again be some sort of Morlockian champion for the irrelevance of 
thought.  2 strangers can be intimate and hold _radically_ different 
understandings of the world(s) presented to them ... at least if we believe the 
tales told to us in countless novels. 8^)


On 02/22/2016 12:40 AM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> Nice to see FRIAM is still alive!
> I like this definition as well: "Intimacy is just being so close that you see 
> the same world from where you stand". In a family for example we are being so 
> close that we roughly see and experience the same world.
>
> I still believe that the solution to the hard problem lies in Hollywood: 
> cinemas are built like theaters. If we see a film about a person, it is like 
> sitting in his or her cartesian theater. We see what the person sees. In a 
> sense, we feel what the feels as well, especially the pain of loosing someone.

--
⇔ glen

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