Which means, I think, that on his account, that no knowledge can be arrived at empirically.
n Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] <https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly Sent: Tuesday, March 3, 2020 8:27 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Acid epistemology - restarting a previous conversation >From the web: Aristotle agrees with Plato that knowledge is of what is true and that this truth must be justified in a way which shows that it must be true, it is necessarily true. --- Frank C. Wimberly 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Tue, Mar 3, 2020, 8:23 PM Frank Wimberly <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: When I was a sophomore at Berkeley majoring in philosophy I was taking history of philosophy. My TA was a PhD student who had graduated from Harvard. He asked the section, "What does it mean to say that you know something?" I raised my hand and said that it means that you believe it and it's true. He said, "Ah, an Aristotelian!" --- Frank C. Wimberly 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Tue, Mar 3, 2020, 9:28 AM <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Two things, Dave, Peirce had actually 4 ways of knowing. Stubbornness, Authority, Reasonableness, Experience, which he tries to treat with equal respect, but his heart is obviously with the last. (The Fixation of Belief). You make me wonder about the relation tween Peirce and that Vedic text. But this begs the most fundamental question raised by your post. What is knowledge, other than belief, and what is belief other than that upon which we are prepared to act? There is one member of our group who, very much in the spirit of William James's altered states, wants to work on aura's He has a tentative belief in aura's. When through experiment and analysis he renders that belief "firm", does he then have knowledge. Already he believes in the possibility of aura's. We know that this is the case because of the effort he is willing to expend in their demonstration. Does he have knowledge of the existence of auras? Does he already know that aura's exist? I think problems with the very idea of knowledge lie at the core of this discussion, and we need some sort of working understanding of what we mean by it, if we are to precede. Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > On Behalf Of Prof David West Sent: Tuesday, March 3, 2020 1:48 AM To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> Subject: [FRIAM] Acid epistemology - restarting a previous conversation Epistemology, loosely speaking, is the “theory of knowing.” What can we know; how do we know we know it; the difference between knowing that, knowing how, and knowing about; and, issues of the “truth” of what we know and/or justifications for thinking we know anything? An associated issue concerns how we come to acquire knowledge. Two means of acquisition are commonly proposed: a priori (independent of experience) and a posteriori (by experience). A Vedic text, Tattirtiya Aranyaka (900-600 BCE), lists four sources of knowledge, roughly translated as: tradition/scripture, perception, authority, and reasoning/inference. Of these the fourth and second seem to map onto a priori and a posteriori. Scholasticism — exemplars include Albertus Magnus, Duns Scotus, and Thomas Aquinas — was concerned with integrating three of the Vedic sources of knowledge: tradition/scripture (Christian theology), authority (Aristotle and Plato), and reasoning/inference. Modern epistemology (and Peirce) seems to be concerned with two of the sources: tradition/scripture (peer reviewed science journals) and reasoning/inference. Claims to "know" something, in a naive sense of know, like "I know that I am," "I know that I am in love," "I had the most interesting experience at FriAM just now," mystical visions, kinesthetic “muscle memory,” chi imbalance, and, of course, hallucinogen induced altered states of consciousness. Is it possible to construct a theory of knowledge that could extend to, incorporate, a wider range of experience and especially mystical and psychedelic experience? If it was possible, would it be of value? If possible and of value, what parameters could be set to limn the resulting philosophy? davew ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/FRIAM-COMIC> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/FRIAM-COMIC> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
