Sorry, No. Most of it was not satisfying. You originally said that the science of mind was doing reasonably well. When I asked what you meant you talked about how shallow psychology is.
I said I expected there to be technology that lets me experience what you are experiencing. You replied that if I believed something (which I didn't claim) then I wouldn't need such technology. That wasn't the point. I guess we agreed that good work is being done on computer vision. I said that we will increasingly be able to link brain activity to subjective experience. I didn't say anything about a Cartesian theater. You raised the notion of a Cartesian theater to knock it down and then talked about grass. The "hard" problem you must know refers to Chalmers. On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 12:51 PM Eric Charles < [email protected]> wrote: > Russ, > I mulled over replying a few times, but wasn't sure what to say. However, > by restating your genuine interest in my response, I now feel like a jack > ass for not responding earilier, so here it goes. Some of these answers > might not be at all satisfying, but I will do my best so long as you accept > the caveat that I am uncertain if some of it will really answer your > questions. > > > "When you say "the science of the mind seems to be doing reasonably well" > what are you referring to?" > > In the original context, I am referring to what people saw when looking > around in the late 1800s. In fact, I think there is very good working being > done in psychology today, but what I consider "good work" is a very small, > and marginalized, corner of the modern field. Most stuff that passes as > "important" psychology research today is either barking up the wrong tree > entirely, or is so mundane as to be uninteresting. Mainstream psychology is > driven much more by the ability to make clever press releases than by a > critical view to advancing the field. > > Compare the recent big-press items in physics to the recent big-press > items in psychology, and it makes you want to weep for our field. The > biggest news item in Psychology right now is a multi-year study showing > that people "feel less in control" of their actions when following the > orders by another person, in comparison to a group that chose the same > actions without being ordered to do them. Seriously. (Yes, seriously.) > > "I wouldn't be surprised if we develop technology that lets me experience > what you are experiencing via neural sensor and communication systems." > > I think we do not have a sensible way to talk about the brain's role in > psychological processes at this time (I've published a few papers about > this), and that when such a language is worked out it will violate most our > folk-psychology intuitions. If you believe that empathy a thing people > sometimes do, then, I submit, you yourself do not believe we need the > posited device to experience what another is experiencing. > > "We have taken impressive steps in computer vision in recent years. I > expect that work to help us develop a more formal structure for our own > visual experiences." > > Well... sure... but that is not qualitatively different than the advances > made in vision research over the past hundred years. We know a lot about > how vision works. Generally speaking, computer vision does not work like > human vision, because, as with all evolved processes, humans are not the > most computationally efficient things in the world. But, there *are *people > working to build inefficient and non-elegant computer vision systems for > the purposes of testing hypotheses regarding human vision. Good stuff. > > "I don't expect a breakthrough that will suddenly crack "the hard problem > of consciousness. More likely we will be able to say more and more > accurately what sort of subjective experience someone is having by looking > at what their brain is doing." > > This is probably the difficult part of your comment to respond to. I > simply don't believe there is a "hard problem." To the extent that I even > understand what you are talking about there, I think the brain is one part > of a much larger system that we would need to examine. That is not to say > that examining the brain adds nothing, but to say that an exclusive focus > on the brain misrepresents the phenomena of interest. > > To elaborate a bit: Traditional philosophy has addressed been largely > oriented towards "internalizing" psychological processes. The Cartesian > claim (an extension of the Platonic claim) was that we only experience the > world that plays out in the theater of our ghost-souls. "Why do I > experience the grass as green?" you ask. "Because the greenness is present > in the theater of your soul," is the answer. This, of course, doesn't solve > anything. Saying that we only experience the world that plays out in the > theater of brains has *almost *all of the same problems, and should be > rejected. At the least, it adds nothing. > > The approach that I would advocate for could be described as > "externalizing" psychological processes. "Why do I experience the grass as > green?" you ask. "Because there is some identifiable property of the grass > that you are responding to, and that property, out there, is what you mean > by the word 'green'," would be my answer. That property could be quite > complex to specify (it is certainly MUCH more complicated than a narrow > range of wave lengths), but whatever that property is, that is thing you > are asking about when you ask about "green". If you want to know if someone > is experiencing the same thing you are when they talk about "green" then we > see if the parameters for their response match the parameters for your > response. That is, we act if they are experiencing, quite literally, the > same *things*. It is challenging problem, but it is a straightforward and > tractable scientific problem, and it renders the philosophers so-called > "hard problem" moot. > > Was any of that satisfying? > > Best, > Eric > > > > > > > > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Lab Manager > Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning > American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A > 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. > Washington, DC 