Glen, it looks like there were two copies of the same pain link there. The one on ethical intuitionism seems to have been missing. Do you still have it handy?
Eric > On Dec 9, 2022, at 4:11 PM, glen <[email protected]> wrote: > > Well, sure. You can always split hairs. But, generally, they're not such > divergent uses of the word. The difference between a testable scientific > thesis and an as yet unproven math sentence isn't that large. Science, in > general, is more tolerant to inconsistency than math languages. But as EricS > broached, things like intuitionism, hott's univalence, proof assistants, etc. > seem to me similar to some well-honed domains of science. > > I do see a stark difference when we get up to the higher order languages like > psychology, though. In particular, I'm trying to make sense of the psycho > part of the biopsychosocial [cough] model (BPS): > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fcoepes.nih.gov%2fmodule%2fmr-lane-acute-farm-injury-chronic-pain%2fbiopsychosocial-model-health&c=E,1,rdU9xOlBczOzL-oUXcUH7nFJTLCyAERIIxyENQJOC5cTrdQkJuCJyA8yZtH10cNdmUPU-Xgn1Tn0Pcc1DTlMGTHG1Nu4erAxILXmQZpVlQ,,&typo=1 > > It reminds me of "ethical intuitionism": > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fcoepes.nih.gov%2fmodule%2fmr-lane-acute-farm-injury-chronic-pain%2fbiopsychosocial-model-health&c=E,1,OlgPHfTROYLaKSGwpwtboiBkbroLvIXHUDR_iadGfT5k2QlRuyMBiSGCI64AUiwopal3SvdixbcA2y0Tqe8kV031dIy3BfGJUgCmBY-0knThW7U,&typo=1 > or things like "natural law": > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/ Or perhaps Nick's > definition of "logic". All these uses of "theory" seem closer to some sort of > anthropocentric sense of *mind* or mental activity. And that's pretty far > away from math's usage. But it still feels like a spectrum, not so much a > difference in kind. The main parameter(s) is(are) whatever methodology for > error correction, validation. *How* one claims to predict with and validate > the BPS is as diverse as the people who use the term. At best, the methods > are difficult to export from your mind/lab. At worst, it's not a coherent > theory at all. > > > On 12/9/22 11:11, Frank Wimberly wrote: >> The use of the word "theory" in mathematics is different than in other >> realms. For example group theory and measure theory are, to mathematicians, >> self contained systems of axioms and theorems. >> --- >> Frank C. Wimberly >> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, >> Santa Fe, NM 87505 >> 505 670-9918 >> Santa Fe, NM >> On Fri, Dec 9, 2022, 11:50 AM glen <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Following a common thread between EricS' and SteveS' responses, I'm >> compelled to say that "model" is a useless term and we should find any and >> every reason to *stop* using it. I've found "analog" to be a more useful >> term. To EricS' point, an analog is something outside our selves. And to >> SteveS' point, it refines one's intention down to a more manageable subset >> of whatever some other might be trying to say. (And it further addresses the >> maps we call analogies and [ptouie] metaphors.) It's not objective, of >> course. But it's better than the nonsensical mess whatever yahoo might mean >> when they use the useless word "model". >> As for "theory", my own arbitrary interactions with that word imply that >> a theory is nothing but a collection of hypo-theses. The extent to which the >> theses are more than hypo then tells us the extent to which the "theory" is >> operationally reliable (thanks for that phrase, Eric). The composition of >> theses into a theory isn't trivial. Again, in my limited and arbitrary >> experience, people vary a great deal in the extent to which they consider >> the ways one thesis can be combined with another. If composition of theses >> into theory is *not* explicitly considered, the result is garbage, even if >> you're composing hyper-theses. c.f. my prior screeds on the unjustified >> dominance of *consistency* as fundamental to theoretical coherence, almost >> totally ignoring completeness. >> <story> At a recent conference, a friend presented knowledge graphs (KGs) >> as a way to organize "facts" (actually just cryptically justified >> sentences). We'd intended for me to give my arching presentation couching >> KGs in the larger space of computation, data lakes, warehousing, etc. But my >> friend had to talk first because we were late and he had a hard time wall. >> At the end of his talk (without the context I intended to paint), an >> audience member asked a "question": 'How is this any different than what we >> used to do in the '60s, writing ideas on index cards and laying them out on >> the floor? That's