We have to be careful not to Jump the Shark. The book doesn't make the argument you caricature, here. There's absolutely nothing wrong with objectives and measurement, in general. What the book targets are *rigid* objectives and tight *controls*. If you've been paying attention to FriAM's recent threads, you'll see conversations about side-effects ([cough] "epiphenomena") as compared to purposeful objectives. You'll see long windy threads about the existence (and definition of) free will, where the very concept of intention/objectives/agency falls apart completely.
Nobody on this list has forgotten Stanley's point. The question is one of degree, not kind. How draconian *should* an error-correction controller be? How does one set [multi-]objectives so as to balance exploration and exploitation of the artifacts produced along the way? So, no. You're simply wrong on that point. Setting ambitious objectives and *monitoring* progression closely does not assure failure. It's *rigid* objectives and tight *control* that assures failure (or, more accurately, fragility -- "failure" is the wrong word for what's meant here). On 5/26/21 7:32 PM, Prof David West wrote: > The book argues that /"setting high level ideals" /(objectives) and /"doing > enough measurement and modeling to monitor how well we are doing" /pretty > much assures failure. > -- ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
