I'm flattered. Thank you. I can see myself in the Devil's Advocate role -- except for the last part. I'll grant that you can think whatever you want.
*[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the more we are of one mind. <==nst]* That won't work for my sense of intimacy. One can be intimate (in my sense) on the telephone and via written words. Sharing (i.e., participating in the same) experiences is not required for intimacy in my sense. What is required (in my sense) is sharing (i.e., talking about one's subjective experiences of one's) experiences. *[NST==>You will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you entertain the notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using the same sort of equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, feelings, and thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the amount of time we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time than you do around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I am up to, thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater familiarity with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. <==nst]* What does it mean to infer something if one has no subjective experience? I think of inferring something as having to do with thinking about it. More generally what does it mean to think about something in your framework? I'll agree that thinking involves stuff happening in the brain. So it's behavior in that sense. But it's not behavior in the sense you seem to be talking about. So what does it mean in your sense to think about something? I realize I'm on shaky ground here because computers "think" about things without having what I would call subjective experience. *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head (or a steel cabinet, etc.), then I can only say that if a robot does mind things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. <==nst]* I don't insist that a mind is anything. I don't know how to talk about subjective experience scientifically. I see no reason to deny it, but I agree we have made little scientific progress in talking about it. By the way, Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are to do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way so that it's easier to do science. *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark of the Vital <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> . Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf Peirce). <==nst]* I looked at (but didn't read in any detail) the Intentionality paper. The upshot seems to be that non-humans have intentionality. I don't argue with that. My question for you is still how you reconcile intentionality with not having subjective experience. What is intentionality without subjectivity? (Again, I'm moving onto shaky ground since we have "goal-directed" software even though the software and the computer that runs it has no subjective experience.) I guess in both cases in which computers seem to "think" or "plan" we are using those terms as analogs to what we see ourselves doing and not really to attribute those processes to computers or software. On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 3:23 PM Nick Thompson <[email protected]> wrote: > See Larding below: > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > *From:* Friam [mailto:[email protected]] *On Behalf Of *Russ > Abbott > *Sent:* Monday, February 22, 2016 3:08 PM > > > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < > [email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy > > > > Sorry that I'm not responding to Glen, Jochen, or John, but I've got to > defend Nick's devil's advocate. Nick, you do keep changing the subject. > In response to your two suggested definitions of intimacy I asked the > following. > > > > -------------- > > > > Version 1: Intimacy is just being so close that you see the same world > from where you stand. > > > > I don't know how to understand that. Do you mean close wrt Euclidean > distance? How does that relate to, for example, pain? No matter how close > you are to someone, you can't see, for example, their toothache. > > *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space > metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be > yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the > more we are of one mind. <==nst] * > > > > Version 2: When the self you see projected in another ‘s behavior toward > you is the same as the self you see projected in your own behavior. > *[NST==>You > will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you entertain the > notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using the same sort of > equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, feelings, and > thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the amount of time > we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time than you do > around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I am up to, > thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater familiarity > with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. <==nst] * > > > > *If I remember what happened when we last did this Russ, you made me > clearer and a clearer (and Eric, who wrote the Devil’s Advocate questions, > in some ways modeled himself after you), but in the end, you just concluded > that I was nuts, and we let it go at that. * > > > > I don't know how to understand that either. What do you mean by "self?" > What does it mean to project it toward someone? What does it mean to say > that it's the same self as the one you project? Over what period of time > must they be the same? If we're talking about behavior would it matter if > the projecting entity were a robot? (Perhaps you answered those questions > in the papers I haven't read. Sorry if that's the case.) > > *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head > (or a steel cabinet, etc.), than I can only say that if a robot does mind > things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. > <==nst] * > > > > -------------- > > > > You responded with a long (and clear and definitive) extract from your > paper. But I don't see how it answers my questions. Wrt the first question, > if we're talking about behavior, distance doesn't see relevant. Wrt the > second question, the extract doesn't (seem to) talk about what you mean by > a self or what it means for the projected behaviors of two of them to be > "the same" -- or even what projected behavior means. Is it the case that > you also don't "believe in" intentionality? After all how can there be > intentionality without a subjective intent? And if that's the case, what > does "projected" mean? Is it the same as oriented in 3D space? > > *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark of > the Vital > <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> > . Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary > condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf > Peirce). <==nst] * > > > > > > > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 1:38 PM glen <[email protected]> wrote: > > > I may as well chime in, too, since none of what's been said so far is > meaningful to me. My concept of intimacy runs along M-W's 2nd entry: > > 2 : to communicate delicately and indirectly > > This is almost nothing to do with subjectivity and almost nothing to do > with non-private knowledge (things others know). It has to do with > "delicate" attention to detail and, perhaps, manipulation. A robot could > easily be intimate with a human, and demonstrate such intimacy by catering > to many of the tiny things the human prefers/enjoys, even if each and every > tiny preference is publicly known. Similarly, 2 robots could be intimate > by way of a _special_ inter-robot interface. But the specialness of the > interface isn't its privacy or uniqueness. It's in its handling of > whatever specific details are appropriate to those robots. > > Even if inter-subjectivity is merely the intertwining of experiences, it's > still largely unrelated to intimacy. Two complete strangers can become > intimate almost instantaneously, because/if their interfaces are > pre-adapted for a specific coupling. There it wouldn't be > inter-subjectivity, but a kind of similarity of type. And that might be > mostly or entirely genetic rather than ontogenic. > > And I have to again be some sort of Morlockian champion for the > irrelevance of thought. 2 strangers can be intimate and hold _radically_ > different understandings of the world(s) presented to them ... at least if > we believe the tales told to us in countless novels. 8^) > > > On 02/22/2016 12:40 AM, Jochen Fromm wrote: > > Nice to see FRIAM is still alive! > > I like this definition as well: "Intimacy is just being so close that > you see the same world from where you stand". In a family for example we > are being so close that we roughly see and experience the same world. > > > > I still believe that the solution to the hard problem lies in Hollywood: > cinemas are built like theaters. If we see a film about a person, it is > like sitting in his or her cartesian theater. We see what the person sees. > In a sense, we feel what the feels as well, especially the pain of loosing > someone. > > -- > ⇔ glen > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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