a KG!' My friend gave a polite and professional answer ... >> way more polite than how I would have answered. >8^D You've been warned. Do >> not invite me to your cocktail party. >> Then I gave my talk, wherein I explained how multigraphs might resolve >> the apparent contradiction between data (lakes) and knowledge (lakes). >> Nobody asked me any questions. [crickets] But the moderator targeted the >> audience member who asked my friend that "question" with: 'Surely you have >> some thoughts.' The audience member replied with 'No. There was a lot of >> clarity there.' WTF does that mean? [sigh] >> </story> >> On 12/8/22 18:44, Prof David West wrote: >> > I missed this morning's vFriam, but had I attended I would have raised >> the following questions for discussions. Perhaps the list will indulge me. >> > >> > The central question: is there a difference between a 'model' of >> something and a 'theory' of something? >> > >> > To me: a model is a representation of a subset of what we know about >> something; a theory is the complete body of knowledge. >> > >> > In my book-in-development I talk about how to create a shared theory >> by having people come together and tell stories about their domain. The >> telling of stories creates a shared theory of the domain (or some subset of >> it that is of immediate concern) that continues to exist—in the >> participant's heads. While the story telling proceeds two graphics are >> generated: one with the stories themselves (as 'index cards') and relations >> among stories, e.g., story a extends story b, story c provides an >> alternative case for a, x is a revision of a, etc.; and two, a Gestalt Map >> that shows objects as bubbles and connecting lines as relations among those >> objects. >> > >> > Those on the other side of the debate contend that these are models, >> just like the models they typically use in software development.. >> > >> > I say they are not, they are merely a form of 'external memory' a >> collection of evocative triggers whose sole purpose is to prompt a 'recall >> to mind' of the actual stories that were told involving those objects or >> those relations. The Gestalt Map, in my mind, represents nothing and could >> not—as is assumed about all other models—convey information to anyone who >> had not participated in the story telling session. >> > >> > Specific questions: >> > 1- Is the Wheel of Life mandala, (attached) a model of Tibetan >> Buddhist Cosmology? Or, does it merely serve the purpose of recalling to >> mind the stories that a Tibetan would have heard about the world and how it >> works. >> > 2- Is a card catalog (forgive me, I am old) a model of a library, or >> even of its collection? >> > 3- Are the Dewey Decimal or the Library of Congress numbering systems, >> models of human knowledge? >> > 4- Is it correct to say that Quantum Physics has a superlative model, >> but no theory? (The dictum to, "to shut up and compute" seems to support an >> affirmative answer to this question. >> > 5- is a metaphor a model? >> > >> > For a short time, Model Driven Development garnered attention in >> software development: The idea was you could build a complete, accurate, and >> unambiguous model of a domain, then use a series of formal transforms (ala >> mathematics) to generate executable code. No one, outside of academia, >> believes this much anymore, but, in less drastic form, dominates all of >> software development and has nearly from the beginning, e.g., CASE and >> Rationale's 'round-trip-engineering'. >> > >> > I am writing about what might be called Theory-Driven Development and >> it is important that I be able to explain the difference between theory and >> model. >> > >> > Thanks for any thoughts any of you might have. > > -- > ꙮ Mɥǝu ǝlǝdɥɐuʇs ɟᴉƃɥʇ' ʇɥǝ ƃɹɐss snɟɟǝɹs˙ ꙮ > > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,SRTmP1WPFJ2cuFj1yZ8m-yYPGIYAvCEufqt96YqmNEdKxifjbnsoj5HX9fsWsmKv3C-75qfk2rxchoaMgPYa2GqqsTUPvZ9sBUchL-UgxIm1hZxW9gnzSHUS8k-E&typo=1 > to (un)subscribe > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,pP2w0MxL6h3OCM3QeUBLnZysrYHd7z9qOa6NV_4U4ARnPPrvXodpSU43JXiD-evJPt_HOtkbMl_MYjaxojS9XlAmJW6K8BbVZo5HWL2iOd0-ZOI,&typo=1 > FRIAM-COMIC > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,AT51BxyhsmtsOJk1bgVJmiNxGUDqlC6pF1V6MebbzYqF75FTIZJ6pcSZHdxAXD4fbIkDgjXMqqoohRAsLS_r40hRcTxypdC8Z_bYgdA2kK6zXfDb&typo=1 > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,dK0wKXUBpJaPNhuZspXcW7ynucyfSnNLf2F2WLOEVf5gN5LUmt9piI86ZKyGseBNM8v90uvINZIOWw2fB3FwlgyyCBD85xNBpm_laH2IPwU,&typo=1 > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom https://bit.ly/virtualfriam to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
