Nick, Eric, I'm disappointed that neither of you responded to my reply (below) to Eric's message. Perhaps it got lost in the weeks.
-- Russ On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 9:56 PM Russ Abbott <[email protected]> wrote: > Eric, When you say "the science of the mind seems to be doing reasonably > well" what are you referring to? I thought your position was that mind was > not a useful concept. I suppose that what you mean by mind is something > that can be investigated by looking at behavior. But what is that sort of > mind? Wouldn't it be better to call it something else so that people like > me don't get confused? So to get back to my original question and to help > me understand what you are saying, what are the recent advances in the > science of mind I should be thinking of in this regard? > > Also, I'm not convinced that subjective experience is forever beyond the > reach of scientific investigation. I wouldn't be surprised if we develop > technology that lets me experience what you are experiencing via neural > sensor and communication systems. And if I can experience what you are > experiencing we will presumably be able to record it and parse it. > > We have taken impressive steps in computer vision in recent years. I > expect that work to help us develop a more formal structure for our own > visual experiences. This is not to say that the formal structure will be a > subjective experience for the computer. But it is to say that it will give > us some leverage for investigating subjective experience. Similarly open > brain surgery has helped us understand how the brain is connected to > subjective experience. > > Just as we now know a lot about how natural language works even though no > science can speak or fully understand natural language, I expect that we > will develop similar theories about how subjective experience works. > > I don't expect a breakthrough that will suddenly crack "the hard problem > of consciousness." More likely we will be able to say more and more > accurately what sort of subjective experience someone is having by looking > at what their brain is doing. We now have ways to allow people to act in > the world by thinking about what they want. These are fairly superficial > mappings of brain signals to physical actuators. But it's pretty impressive > nonetheless. More advances along these and related lines will make > subjective experience less of a mystery and more just another feature of > the world. > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:09 PM Eric Charles < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Russ said: "*Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are >> to do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. >> thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and >> quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is >> fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way >> so that it's easier to do science.*" >> >> Exactly! Let me try another tact. >> >> 1) We could imagine (with various levels of clarity) any number of worlds >> in which things worked differently from each other. >> >> 2) "Doing science" is largely a process of trying to figure out which of >> those worlds we live in, by searching for the best way to divide up >> empirical evidence, so that it is reliable and can be agreed up. (Peirce >> was particularly fascinated with the advances made in 18th century >> chemistry.) Scientists search for more and more stable ways to view the >> world, i.e., ways which stand up to more and more empirical scrutiny. >> (Early attempts at the periodic table, though imperfect, serve as an >> excellent example of this, leading to countless confirmatory experiments, >> including the correct prediction of the properties of yet-to-be-isolated >> elements.) >> >> 3) In order to do science about something, we need only one thing to be >> true: It can be investigated empirically. That is, it is something, "out >> there" which we can turn our machinations towards, and which will yield >> stable results once we find the appropriate methods for its investigation. >> >> 4) Many important big-name people have declared that a science of >> psychology is impossible, because the stuff under discussion in that >> context simply cannot be investigated empirically. Kant, is a prime >> example. Those big-names declared that another person's mind was not the >> type of thing that you could examine empirically, because the province >> of the soul did not yield itself to earthly poking and prodding. If those >> big-names are correct, and minds cannot be investigated, *by their very >> nature*, we would expect efforts in that direction to fail-to-produce >> the convergence-of-ideas characteristic of successful science. >> >> 5) We can imagine a world in which those big-names are correct. We can >> imagine a world in which many types of things can be investigated >> empirically, but *not* minds, and in which all attempts to produce a >> science of the mind would fail pathetically. >> >> 6) The above view has had a virtual strangle hold on Western thinking for >> centuries. However, in the late 1800's a few serious scholars started >> thinking that "science of psychology" might be given a go, to see how it >> went. They were widely dismissed, not allowed to hold their heads high in >> either scientific circles or philosophical ones. >> >> 7) And that's where we find ourselves. *If* a science of psychology is >> possible, then *de facto* the subject matter of psychology is some swath >> of empirically investigatable happenings, about which a community of >> investigators would eventually reach a consensus as the scientific process >> takes its course. We might not live in such a world, but we won't know >> without trying it. A science of ether winds never worked out. The attempted >> science of medieval humours was a bust. A science of studying >> bumps-on-people's-heads has been roundly rejected. All sorts of attempted >> sciences have not worked out over the years. But the science of the mind >> seems to be doing reasonably well. Either that progress is an illusion, and >> empirical-psychologists