20016 > phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 > email: [email protected] > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 1:29 AM, Nick Thompson <[email protected] > > wrote: > >> Russ, >> >> >> >> Partly exhaustion, I think. >> >> >> >> Once we all agree that there is no *in-principle reason* that I cannot >> ultimately tap your subjective mind, then we all know what we are and we >> are just dickering about the price. >> >> >> >> Nick >> >> >> >> Nicholas S. Thompson >> >> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >> >> Clark University >> >> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >> >> >> >> *From:* Friam [mailto:[email protected]] *On Behalf Of *Russ >> Abbott >> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 24, 2016 10:15 PM >> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >> [email protected]> >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) >> >> >> >> Nick, Eric, >> >> >> >> I'm disappointed that neither of you responded to my reply (below) to >> Eric's message. Perhaps it got lost in the weeks. >> >> >> >> -- Russ >> >> >> >> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 9:56 PM Russ Abbott <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> Eric, When you say "the science of the mind seems to be doing reasonably >> well" what are you referring to? I thought your position was that mind was >> not a useful concept. I suppose that what you mean by mind is something >> that can be investigated by looking at behavior. But what is that sort of >> mind? Wouldn't it be better to call it something else so that people like >> me don't get confused? So to get back to my original question and to help >> me understand what you are saying, what are the recent advances in the >> science of mind I should be thinking of in this regard? >> >> >> >> Also, I'm not convinced that subjective experience is forever beyond the >> reach of scientific investigation. I wouldn't be surprised if we develop >> technology that lets me experience what you are experiencing via neural >> sensor and communication systems. And if I can experience what you are >> experiencing we will presumably be able to record it and parse it. >> >> >> >> We have taken impressive steps in computer vision in recent years. I >> expect that work to help us develop a more formal structure for our own >> visual experiences. This is not to say that the formal structure will be a >> subjective experience for the computer. But it is to say that it will give >> us some leverage for investigating subjective experience. Similarly open >> brain surgery has helped us understand how the brain is connected to >> subjective experience. >> >> >> >> Just as we now know a lot about how natural language works even though no >> science can speak or fully understand natural language, I expect that we >> will develop similar theories about how subjective experience works. >> >> >> >> I don't expect a breakthrough that will suddenly crack "the hard problem >> of consciousness." More likely we will be able to say more and more >> accurately what sort of subjective experience someone is having by looking >> at what their brain is doing. We now have ways to allow people to act in >> the world by thinking about what they want. These are fairly superficial >> mappings of brain signals to physical actuators. But it's pretty impressive >> nonetheless. More advances along these and related lines will make >> subjective experience less of a mystery and more just another feature of >> the world. >> >> >> >> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:09 PM Eric Charles < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >> Russ said: "*Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are >> to do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. >> thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and >> quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is >> fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way >> so that it's easier to do science.*" >> >> Exactly! Let me try another tact. >> >> 1) We could imagine (with various levels of clarity) any number of worlds >> in which things worked differently from each other. >> >> 2) "Doing science" is largely a process of trying to figure out which of >> those worlds we live in, by searching for the best way to divide up >> empirical evidence, so that it is reliable and can be agreed up. (Peirce >> was particularly fascinated with the advances made in 18th century >> chemistry.) Scientists search for more and more stable ways to view the >> world, i.e., ways which stand up to more and more empirical scrutiny. >> (Early attempts at the periodic table, though imperfect, serve as an >> excellent example of this, leading to countless confirmatory experiments, >> including the correct prediction of the properties of yet-to-be-isolated >> elements.) >> >> 3) In order to do science about something, we need only one thing to be >> true: It can be investigated empirically. That is, it is something, "out >> there" which we can turn our machinations towards, and which will yield >> stable results once we find the appropriate methods for its investigation. >> >> >> >> 4) Many important big-name people have declared that a science of >> psychology is impossible, because the stuff under discussion in that >> context simply cannot be investigated empirically. Kant, is a prime >> example. Those big-names declared that another person's mind was not the >> type of thing that you could examine empirically, because the province >> of the soul did not yield itself to earthly poking and prodding. If those >> big-names are correct, and minds cannot be investigated, *by their very >> nature*, we would expect efforts in that direction to fail-to-produce >> the convergence-of-ideas characteristic of successful science. >> >> 5) We can imagine a world in which those big-names are correct. We can >> imagine a world in which many types of things can be investigated >> empirically, but *not* minds, and in which all attempts to produce a >> science of the mind would fail pathetically. >> >> 6) The above view has had a virtual strangle hold on Western thinking for >> centuries. However, in the late 1800's a few serious scholars started >> thinking that "science of psychology" might be given a go, to see how it >> went. They were widely dismissed, not allowed to hold their heads high in >> either scientific circles or philosophical ones. >> >> 7) And that's where we find ourselves. *If* a science of psychology is >> possible, then *de facto* the subject matter of psychology is some swath >> of empirically investigatable happenings, about which a community of >> investigators would eventually reach a consensus as the scientific process >> takes its course. We might not live in such a world, but we won't know >> without trying it. A science of ether winds never worked out. The attempted >> science of medieval humours was a bust. A science of studying >> bumps-on-people's-heads has been roundly rejected. All sorts of attempted >> sciences have not worked out over the years. But the science of the mind >> seems to be doing reasonably well. Either that progress is an illusion, and >> empirical-psychologists will soon go the way of the phrenologists, or that >> progress is evidence that the big-names who thought of "mind" as inherently >> uninvestigatable were wrong on a very fundamental level. >> >> If you are to study a romantic partner's mind in order to become intimate >> with her, then her mind must be something that can be studied. If I am to >> study your feeling of intimacy, then your feeling-of-intimacy must be >> something that can be studied. And so on, and so forth. Whatever methods >> and categories that leads us two, such is the stuff of the science of >> psychology, whether it matches any of our preconceptions, or not. >> >> Best, >> >> Eric >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------- >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Lab Manager >> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning >> American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A >> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >> Washington, DC 20016 >> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >> email: [email protected] >> >> >> >> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:13 PM, Russ Abbott <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> I'm flattered. Thank you. I can see myself in the Devil's Advocate role >> -- except for the last part. I'll grant that you can think whatever you >> want. >> >> >> >> *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space >> metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be >> yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the >> more we are of one mind. <==nst]* >> >> >> >> That won't work for my sense of intimacy. One can be intimate (in my >> sense) on the telephone and via written words. Sharing (i.e., participating >> in the same) experiences is not required for intimacy in my sense. What is >> required (in my sense) is sharing (i.e., talking about one's subjective >> experiences of one's) experiences. >> >> >> >> *[NST==>You will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you >> entertain the notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using >> the same sort of equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, >> feelings, and thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the >> amount of time we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time >> than you do around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I >> am up to, thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater >> familiarity with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. >> <==nst]* >> >> >> >> What does it mean to infer something if one has no subjective experience? >> I think of inferring something as having to do with thinking about it. More >> generally what does it mean to think about something in your framework? >> I'll agree that thinking involves stuff happening in the brain. So it's >> behavior in that sense. But it's not behavior in the sense you seem to be >> talking about. So what does it mean in your sense to think about something? >> >> >> >> I realize I'm on shaky ground here because computers "think" about things >> without having what I would call subjective experience. >> >> >> >> *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head >> (or a steel cabinet, etc.), then I can only say that if a robot does mind >> things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. >> <==nst]* >> >> >> >> I don't insist that a mind is anything. I don't know how to talk about >> subjective experience scientifically. I see no reason to deny it, but I >> agree we have made little scientific progress in talking about it. >> >> >> >> By the way, Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are >> to do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. >> thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and >> quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is >> fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way >> so that it's easier to do science. >> >> >> >> *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark of >> the Vital >> <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> >> . >> Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary >> condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf >> Peirce). <==nst]* >> >> >> >> I looked at (but didn't read in any detail) the Intentionality paper. The >> upshot seems to be that non-humans have intentionality. I don't argue with >> that. My question for you is still how you reconcile intentionality with >> not having subjective experience. What is intentionality without >> subjectivity? (Again, I'm moving onto shaky ground since we have >> "goal-directed" software even though the software and the computer that >> runs it has no subjective experience.) >> >> >> >> I guess in both cases in which computers seem to "think" or "plan" we are >> using those terms as analogs to what we see ourselves doing and not really >> to attribute those processes to computers or software. >> >> >> >> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 3:23 PM Nick Thompson <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> See Larding below: >> >> >> >> Nicholas S. Thompson >> >> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >> >> Clark University >> >> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >> >> >> >> *From:* Friam [mailto:[email protected]] *On Behalf Of *Russ >> Abbott >> *Sent:* Monday, February 22, 2016 3:08 PM >> >> >> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >> [email protected]> >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy >> >> >> >> Sorry that I'm not responding to Glen, Jochen, or John, but I've got to >> defend Nick's devil's advocate. Nick, you do keep changing the subject. >> In response to your two suggested definitions of intimacy I asked the >> following. >> >> >> >> -------------- >> >> >> >> Version 1: Intimacy is just being so close that you see the same world >> from where you stand. >> >> >> >> I don't know how to understand that. Do you mean close wrt Euclidean >> distance? How does that relate to, for example, pain? No matter how close >> you are to someone, you can't see, for example, their toothache. >> >> *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space >> metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be >> yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the >> more we are of one mind. <==nst] * >> >> >> >> Version 2: When the self you see projected in another ‘s behavior toward >> you is the same as the self you see projected in your own behavior. >> *[NST==>You >> will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you entertain the >> notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using the same sort of >> equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, feelings, and >> thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the amount of time >> we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time than you do >> around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I am up to, >> thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater familiarity >> with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. <==nst] * >> >> >> >> *If I remember what happened when we last did this Russ, you made me >> clearer and a clearer (and Eric, who wrote the Devil’s Advocate questions, >> in some ways modeled himself after you), but in the end, you just concluded >> that I was nuts, and we let it go at that. * >> >> >> >> I don't know how to understand that either. What do you mean by "self?" >> What does it mean to project it toward someone? What does it mean to say >> that it's the same self as the one you project? Over what period of time >> must they be the same? If we're talking about behavior would it matter if >> the projecting entity were a robot? (Perhaps you answered those questions >> in the papers I haven't read. Sorry if that's the case.) >> >> *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head >> (or a steel cabinet, etc.), than I can only say that if a robot does mind >> things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. >> <==nst] * >> >> >> >> -------------- >> >> >> >> You responded with a long (and clear and definitive) extract from your >> paper. But I don't see how it answers my questions. Wrt the first question, >> if we're talking about behavior, distance doesn't see relevant. Wrt the >> second question, the extract doesn't (seem to) talk about what you mean by >> a self or what it means for the projected behaviors of two of them to be >> "the same" -- or even what projected behavior means. Is it the case that >> you also don't "believe in" intentionality? After all how can there be >> intentionality without a subjective intent? And if that's the case, what >> does "projected" mean? Is it the same as oriented in 3D space? >> >> *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark of >> the Vital >> <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> >> . Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary >> condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf >> Peirce). <==nst] * >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 1:38 PM glen <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> I may as well chime in, too, since none of what's been said so far is >> meaningful to me. My concept of intimacy runs along M-W's 2nd entry: >> >> 2 : to communicate delicately and indirectly >> >> This is almost nothing to do with subjectivity and almost nothing to do >> with non-private knowledge (things others know). It has to do with >> "delicate" attention to detail and, perhaps, manipulation. A robot could >> easily be intimate with a human, and demonstrate such intimacy by catering >> to many of the tiny things the human prefers/enjoys, even if each and every >> tiny preference is publicly known. Similarly, 2 robots could be intimate >> by way of a _special_ inter-robot interface. But the specialness of the >> interface isn't its privacy or uniqueness. It's in its handling of >> whatever specific details are appropriate to those robots. >> >> Even if inter-subjectivity is merely the intertwining of experiences, >> it's still largely unrelated to intimacy. Two complete strangers can >> become intimate almost instantaneously, because/if their interfaces are >> pre-adapted for a specific coupling. There it wouldn't be >> inter-subjectivity, but a kind of similarity of type. And that might be >> mostly or entirely genetic rather than ontogenic. >> >> And I have to again be some sort of Morlockian champion for the >> irrelevance of thought. 2 strangers can be intimate and hold _radically_ >> different understandings of the world(s) presented to them ... at least if >> we believe the tales told to us in countless novels. 8^) >> >> >> On 02/22/2016 12:40 AM, Jochen Fromm wrote: >> > Nice to see FRIAM is still alive! >> > I like this definition as well: "Intimacy is just being so close that >> you see the same world from where you stand". In a family for example we >> are being so close that we roughly see and experience the same world. >> > >> > I still believe that the solution to the hard problem lies in >> Hollywood: cinemas are built like theaters. If we see a film about a >> person, it is like sitting in his or her cartesian theater. We see what the >> person sees. In a sense, we feel what the feels as well, especially the >> pain of loosing someone. >> >> -- >> ⇔ glen >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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