will soon go the way of the phrenologists, or that >> progress is evidence that the big-names who thought of "mind" as inherently >> uninvestigatable were wrong on a very fundamental level. >> >> If you are to study a romantic partner's mind in order to become intimate >> with her, then her mind must be something that can be studied. If I am to >> study your feeling of intimacy, then your feeling-of-intimacy must be >> something that can be studied. And so on, and so forth. Whatever methods >> and categories that leads us two, such is the stuff of the science of >> psychology, whether it matches any of our preconceptions, or not. >> >> Best, >> Eric >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------- >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Lab Manager >> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning >> American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A >> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >> Washington, DC 20016 >> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >> email: [email protected] >> >> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:13 PM, Russ Abbott <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> I'm flattered. Thank you. I can see myself in the Devil's Advocate role >>> -- except for the last part. I'll grant that you can think whatever you >>> want. >>> >>> *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space >>> metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be >>> yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the >>> more we are of one mind. <==nst]* >>> >>> That won't work for my sense of intimacy. One can be intimate (in my >>> sense) on the telephone and via written words. Sharing (i.e., participating >>> in the same) experiences is not required for intimacy in my sense. What is >>> required (in my sense) is sharing (i.e., talking about one's subjective >>> experiences of one's) experiences. >>> >>> *[NST==>You will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you >>> entertain the notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using >>> the same sort of equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, >>> feelings, and thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the >>> amount of time we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time >>> than you do around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I >>> am up to, thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater >>> familiarity with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. >>> <==nst]* >>> >>> What does it mean to infer something if one has no subjective >>> experience? I think of inferring something as having to do with thinking >>> about it. More generally what does it mean to think about something in your >>> framework? I'll agree that thinking involves stuff happening in the brain. >>> So it's behavior in that sense. But it's not behavior in the sense you seem >>> to be talking about. So what does it mean in your sense to think about >>> something? >>> >>> I realize I'm on shaky ground here because computers "think" about >>> things without having what I would call subjective experience. >>> >>> *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head >>> (or a steel cabinet, etc.), then I can only say that if a robot does mind >>> things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. >>> <==nst]* >>> >>> I don't insist that a mind is anything. I don't know how to talk about >>> subjective experience scientifically. I see no reason to deny it, but I >>> agree we have made little scientific progress in talking about it. >>> >>> By the way, Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are >>> to do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. >>> thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and >>> quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is >>> fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way >>> so that it's easier to do science. >>> >>> *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark >>> of the Vital >>> <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> >>> . >>> Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary >>> condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf >>> Peirce). <==nst]* >>> >>> I looked at (but didn't read in any detail) the Intentionality paper. >>> The upshot seems to be that non-humans have intentionality. I don't argue >>> with that. My question for you is still how you reconcile intentionality >>> with not having subjective experience. What is intentionality without >>> subjectivity? (Again, I'm moving onto shaky ground since we have >>> "goal-directed" software even though the software and the computer that >>> runs it has no subjective experience.) >>> >>> I guess in both cases in which computers seem to "think" or "plan" we >>> are using those terms as analogs to what we see ourselves doing and not >>> really to attribute those processes to computers or software. >>> >>> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 3:23 PM Nick Thompson < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> See Larding below: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Nicholas S. Thompson >>>> >>>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >>>> >>>> Clark University >>>> >>>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *From:* Friam [mailto:[email protected]] *On Behalf Of *Russ >>>> Abbott >>>> *Sent:* Monday, February 22, 2016 3:08 PM >>>> >>>> >>>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >>>> [email protected]> >>>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Sorry that I'm not responding to Glen, Jochen, or John, but I've got to >>>> defend Nick's devil's advocate. Nick, you do keep changing the subject. >>>> In response to your two suggested definitions of intimacy I asked the >>>> following. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -------------- >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Version 1: Intimacy is just being so close that you see the same world >>>> from where you stand. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't know how to understand that. Do you mean close wrt Euclidean >>>> distance? How does that relate to, for example, pain? No matter how close >>>> you are to someone, you can't see, for example, their toothache. >>>> >>>> *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space >>>> metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be >>>> yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the >>>> more we are of one mind. <==nst] * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Version 2: When the self you see projected in another ‘s behavior >>>> toward you is the same as the self you see projected in your own behavior. >>>> *[NST==>You >>>> will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you entertain the >>>> notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using the same sort of >>>> equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, feelings, and >>>> thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the amount of time >>>> we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time than you do >>>> around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I am up to, >>>> thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater familiarity >>>> with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. <==nst] * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *If I remember what happened when we last did this Russ, you made me >>>> clearer and a clearer (and Eric, who wrote the Devil’s Advocate questions, >>>> in some ways modeled himself after you), but in the end, you just concluded >>>> that I was nuts, and we let it go at that. * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't know how to understand that either. What do you mean by "self?" >>>> What does it mean to project it toward someone? What does it mean to say >>>> that it's the same self as the one you project? Over what period of time >>>> must they be the same? If we're talking about behavior would it matter if >>>> the projecting entity were a robot? (Perhaps you answered those questions >>>> in the papers I haven't read. Sorry if that's the case.) >>>> >>>> *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head >>>> (or a steel cabinet, etc.), than I can only say that if a robot does mind >>>> things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. >>>> <==nst] * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -------------- >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> You responded with a long (and clear and definitive) extract from your >>>> paper. But I don't see how it answers my questions. Wrt the first question, >>>> if we're talking about behavior, distance doesn't see relevant. Wrt the >>>> second question, the extract doesn't (seem to) talk about what you mean by >>>> a self or what it means for the projected behaviors of two of them to be >>>> "the same" -- or even what projected behavior means. Is it the case that >>>> you also don't "believe in" intentionality? After all how can there be >>>> intentionality without a subjective intent? And if that's the case, what >>>> does "projected" mean? Is it the same as oriented in 3D space? >>>> >>>> *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark >>>> of the Vital >>>> <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> >>>> . Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary >>>> condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf >>>> Peirce). <==nst] * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 1:38 PM glen <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> I may as well chime in, too, since none of what's been said so far is >>>> meaningful to me. My concept of intimacy runs along M-W's 2nd entry: >>>> >>>> 2 : to communicate delicately and indirectly >>>> >>>> This is almost nothing to do with subjectivity and almost nothing to do >>>> with non-private knowledge (things others know). It has to do with >>>> "delicate" attention to detail and, perhaps, manipulation. A robot could >>>> easily be intimate with a human, and demonstrate such intimacy by catering >>>> to many of the tiny things the human prefers/enjoys, even if each and every >>>> tiny preference is publicly known. Similarly, 2 robots could be intimate >>>> by way of a _special_ inter-robot interface. But the specialness of the >>>> interface isn't its privacy or uniqueness. It's in its handling of >>>> whatever specific details are appropriate to those robots. >>>> >>>> Even if inter-subjectivity is merely the intertwining of experiences, >>>> it's still largely unrelated to intimacy. Two complete strangers can >>>> become intimate almost instantaneously, because/if their interfaces are >>>> pre-adapted for a specific coupling. There it wouldn't be >>>> inter-subjectivity, but a kind of similarity of type. And that might be >>>> mostly or entirely genetic rather than ontogenic. >>>> >>>> And I have to again be some sort of Morlockian champion for the >>>> irrelevance of thought. 2 strangers can be intimate and hold _radically_ >>>> different understandings of the world(s) presented to them ... at least if >>>> we believe the tales told to us in countless novels. 8^) >>>> >>>> >>>> On 02/22/2016 12:40 AM, Jochen Fromm wrote: >>>> > Nice to see FRIAM is still alive! >>>> > I like this definition as well: "Intimacy is just being so close that >>>> you see the same world from where you stand". In a family for example we >>>> are being so close that we roughly see and experience the same world. >>>> > >>>> > I still believe that the solution to the hard problem lies in >>>> Hollywood: cinemas are built like theaters. If we see a film about a >>>> person, it is like sitting in his or her cartesian theater. We see what the >>>> person sees. In a sense, we feel what the feels as well, especially the >>>> pain of loosing someone. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> ⇔ glen >>>> >>>> ============================================================ >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>> >>>> ============================================================ >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > >
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